On Saturday morning, September 10, Russia Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and US Secretary of State John Kerry announced the signing of an agreement that envisions a ceasefire in Syria and joint operations against ISIS and Jabhat an-Nursa (recently rebranded as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) militants. Kerry expressed his belief that the plan may lead to an end of the Syrian civil war, although he noted that its implementation is dependent on both government and rebel forces’ adherence.

The agreement was forged in negotiation that had lasted two weeks and ended in a marathon of talks on Friday, September 9. The ceasefire is to begin on Monday at sundown and government air force is to stop strikes on opposition-controlled territory, which Kerry cited as ‘the main driver of civilian casualties’. Following that, humanitarian corridors to rebel-held and government-blockaded parts of Aleppo are to be opened. In the north of the city, an area near the strategic Castello Road is to be demilitarised, while in the south both government and rebel forces are to allow unhindered movement through Ramouseh district. The agreement also envision the opening of channels for humanitarian aid to other areas besieged by government forces.

The Friday plan replaces a ceasefire that was negotiated in February and broke down, in large part due to government attacks on opposition areas under the pretext of fighting against terrorists. To avoid a repeat of this scenario, the US and Russia plan to open a so-call joint implementation centre if the ceasefire holds. Its aim is to establish which areas are held by opposition groups covered by the agreement and distinguish them from Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, which will be then jointly targeted. Opposition forces are to separate themselves from Jabhat Fatah al-Sham units within a week, a task made difficult by the degree to which various groups are mixed on several fronts. Prospects of a success of the deal are unclear, as its implementation hinges on actions of a multitude of actors. Bashar al-Asad regime and Syrian opposition are dependent on Russian and US aid, respectively, but the capacity of these patrons to put pressure on their clients is limited.

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