



Hungary's Jobbik Party, the Challenge of European Ethno-Nationalism and the Future of the European Project

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Abstract

The Movement for a Better Hungary – Jobbik stands both for ‘better’ and ‘right’ – is currently the third largest political party in Hungary. With 47 seats in the Hungarian Parliament and three seats in the European Parliament, Jobbik stands out as the most radical right wing ethno-nationalist political movement in Europe. Determined to lead Hungary out of the European Union and - based on the mythical idea of *Turanism* – longing to take the country back to its ‘Asian’ roots, Jobbik is also aggressively anti-Semitic and anti-Roma. If not contained, its ethno-nationalist agenda could become a fundamental challenge for European integration on two interconnected levels:

On the civil society level by the extremism of a revisionist, ethno-nationalistic, openly anti-Semitic and aggressively anti-Roma political agenda;

On the official level by a weak response of the Orban Government and its two thirds majority in the Hungarian Parliament as well as by the lack of effective political and legal standards of the European Union for political parties.

As a result of the European economic and financial crisis and what many see as a ‘middle income trap’ in Eastern and Central European countries, the growing strength of anti-European right wing nationalist and populist movements in the run up to the European elections in May 2014, for the first time in the history of European integration, could confront the European Union with a major challenge from below in addition to the vacuum of leadership at the top.

The Challenge

Francis Fukuyama's optimistic interpretation of the fall of the wall and the collapse of the Soviet empire as the 'end of history' and the final victory of democracy and economic liberalism was challenged early on not only by the persistence of authoritarianism in the non-West, particularly in China and Russia. Within the West, including in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, one could observe a rise of authoritarianism predominantly in the form of radical right wing political parties. Hungary's Jobbik Party is a relatively late addition to this development. The Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik stands both for 'Right Wing' as well as for 'Better') represents an extreme form of ethno-nationalism with deep roots in the past. Founded just a decade ago, on October 24, 2003, Jobbik picked up the pieces left behind by MIEP (Party of Hungarian Life and Justice) when it collapsed after the 2002 national elections. The aggressively anti-Semitic slogans of its leader Istvan Csurka as well as his wild conspiracy theories – for example blaming the US for the September 11 terrorist attacks – never succeeded to attract larger audiences. But the opening on the right political spectrum that MIEP left behind gave the more vigorous Jobbik Party under the leadership of Gabor Vona, at the time only in his mid-twenties, a chance to assume leadership of the extreme right in Hungary.¹

Today, Jobbik is the third largest political party in Hungary. In the 2010 Parliamentary elections 855,436 people voted for Jobbik, a 16.67% share of the votes in the first round of elections. The party now holds 47 seats in the Hungarian Parliament. In 2009 Jobbik was able to win 3 seats in the European Parliament where it is part of the *Alliance of European National Movements* (AENM) and today, Jobbik is one of the most dynamic forces within the AENM.² Although there are many cross national similarities between extreme right wing political parties with regard to their ideology and their political aspirations – in particular their strong opposition to immigration – the nationally grounded objectives of these parties also create powerful barriers for cross national alliances and group formation in the European Parliament.³ The level of cross-border and transnational cooperation is still weak but could become stronger in the future. In 2012 a conference in Hungary brought ten right wing nationalist parties together from Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal Spain, Slovenia and Sweden. But so far the Alliance of European National Movements does not have Group status in the European Parliament. These parties might be able to agree on a common platform against deeper European integration as well as against immigration and an Islamic presence in Europe. But even if they would be in a position to achieve Group status in the European Parliament, the capacity to act

on the European level will remain limited, given their hostility to integration as a general political concept and principle.

Radical right wing political parties, however, do not lack efforts of cross border cooperation. Modern right wing thinkers such as Alain de Benoist clearly aim beyond narrow nationalism. He as well as others would, of course, reject the contemporary – in their view - capitalist European Union, but instead support the Pan European identity of the modern nationalist right.⁴ Or take the example of the German NPD leader Udo Voigt, who in a message of congratulation to the Jobbik Party after its electoral success in 2010 invoked a “free Hungary, Germany and Europe”.⁵ What appears to emerge is an international network with a collective identity and an internationally comparable ideology based on modern media and information technologies.⁶ Most recently the French *Front National* and the Dutch *Party for Freedom* joint forces in an effort to strengthen right wing nationalist parties for the 2014 European elections. The objective of their initiative is the creation of a *European Alliance for Freedom*.⁷ Possible alliance partners for the initiative are the *Sweden Democrats*, the Belgian *Vlaams Belang*, the Austrian *Freedom Party*, and the Italian *Lega Nord*. The new initiative to create a Europe wide alliance of nationalist parties tries to put some distance between its anti-European, anti-immigration and

anti-Islam political agenda and more extremist right wing movements such as Jobbik and the German NPD. The British *Independence Party*, on the other hand, hesitates to join the Wilders/Le Pen initiative because the anti-Semitic past of the Front National. Less acceptable even for many European right wing parties is Hungary’s Jobbik movement because of its anti-Semitic and pro-Iranian positions.

In spite of the differences within the anti-European right, the EU has to take the challenge of right wing nationalist parties seriously. Their challenge will not simply go away and should be used as an opportunity to demonstrate the superiority of common European economic and political solutions compared with strictly national strategies which, under the conditions of economic globalization, can only harm the EU as well as its Member States. Mainstreaming nationalism is a better answer than exclusion. The European Parliament gives the radical right a platform and through debate in the European Parliament as well as in the general European public, there is a chance that engagement will lead to political moderation. Exclusion and marginalization would have the opposite effect of encouraging and further deepening extremism.



What must be anticipated short term is that electoral politics in Europe could well lead to a revival of nationalist extremism and ultimately to a reversal of democratic achievements in individual Member States of the EU. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are currently the most serious cases of such a trend. The elections to the European Parliament in 2014 will take place in a climate of economic and social hardship as a result of ‘austerity’ policies initiated in the aftermath of the Euro-zone’s debt crisis since 2008. If the social compact in Europe comes apart, a breakthrough of anti-EU right wing populist parties is possible. The result would be a declining authority of EU institutions and a lack of capacity to act on the European level.

In the case of Romania, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe voiced concern about various measures taken by the Romanian Government and Parliament as “problematic from the viewpoint of constitutionality and the rule of law.” The Commission also criticized the lack of respect for state institutions including the Constitutional Court and saw both democracy and the rule of law at risk.⁸

In Bulgaria recent demonstrations against government corruption show that democratic governance can be undermined by corruption behind closed doors, allowing criminal organizations to hijack a democratically elected government. Without openly violating any trea-

ty obligation, Bulgaria seems to be on a trajectory to an *oligarchic model* of governance.⁹ Developments in Bulgaria led the French and the German Ambassadors in this country to write an open letter complaining about the danger of corruption. They emphasized that membership in the European Union is a *civilizational decision* implying that an oligarchic model of governance has no place in Bulgaria as well as other countries of the European Union.¹⁰ Like in the days of the Weimar Republic – they argued – this can only lead to the formation of “a state within the state”¹¹ with the risk of squelching democratic governance. The beneficiaries of democratic back-sliding would be the right wing nationalist parties in both countries: ATAKA in Bulgaria and the Greater Romania Party in Romania.

AS the third largest political force in Hungary Jobbik is a serious challenge for the European Union on two interconnected levels:

- on the civil society level by the extremism of a revisionist, ethno-nationalistic, openly anti-Semitic and aggressively anti-Roma political movement;
- on the official level by a weak response of the Orban- Government and its two thirds majority in Parliament as well as a lack of effective political and legal standards of the European Union for political parties.

Developments on both levels and their intertwinement carry the great risk of an escalating vicious circle if a policy of containment and ultimately mainstreaming will remain unsuccessful. To succeed, official as well as civil society initiatives both on the Hungarian side as well as on the level of the EU and its Member States will be necessary. Containment alone is not enough. It has to come with a strategy of engaging right wing nationalist movements through enhanced policy discourse, education as well as a new narrative of the European Union. After a successful enlargement process in Eastern Europe, the EU will have to renew its commitment as a solidarity community in order to prevail against the temptation of nationalism.

Legitimacy for a policy of containment and mainstreaming has its source in the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership. The commitment to the fulfillment of these criteria does not end with EU membership. If that were the case, the undoing of the Copenhagen criteria would be possible once membership is achieved. It is true that the EU before enlargement was in a much more powerful position to impose democratic reform through conditionality than after enlargement. Leverage over full EU Member States is much weaker than it is over candidates for membership.¹² EU Treaty obligations put the commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law for Member States at the center

of the European project. A reversal of democratic values and standards would be a clear case of treaty violation. As guardian of the EU institutions and based on Art. 7 of the Treaty on European Union, the EU Commission with support of the EU Council could take Member States to court. Possible sanctions include the suspension of voting rights. But this procedure is extremely difficult to put into practice. It would be – as EU Commission President Barroso put it – a ‘nuclear option’. Legal and political hurdles would make it close to impossible using Article 7 against a Member State. The article has never been used and in all likelihood will continue to exist only on paper. Faced with an Article 7 case of Treaty violation Member States would most likely use the Article 50 option of leaving the European Union rather than going through the painful process of defending themselves in a case of Treaty violation.

If the Commission would open an Article 7 based treaty violation procedure against Hungary, the most likely outcome would be an even stronger support for Jobbik’s anti-European campaign. A more promising course of action would be the strengthening of civil society institutions and the promotion of civil society dialog programs in Hungary. These programs could also be initiated and financed by the European Union or by Member State initiatives such as the work of the various national political foun-



dations and cultural institutions such as the *British Council*, the *Maison Française* or the German *Goethe Institut*.

Nationalism in the EU will not go away, but on the basis of a policy of containment as well as engagement and mainstreaming in combination with policies of economic growth and fiscal stabilization, it should be possible to put a stop to the erosion of the legitimacy of European institutions. The political, economic and social achievements of European integration are indisputable, most importantly the fact that through enlargement, European integration since its beginning lifted more than 300 Million people out of poverty and repression.¹³ Still, a reversal of democratic achievements is possible – as the cases of Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania demonstrate. Without improving the institutional arrangements to ensure compliance with the values, standards and principles of the European Union it will be difficult to prevent democratic backsliding. A top down approach and the use of the current weak EU enforcement mechanisms will not be sufficient and it cannot be the only answer to the challenge. Ultimately the democratic process in these countries and their civil society institutions must meet the challenge that these developments pose for the European project but the EU has to help preserve their European destination with a helping hand.

Democracy Stabilization European Style

European integration since its beginning has always served as an anchor of stability in the transition process from authoritarianism to democracy and free markets. That was true for Germany and Italy as they emerged from their authoritarian past. Europe again was the core and center of stabilization for Greece, Portugal and Spain when they shook off their dictatorial regimes and joined the European family in the Southern enlargement process between 1981 and 1983. In the latest rounds of enlargement in 2004, 2007 - and most recently also in the case of Croatia in 2013-, the European Union again provided a welcome and accepted measure of democratic stabilization on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria.¹⁴

In the last decade, however, electoral politics in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and Spain, demonstrated a revival of nationalism and separatism. In Great Britain Scottish independence reappeared; in Spain, Catalan autonomy is gaining strength; in Italy, the Lega Nord has emphasized regionalism and similar movements mushroomed all over Europe. Not every national movement that enriched the electoral map of Europe in the re-

cent past challenges the European project. Scotland in all likelihood would remain within the European Union even if its independence movement would be successful. Catalonia would also want to stay in Europe even if its drive for independence from Spain would succeed.

The reason why hardly any of the nationalist and separatist movements in Europe rushes to the exit is obvious. The European Union – and that is part of its attraction – serves well as a common roof, even if nationalist or separatist movements are filled with grievances against their own governments. Take the example of Belgium. It's Flemish and Walloon parts might well drift apart even further but the two would still not seek to leave the European Union. A similar phenomenon could be observed in the former Czechoslovakia. When the people of the former Czechoslovakia got the chance to practice self – determination, they opted for two different nation states but both Slovakia and the Czech Republic remained part of the European Union. The European Union could play a similarly useful role in the Western Balkans where ethnic tensions drove Kosovo away from Serbia ending up as an independent state. Both Serbia and Kosovo are now on their way to join the European Union.

This does not mean that the future of the European project is secured. The nationalist temptation will put limits to integration but the European project can still survive provided that legitimate national traditions and aspirations do not degenerate into regressive ethno-nationalist ideologies bent on the destruction of European institutions. If the identity of an ethnic group is elevated to a level where integration turns into an existential threat, the logic of ethno-nationalism becomes inherently totalitarian in the sense that everything else must be ‘foreign’ and ‘alien’ in nature.¹⁵ By definition, any community larger than the group cannot be trusted. The larger community then becomes a threat to its own survival. The agenda of the *Movement for a Better Hungary*-Jobbik- points exactly in that direction. If European integration would have been the result of an imposition, the emergence of countervailing forces would be understandable. But the EU is the result of transformation without power and it achieved its current gestalt exclusively through treaty consensus and the power of economic and political attraction, not by any imperial design.

The Jobbik Agenda

Hungary's Jobbik Party is a case of extreme ethno-nationalism and the determination to lead Hungary out of the European Union is at the core of its political agenda. If Jobbik's extreme positions attract larger audiences in Eastern Europe and possibly also in other parts of Europe – more Member State governments could be pushed into increasingly anti-integration policies. Elections for the European Parliament in 2014 will take place in the wake of the economic and financial crisis that plagued Europe since 2008. Although Euro-zone economic growth prospects are beginning to improve, the pace of recovery appears to be slow. But even with improving economic conditions, nationalism and separatism will remain a major challenge. Mainstreaming these forces will be a long multidimensional struggle. Chances are that in 2014 the European Union will be confronted with a social and political challenge from below in addition to the current difficulties of decision making combating the economic and financial crisis.

Unemployment in Greece now stands at 27% and in other Southern European countries the situation is not much better. The unemployment rate in Spain stands at 26.5%, in Portugal at 17.5%, in Italy at 12.1%. On average the Euro-zone's unemployment rate is 12.1%, an unsus-

tainable high rate. Youth unemployment in particular is a profoundly debilitating problem in Southern Europe where more than one quarter of the younger generation faces unemployment as the first real life experience. On average the EU youth unemployment rate is 23% with individual countries at much higher levels. Youth unemployment in Greece stands at 62.5%, in Spain 56.4%, in Portugal 42.5% and in Italy 40.5%. Over time and if not properly addressed, the current situation might well become a large scale social crisis with the potential to unleash a new wave of nationalism and extremism that became visible with the rise of Jobbik in Hungary and the *People's Association – Golden Dawn* in Greece. Youth unemployment is the most dangerous result of the economic and financial meltdown and the Euro-zone's response to its sovereign debt crisis. Europe might well lose a whole generation if it stumbles into a deflation trap.

Nationalist and radical right parties have emerged everywhere in Europe, East and West, and once nationalist radical right wing parties become a stronger force also on the European level, it will be more difficult to preserve the legitimacy and authority of European institutions. The collapse of communism was undoubtedly a huge victory for democracy that led to a new wave of democratization after – or even still part of – the 'Third Wave of Democratiza-

tion' in Sam Huntington's terminology. In Eastern Europe, however, the democratic revolution also reflected a process that the German sociologist Detlev Clausen interpreted as an "ethno-nationalistic dissolution of the Soviet system."¹⁶ Communist ideology, the creation of one-party states in Central and Eastern Europe and the artificial nationality policy of the Soviet empire contributed to the suppression of all national aspirations of the peoples within the Soviet Union as well as in the countries conquered by the Soviet army. Following this line of thinking one possible interpretation of the dissolution of the Soviet empire is to see it as the "belated conclusion of the Wilsonian project of state and nation making."¹⁷ With the collapse of the Soviet empire these long suppressed national aspirations often found their outlet in radical ethno-nationalist movements and political parties. Ethno-nationalism, for lack of a coherent political program after the collapse of the Soviet empire, became a default option and new programmatic guideline for many non-communist political parties after the fall of the wall.

Although with different ideological aspirations in each individual country, ethno-nationalist characteristics appear to be a common feature of right wing extremism in Central and Eastern Europe. Jobbik stands out as the only right wing extremist party in Europe with an openly anti-Semitic and aggressive anti-Roma

agenda. The party uses the political symbols of an earlier Hungarian fascist movement as its own distinctive mark. In the 1930s and 1940s the *Arrow Cross Party* in Hungary was part of a larger fascist wave in Europe modeled after the Italian and German fascist parties. The AR-PAD Stripes that Jobbik uses as its official emblem go back to the 13th century and also served as the official flag of the *Arrow Cross Party*. A special characteristic of the Jobbik Party is its symbiosis with the Hungarian Guard (*Magyar Garda*), a paramilitary institution not unlike Hitler's SA (*Sturmabteilung*). Jobbik, too, in public appearances of its leaders artificially tries to create a sense of angst and being under siege as a nation and then provides authoritarian solutions with the help of its own paramilitary forces. In Jobbik's case the perceived threat comes from 'Jewish influence' and 'Gypsy terror'.¹⁸ Most recently, after a stabbing incident, Jobbik organized a demonstration against 'Gypsy crime' and set up a special crime unit on its own.¹⁹ The activities of Jobbik with regard to the preservation of 'Magyrisms' are not the objectionable issue. However old fashioned 'Magyarism' might be, today, its cultural preservation must be allowed. It is Jobbik's regression into violence and authoritarianism that needs to be controlled and prevented.

The Social Base of Jobbik

The rapid growth of public support for the Jobbik Party in Hungary since its foundation in 2003 can not only be attributed to economic and social conditions in Hungary. To be sure, Hungary like many other European countries experienced difficulties as a result of the 2008 global economic and financial meltdown and ran up substantial public debts. In 2010 the country was close to bankruptcy. Hungary's transition from a state run economy to market principles was not easy. From 1990 to 1993 Hungary's GDP declined by 18% and grew only slowly in the following years. EU membership in 2004 brought new foreign investments to Hungary but the fiscal situation of the country deteriorated quickly. Budget deficits ballooned to approximately 10% of GDP. Hungary's credit rating was downgraded and the country was forced to accept a rescue package of 25 billion US Dollars negotiated with the EU and the IMF.²⁰ During the financial crisis Hungary entered a period of recession and between 2008 and 2009, the recession led to another 6.4% decline of GDP. In 2011 due to an export led industrial production growth, the economy grew by 1.6%, but re-entered recession in the first two quarters of 2012.²¹ During the second half of 2013 slow growth came back again, but foreign and domestic investment remains a problem. Data of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for 2011 show a se-

vere erosion of the capital stock in the Hungarian private sector. This led to a declining rate of investment as share of GDP. For years Hungary had one of the lowest investment rates in Eastern Europe and in 2011, the investment rate declined again.²² The Orban - Government took a number of initiatives to contain and eventually reduce public debt, but so-called 'crisis taxes' on the telecommunication industry, energy and financial services began to deter foreign investments (FDI) putting a strain on job creation. The idea to levy a surtax on multinational companies was part of Jobbik's 2006 Ten Point Program and a number of issues of the agenda were then implemented by the 2/3 majority of FIDESZ in the Hungarian Parliament after the 2010 elections such as tax reductions, nationalization of the energy sector, the surtax on multinational companies, landownership legislation restricting the sale of land to foreigners as well as the proposal to grant citizenship to Hungarians living abroad.²³ Provocatively Jobbik called the latter proposal an act to grant citizenship to Hungarians living in "annexed territories".

Unemployment in Hungary today stands at 10.4% but youth unemployment (those under 25 years) is much higher, reaching 27.7%.²⁴ In order to improve the employment rate of the country, Hungary would need more foreign investment. But part of Jobbik's political strategy is to drive out foreign companies and foreign investment in Hungary. A smart public diplomacy strategy of the EU should be in a position to point out how damaging Jobbik's xenophobic policies are for Hungary's well-being. The fact is that xenophobia will deter foreign investment. European companies, too, will hesitate to cooperate with Hungary. With an employment rate of just about 50%, Hungary also has one of the lowest employment rates in Central Europe. Although the ability to attract foreign capital is an important factor for Hungary's economic future, Jobbik exacerbates the problem by campaigning against the influence of foreign capital and challenging the presence of foreign banks in Hungary. But Jobbik is not the only problem. A number of actions of the Orban government also caused concern in Europe, in particular efforts to restrict the independence of the National Central Bank. Whenever useful to cement his power, Viktor Orban, in spite of his European commitment, does not hesitate to cast the free market principles of the European Union aside.

It would be misleading to assume that as in the late 1920s and early 1930s in Germany, primarily economic problems, unemployment and increasing poverty pushed people into the arms of right wing extreme parties. As reported by Freedom House, "Jobbik supporters are in fact younger, better educated and more well-off than average voters of the two major parties, FIDESZ and the Socialist Party (MSZP)."²⁵ The percentage of 18-35 years old among Jobbik supporters is higher (40%) than among FIDESZ (32%) or MSZP (19%) supporters. Only the left liberal Green Party LMP has more 18-35 years old among its supporters (43%).²⁶

Looking at the monthly household income situation, it is again interesting that Jobbik supporters are in the highest income group. Only LMP supporters are better off. FIDESZ and MSZP supporters fall into the group of lower income households.²⁷

Vice versa: People who come from extremely modest backgrounds and living in badly equipped households are most likely MSZP supporters (54%). Only 26% of Jobbik supporters come from the same background. The number for FIDESZ is 43%. Among the LMP supporters only 22% come from this background.²⁸



With regard to education, the level of education among Jobbik supporters is higher than in any other political party, except for the LMP. The share of High School graduates among Jobbik voters is the highest among all political parties: 41%. The number for MSZP is 28%, for FIDESZ 26% and for LMP 38%. The share of university graduates in Hungary's political parties is as follows: Jobbik 15%, MSZP 9%, FIDESZ 16% and LMP 25 %.²⁹ Political discontent, path dependency and anti-modernity in addition to the anti-Semitic and anti-Roma agenda expressed in Jobbik's return to the symbols of the *Arrow Cross Party*, seem to reflect more accurately the true character of the party: a return to a fascist-type of authoritarianism. Less discredited than Hitler's National Socialism, these older Hungarian patterns of governance have now become a vehicle for a new radicalized Hungarian ethno-nationalism. The fact that Jobbik is a relatively young party and appears to be successful in the younger generation points in the direction of universities and adult education facilities for programs designed to strengthen Hungary's constitutional commitment to Europe. To some degree this is part of the mission of the Central European University in Budapest, founded in 1991 in the spirit of George Soros' open society concept. The Central European University is now one of the top schools for economics as well as the social sciences and history. What is missing is a true European University such as

the European University Institute in Florence or the *Viadrina* in Frankfurt/Oder designed to develop close academic ties with Poland and Eastern European countries. Budapest would be a perfect place for another European University modeled after *Florence* and *Frankfurt/Oder*. At a minimum the EU should add another Center of Excellence to the Central European University in Budapest in order to offer more Hungarian students a chance to specialize in European Union Studies.

Exploiting the Roma Issue

A crucial factor in Jobbik's electoral strategy is the Roma issue. The way Jobbik exploits the issue for electoral purposes was demonstrated during the events in the city of Gyoengyoespata in the spring of 2011.³⁰ Also known as the 'Burning Spring', the events in Gyoengyoespata were caused by a number of violent clashes between Roma and non-Roma of this small community of approximately 2700 Magyars and 324 (11 percent) Roma. Grievances escalated on both sides when in February of 2011 a resident of the city committed suicide, allegedly because of the 'relocation of Roma into the village'.³¹ The incident was used to legitimize a virtual invasion by the '*For a Better Future Civic Guard Association*', the successor organization of the original 'Hungarian Guard'. The Hungarian Guard was founded in 2007 by the Leader

of the Jobbik Party, Gabor Vona. Outlawed by a court in 2009 it quickly regrouped under a new name and de facto pursued the same law and order activities against the Roma as before. Using the 'Gypsy card' allowed Jobbik to take full ownership of the issue and thereby increasing its standing in the public eye. In the local elections that followed the 'Burning Spring', Jobbik was able to take over the office of Mayor in the city. But Jobbik's militant stand on the Gypsy question was also meant to influence the national political discourse. The FIDESZ government largely remained silent on the events in Gyoengyoespata, thereby letting things take its own course in the direction that Jobbik had planned. The purpose was to prepare the ground for stronger nation-wide public acceptance of anti-Roma law and order actions of the Jobbik Party and its civic guards. Before 2010, during the years in opposition, so-called 'civic guards' were used by FIDESZ to stage public demonstrations against the Socialist government of Ferenc Gyurcsany, in particular after his 2006 speech admitting that the government had lied about the true state of the Hungarian economy. Orban's civic guards were different from Jobbik's Hungarian Guard and its successor organizations. FIDESZ' civic guards were created for the purpose of mobilizing public opinion against the MSZP government of Ferenc Gyurcsany. They were not para-military organizations of the kind that Gabor Vona established in 2007.

The tolerance of the Orban government in view of a deliberate strategy of intimidation and pressure on a minority is hardly acceptable both from a legal as well as a political point of view. Most recently a court in Budapest had to decide the case of a series of attacks against the Roma between 2008 and 2009.³² Three extreme right activists killed the father and his son as well as four other Roma. The incident sent shockwaves through the entire Roma community in Hungary. In this case the Hungarian courts acted forcefully. The perpetrators were sentenced to life imprisonment. The court decision is an important step forward to demonstrate the necessary determination in the fight against hate crime. But Roma intimidation through unformed demonstrations and lower level violence is still a problem and too little is done in order to prevent intimidation. As a result of the show of force by Jobbik members and its affiliates over the years and country wide, a climate of intimidation has set in for the Roma minority. This issue needs to be addressed more vigorously in Hungary and also through European Roma programs.

Roma make up about 8% of the Hungarian population of 10 million. Their situation is still characterized by long term unemployment, lack of education and skills as well as abject poverty leading to a “cycle of poverty, welfare dependence and, sometimes, petty crime.”³³ They also suffer discrimination and hatred that Jobbik is trying to exploit for its own electoral benefits. Instead of addressing the real grievances of the Roma, Jobbik uses the political, economic, social and cultural divide between Roma and non-Roma to advocate a strategy of conflict escalation rather than integration. This strategy has consequences in neighboring countries, too. In Slovakia several cities have erected walls to separate Roma communities from their non-Roma neighbors.³⁴

The Jobbik solution for the Roma would be segregation. Saying that integration has failed, Jobbik President Gabor Vona stated that “In most cases, segregation would be the most effective way of educating these people.”³⁵ Vice Chairman of the party, Csanad Szegedi called for public safety protection camps. Such camps should be fenced in. Its inhabitants should be required to get permission as well as a 10 pm curfew.³⁶ To counter complaints about the failure to act, the Hungarian government launched a Europe wide strategy of Roma integration but paid only lip service to it in practice. Jobbik marches into Hungarian cities with their uni-

formed guards still continue. The guards claim the right to self- defense for their activities and the government does not intervene although there is a law against “uniformed crime”. But that law, it is argued, does not apply in case of ‘legal’ demonstrations in uniforms.³⁷

The EU has launched a new initiative in 2011 called “Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020.”³⁸ The strategy is based on a four pillar approach of education, employment, health care and housing and requires national governments to submit their strategies for Roma integration, but the program is primarily based on what Member States are willing to do. Thus in a 2012 progress report on the implementation of the EU Framework, the Commission concluded that “weaknesses in allocating financial resources matching the policy commitments made in the strategies remained a major obstacle to implementation.”³⁹ What the Commission did in principle and in practice was to establish a robust monitoring system with the help of the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency. So called ‘National Contact Points’ were asked to provide the necessary data on what national governments have done so far and how they will contribute to the achievements of the goals set out in the EU Framework. The Commission also proposed to allocate an “adequate share of EU cohesion funding to investment in people, employment and social

policy reforms through the European Social Fund (ESF).”⁴⁰ What is missing in the EU Roma strategy is support for a more robust effort of engaging local communities and their leaders. Only with their commitment to more dialog and practical cooperation with mayors and local community leaders can the current situation change. Mayors would be the most important officials to work with. Given the relatively small monetary size of such programs, funding should not be the most important problem. Funds have to be directed to the crucial pillars of cooperation and these pillars are still weak.

During the process of accession the EU provided PHARE funding for all accession countries between 1997 and 2004. Hungary benefited from PHARE funding and part of these funds was used specifically for programs in support of Roma communities. However, a report of the *Minority Rights Group International* on EU funded Roma programs revealed that support for projects specifically targeting Roma represented only a tiny proportion of total PHARE funding. Furthermore, the effectiveness of Roma projects was very limited because of the centralization of larger initiatives which marginalized the input of the Roma.⁴¹

PHARE funding is no longer available as these funds were designed to help candidate countries with the preparation for full EU membership. For a serious effort to improve the situation of the Roma in Hungary and other EU member states with strong Roma minorities, special programs of the EU for minorities are crucial. It should not be impossible to provide Hungary with additional funds designed to improve the social, economic and cultural situation of the Roma minority.

Unfortunately, after enlargement a great number of programs were almost abruptly no longer eligible for EU funding. The best equipped programs to reach out to the Hungarian civil society after enlargement now direct their work only to non-EU countries. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) with the strongest record of civil society engagement is now only active in non-EU countries, including in developing countries. The European *Civil Society Facility* now tries to reach out to the EU neighborhood in Eastern as well as Southern Europe. The most recently created *European Endowment for Democracy* (EED) modeled after the American *National Endowment for Democracy* (NED) is specifically dedicated to democracy support in the Member States of the Eastern Partnership. The *European Partnership for Democracy* (EPD), a European-level political foundation created in 2008, too,



only supports democratic transformation outside the EU. The Hungarian example of democratic transition served as the model for the *International Center for Democratic Transitions* (ICDT). Based in Budapest its creation was strongly supported by the *American Council for a Community of Democracies*. However, only occasionally does IDCT offer public programs in the Hungarian capital. In 2011 the institute offered a program for Roma and non-Roma youth in an effort to promote dialog. But this is by far too little. It is interesting that while the EU after enlargement stopped funding democracy support programs, non-EU countries such as Switzerland and Norway kept funding civil society related programs in Hungary.

Hungary is not in need of civil society institutions, but their financial health drastically dropped after enlargement. What could be improved is networking with partner organizations in the European Union. Here the European Network of Political Foundations (ENoP) could play a useful role in fostering civil society programs in Hungary. ENoP has some 60 member foundations with different political party affiliations on the European level. With regard to work in Hungary there are three European Parties with affiliates in Hungary: the European Peoples' Party (EPP), the European Socialist and Social Democratic Party (ESP) and the more Euro-skeptic Alliance of Conservatives

and Reformists (ECR). Fiercely independent, ENoP was created in 2006 to serve as a communication and dialog instrument between European political foundations and the institutions of the European Union as well as civil society actors in the field of democracy promotion and development. ENoP and its members would be in a position to develop dialog programs that could even reach out to Euro-skeptic groups. But its potential is not used adequately. EU offices in Hungary such as the *European Commission Representation* and also the office of the *European Parliament* and its *Citizen's Agora* program could use their influence more to engage Jobbik. Here, too, engagement is not part of the strategy. The result is that Jobbik has room for expansion.

Anti-Semitism

The DEREK Index that Freedom House uses for the purpose of measuring right wing extremism lists Hungary as Europe's fourth most prejudiced country after Turkey, Ukraine and Bulgaria.⁴² DEREK stands for "Demand of Right Wing Extremism". It is an index developed by the Hungarian Political Capital Institute and measures the percentage of people in a given country whose radical views could destabilize a democratic political system and undermine trust in a free market economy. The institute found out that among five European

countries (Greece, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Cyprus and Hungary) Hungary scores very high on the issue of prejudice (with 48% second only to Greece) and right wing value orientation (with 32% second only to Cyprus).⁴³ Anti-Jewish sentiment in Hungary has been strengthening in the past five years and the 2008 global financial crisis breathed new life into anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, including the theory that Jews are profiting from the economic crisis.⁴⁴ Alarmed by this development the World Jewish Congress decided to meet in Budapest in 2013 also to raise concerns about anti-Semitism beyond the Hungarian borders. One of the central demands of the meeting of the World Jewish Congress in Budapest was to encourage European governments to consider banning extremist right wing parties such as Jobbik.⁴⁵

Anti-Semitism is the most serious challenge coming from the Jobbik Party. No other right wing political party in Europe is as open and as aggressive in the pursuit of an anti-Semitic agenda as the leaders of the Jobbik Party. Anti-Semitic tendencies in Hungary are far above those of most other European countries. According to a survey of the Anti-Defamation League, more than 70 percent of Hungarians agree that “Jews have too much power in the business world/international financial markets.”⁴⁶ A Hungarian study recently found that “despite a slight decline since 2010, the percentage of those who

can be defined as ‘extremely anti-Jewish’ has grown from below 10 percent to above 20 percent in the past 10 years, somewhat higher than the percentage measured in Western and most Central and Eastern European countries.”⁴⁷ Whereas radical right wing political parties in the European Union focus on a perceived Islamic threat, Jobbik leaders openly portray Jews as the main threat for Hungary. When it became known that one of the Jobbik leaders was Jewish, the party did not hesitate to exclude him.⁴⁸ A leading member also advised the Hungarian government to draw up a list of Jews who pose a ‘national security risk’.⁴⁹ The official website of the Jobbik Party quotes the president of the Jobbik Party in a reference to the situation in Gaza saying that “Israel operates the world’s largest concentration camp”.⁵⁰ Jobbik leaders also express their sympathy with Hezbollah and Iran. They declare for example that what Israel does in Palestine “is an organized genocide”.⁵¹ Marton Gyoengyoesi, a leading member of the Jobbik Party also serves as Vice President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament. He declared at a demonstration in Budapest on December 2, 2011: “If we know the nature of the power dominating the globalized world we can see that the West subordinated to the Zionist interests has been operating indirect propaganda campaigns for decades against the ancient and proud, freedom and independence-loving Persian nation.”⁵²

Jobbik's anti-Semitic activities are well known to Viktor Orban and most recently, the Hungarian government has stepped up its efforts to combat anti-Semitism. Hungary indeed stood out with a level of anti-Semitism that began to make the growing Jewish community in Budapest as well as the World Jewish Congress and the Anti Defamation League uncomfortable. The case of a well known suspected Nazi war criminal who was able to live undisturbed for more than a decade in Budapest after the Canadian government stripped him of citizenship in 1997 also prompted the Simon Wiesenthal Center to voice concern about Hungary's commitment and willingness to hold Holocaust criminals accountable.⁵³ Most recently the FIDESZ Government gave its full support for a conference of the Tom Lantos Institute on "Jewish Life and Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Europe" where Deputy Prime Minister Tibor Navracsics declared that "We must ensure that there is no bridge between democratic political forces and those who fuel anti-Semitism".⁵⁴ In an effort to strengthen Holocaust education, the government also dedicated the year 2014 to the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Hungarian Holocaust.

Jobbik's affinity to Iran is quite astounding as it sees Iran as one of the few countries "with a shared commitment to resisting Western hegemony".⁵⁵ Jobbik as a party is active in the Parliament's "Hungarian-Iranian Friendship Committee".⁵⁶ What drives the Jobbik party into closeness to Iran is the antagonism to Israel. Party officials such as Marton Gyongyosi frequently evoke the "Zionist threat to world peace".⁵⁷ Whereas the US and the European Union tried to impose economic and financial sanctions on Iran in order to change the course of the country towards the development of nuclear weapons, Jobbik did exactly the opposite by intensifying its political contacts with Iran and seeking ways to intensify the trade relationship between the two countries. There are rumors that Jobbik even received money from Russia and Iran but so far there is no confirmation of any direct transfers of money to Jobbik. Also shrouded in secrecy and difficult to confirm is the participation of parts of the Hungarian Guard in the civil war in Syria where Hungarian Guardsmen given Jobbik's closeness to Iran might even fight on Assad's side. The Hungarian magazine *HVG* in its internet version *hvg.hu* reported about such activities of the Hungarian Guard but without identifying on which side they were fighting.⁵⁸ What seems to be clear on the basis of these reports is that there is a small group of Hungarians involved in the Syrian civil war and that 11 Guard members died as

victims of the civil war.⁵⁹ The involvement of foreign fighters in the civil war in Syria is not insignificant and is estimated to be between 3.400 and 11.000. So far approximately 1.100 foreign fighters have lost their lives in Syria.⁶⁰

European involvement in the civil war in Syria appears to be growing. According to the *International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence in London*, between 140 and 600 Europeans traveled to Syria since 2011 and they now represent between 7 and 11% of the foreign fighter total.⁶¹ The most important countries of origin are Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Based on German intelligence sources DER SPIEGEL reported that around 1000 volunteer jihadists from across Europe are now in Syria.⁶² The number of German jihadists alone is approximately 200 and these fighters even set up a 'German Camp' according to DER SPIEGEL.

Turanism

One element of Jobbik's proclivity to side with Iran as well as a more general opening of Hungary to Asia and away from Europe and the West is the concept of Turanism. Turanism was also one characteristic of Hungarian fascism. The idea of Turanism is little more than a myth, but for Jobbik as well as for Viktor Orban the opening to the East is quite real. Jobbik representatives such as Marton Gyoengyoesi are convinced that the roots of Hungary as a nation are in the East and that the country must return to the roots of the Hungarian nation. On August 16, 2012, *Presseurope* reported about a meeting in the city of Bugac of some 250 000 representatives of peoples and tribes who believe in Turanism. Various Hungarian sources contributed 70 Million Forint to the costs of the meeting and the Vice President of FIDESZ, Sandor Leszak received a group of the participants in the Hungarian Parliament.⁶³

Hungarian Turanism reached its peak after Trianon and during the 1920s and 1930s.⁶⁴ Today, Jobbik's adoption of Turanism serves as vehicle to "terminate Hungary's alliance with the Euro-Atlantic community and replace it with an Eastward turn in order to empower the country that has been, allegedly, weakened by its aspirational Westernism."⁶⁵ On the background of the current crisis in Europe and more

general the crisis of the Western concept of globalization, the party sees Hungary in desperate need of new supportive alliances. Turanism, or better “Neo Turanism” provides both a convenient cultural as well as an economic foundation for such a re-orientation of Hungary’s foreign and economic policy. In essence this would mean “leaving the European Union and establishing a new ‘Turanian’ alliance with Asian states.”⁶⁶ In the past Turanism as a geographical and ethno-cultural concept also served as a counterweight to Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism. Internally associated with an anti-Semitic nationalism, Turanism also provided the foundation for the pursuit of political and economic benefits beyond the Hungarian borders, not unlike the German concept of ‘Lebensraum’.⁶⁷

Turanist ideology is now mainly disseminated through the internet such as the web page of the Hungarian Turan Association. There are also rock groups such as ‘Hungarica’ and ‘Karpathia’ whose lyrics praise a Hungarian alternative to the Western model. For the celebrations of the Hungarian National Day their albums are on sale both at FIDESZ as well as Jobbik events.⁶⁸ Turanism is also spread on facebook and other electronic devices where ‘the yearning for the days of ‘Greater Hungary’ and a ‘glorious past’ are illustrated most prominently. The revival of such an old and mystical concept born primar-

ily out of sheer imagination is surprising. In Jobbik’s political strategy, Turanism is seen as an alternative to modernization and as a way to counter the economic hardship imposed by the European Union. On that basis, proponents of Turanism can present themselves as “as healers of social ills such as immorality, unemployment, poverty, cultural decadence, and the threat of immigration.”⁶⁹ Far right movements such as Jobbik- as Slavoj Žižek has pointed out – even appear attractive for the working class, because they are today “the only serious political force that still employs anti-capitalist rhetoric and as such can mobilize whatever remains of the mainstream working class in our Western societies.”⁷⁰ This also helps to explain why Viktor Orbán hesitates to oppose Jobbik directly and with full force. He fears that he could lose part of his own political support among the working class. Jobbik leaders are convinced that a revival of Turanism, which was forbidden in the communist era, can only benefit the party. Jobbik leader Marton Gyoengyoesi sees Turanism as a crucial cultural component of the Jobbik ideology. “For us” – he declared- “Turanism is a way to realize that we are not alone. We are a huge cultural family. We thus need to find the deep interconnectedness between our nations and this gives us something like a ‘spiritual resurrection’...After 50 years [of suppression], there is now a huge demand in Hungary for [tracing] the roots.”⁷¹

The Trianon- Tragedy

Today, the European Union must realize that the Hungarian model of transition neglected national grievances and these grievances now re-appear as a right wing mobilization device. True, there was little chance to ever realize the dream of a 'greater Hungary' in the recent past, but not to address enduring national grievances at all was bound to backfire in one way or another. Jozsef Antall's MDF, in the interest of catching up with the standards of his West European sister parties, needed to look forward into the European future of Hungary, and not Hungary's past. That task was left to MIEP, the radical right wing party under the leadership of Istvan Csurka. But Csurka's leadership was so outlandishly anti-Semitic and authoritarian that in view of the demands of the time and the pressure of economic reform, there was little room for a serious debate of national grievances compatible with other political and economic priorities of the day. Only four years after the end of communism, Hungary sought refuge with the successor of the party that began the transition already before 1989 when it was still the official –at least by name- Communist Party, the Hungarian Workers Party (HWP).

The one- but as a matter of national grievances critical - issue that the Hungarian model of transition failed to address was the Trianon-complex. The right wing of the political spectrum in Hungary could certainly address the issue with greater credibility. That is what Viktor Orban learned to understand when he moved FIDESZ systematically to the right. Starting out as a liberal post-communist party that originally linked up with the Liberal International, the international alliance of 'liberal' parties, he saw the opening of FIDESZ to the right of the Hungarian political spectrum as a way to a secure majority of voters for his own party. MIEP with its erratic and unattractive leadership largely discredited itself and the center right KDNP (Christian Democratic People's Party) was in many ways too Western and too European in order to present a national alternative. Orban moved FIDESZ into this void and now occupies a political spectrum in Hungary that reaches from national liberalism and catholic conservatism to classical right wing nationalism overlapping even with parts of the Jobbik agenda.



Orban will try everything in order to take Jobbik under his wings. When he took office in 2010, he immediately made June 4 a Day of Remembrance called the 'Day of National Unity'.⁷² June 4, 1920 is the fateful day at the end of WWI when the Allies presented Hungary with a dictat settlement that forced Hungary to give up two thirds of its territory and to accept the loss of more than 3 Million citizens. "Trianon meant the vivisection of the Hungarian nation and the end of historical Hungary", Paul Lendvai wrote in his historical masterpiece "The Hungarians. A Thousand Years of Victory in Defeat".⁷³ It is "to this day the most devastating tragedy"⁷⁴ in the history of Hungary and the country never fully recovered from this trauma. With regard to Hungary's domestic development, it turned out that Trianon proved to be "a disastrous obstacle to democratization."⁷⁵ In fact until 1989 the country went through a series of non- democratic and authoritarian convulsions. The first was a short but disastrous experience with communism under the leadership of Bela Kun which lasted only 133 days but it came with revolutionary tribunals, strikes and increasing attempts of insurrection.⁷⁶ What followed can only be described as a catastrophic economic downturn accompanied by political instability and upheaval. Under these circumstances Hungary became the perfect "breeding ground for the historically well- known transformation of nationalism from an ideology of

liberation to one of distraction."⁷⁷ Then came a short period of occupation by Romania and finally on March 1, 1920 began the more than two decades long authoritarian regime of Miklos Horthy. Hungary entered a period of stabilization but only to end up in the stranglehold of the Nazi regime in 1944, including the entanglement in the holocaust. The Horthy regime ended at the hands of the Nazi regime and the Arrow Cross regime then served as Hitler's willing executioners in the final solution. 564 000 Jews in the Greater Hungary of 1941 died and the number of victims in Trianon Hungary was 297 000, of which 100 000 were from Budapest alone.⁷⁸

Similar to the "*Dolchstosslegende*" (stab in the back legend) in Germany where against all reason the claim that Germany did not lose WWI militarily (*im Felde unbesiegt*) became extremely popular - thus scape- goating the new political elite of the Weimar Republic politicians and not the old *Kaiserreich* and its representatives - in Hungary, the Jews became the bogeymen. Jews were made responsible for Trianon and for the 1919 Communist revolution. According to Paul Lendvai the "Hungarian myth of a stab in the back had enormous significance for the dynamics of Hungarian anti-Semitism in the interwar years."⁷⁹ In short: Jews were seen as the mortal enemy of the Hungarian nation.⁸⁰

Jobbik's anti-Semitism has its roots in these older patterns and in today's Hungary it is allowed to erect new monuments for Miklos Horthy whose anti-Semitism is well known to the Hungarian public. Instead of distancing FIDESZ from Jobbik, Orban seems to move in the other direction, hoping to win over Jobbik voters. But this strategy can also backfire and further legitimize Jobbik as the most credible owner of Hungarian nationalism.

Transition Success and Failure

Authoritarian in its structure, anti-Semitic, anti-Western, anti-European and aggressively discriminating against the Roma population of Hungary, Jobbik stands out as the most radical right wing ethno nationalist movement in Europe. Its backward orientation, if successful, would move Hungary not only away from Europe and the West. Its political program would also turn Hungary into a closed society, authoritarian inside and a clear danger for Hungary's Jewish population as well as the Roma, but also for all non-Magyars. The frequent reference to 'Magyars' could potentially open up territorial claims against Hungary's neighbors and/or claims to protect Hungarian minorities in other countries, in particular Romania. There are reports today that the Hungarian government is financing an ethnic Hungarian party in Romania.⁸¹ If not addressed this could have serious

consequences. The fact that the Orban government shortly after taking over the government with a strong majority in Parliament proceeded to offer citizenship and passports to all Hungarians living abroad was a first indication that the spirit of revisionism was gaining ground. This potentially explosive issue needs to be addressed head on and as soon as possible.

One way to deal with the remaining issues of minorities and borders would be to establish a text book commission as a first step. The objective of the textbook commission would be to find out how textbooks for school children on all levels handle the Trianon-complex and the resulting border and minority issues. The situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania and Slovakia is the most difficult and delicate legacy of the Trianon Treaty. In the German-Polish relationship a text book commission played an important role in the process of reconciliation. Today, such a text book commission should perhaps best be set up as a bilateral endeavor of historians and non-government experts of Hungary, Romania and Slovakia meeting on a bilateral level and reaching out to the civil society of all three countries. The 1997 *Treaty of Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighbourliness* between Hungary and Romania and a similar one between Hungary and Slovakia is a good foundation for such an exercise. Its article 15 calls for an *intergovernmental Commis-*

sion of Experts with regard to minority rights. Broadening the Commission proposal to include the civil society of all three countries could add to building sufficient confidence for a more profound process of reconciliation.

In 1989 the optimistic expectations for a democratic transition including reconciliation were based on too short term considerations not sufficiently realizing the deeper currents of national pride and aspirations or – as Jan Werner Mueller eloquently put it – the ‘Longing for Greater Hungary’.⁸² With the collapse of the Soviet empire and communism profoundly discredited in Europe, Hungary at first appeared to have the best chances for a successful transition from authoritarianism and a state controlled economy to a Western style democracy and a market based economy. For one, Hungary was geographically close to the West given its proximity to and union with Austria. Hungary also enjoyed one of the most ‘liberal’ communist systems within the Soviet bloc. Known as the ‘merriest barracks in the socialist camp’, the Hungarian version of communism after the 1956 uprising against the Soviet Army also allowed ‘little freedoms’ under the leadership of Janos Kadar.⁸³ Of all communist party leaders in Eastern Europe, thanks to his ‘goulash communism’, Janos Kadar still today enjoys an enormous popularity.⁸⁴

The economic and financial crisis that is gripping Europe since 2008 alone cannot explain the rise of Jobbik. A much more complex development is at work in Hungary as well as in other parts of Eastern and Central Europe. In the case of Hungary Jobbik’s success also points to the failure of the transition process after the 1989 revolution to address more fundamental concerns of Hungary’s national identity. Hungary and Poland were first in Eastern Europe to get rid of their communist oppressors by holding elections. What matters even more was that in Hungary’s case, the transition process was so smooth that it is more accurate to speak of a process of evolution rather than revolution. Massive reforms already began under the – by name only – communist party. It was the former Communist party official Gyula Horn who, as Foreign Minister opened the border between Hungary and Austria on September 11, 1989, thereby allowing thousands of East German citizens to leave the GDR for West Germany, much to the chagrin of Hungary’s Warsaw Pact ally, the GDR.⁸⁵

AS Jacques Rupnik and Jan Zielonka suggest, “decommunization (mostly rhetorical and legal) was inversely proportional to the degree of resistance to communism”.⁸⁶ This allowed Viktor Orban, the winner of the 2010 elections in Hungary with a 2/3 majority of the seats in the Hungarian Parliament to speak of the ‘corrupt bargain’ of 1989.⁸⁷ What took place in reality after communism was not retribution or transitional justice - that is a cleansing process with the purpose of holding to account all those responsible for oppression and even crimes – but swift and painless reconciliation. “Not a single top official or head of the various secret services was ever held to account”.⁸⁸ In Hungary the events of 1989 can hardly be seen as a revolution. It was a ‘handshake revolution’ or a combination of reform and revolution.⁸⁹ The political transition in Hungary suffered from what Eva Voszka eloquently called “the unbearable lightness of non-cathartic transition”.⁹⁰ The result was a belated culture war between left and right when neither the right nor the left was able to lift Hungary out of its economic problems after the 1989 revolution.

Also hardly present at the creation of the new Hungary in 1989 was the spirit of 1956, the uprising against the Soviet tanks that crushed Hungary’s independence movement and the attempt to free Hungary from the shackles of communism and a one party state imposed by the So-

viet Union. It was the young Viktor Orban who as a 26 years old, on June 16, 1989 at the profoundly symbolic reburial of Prime Minister Imre Nagy, the hero of the 1956 revolution who was executed 31 years ago, gave the last, but most memorable speech on the meaning of 1956 at this historical event in front of 250 000 people. “His anti-communist speech”, Paul Lendvai wrote, “formulated with extraordinary sharpness by the standards of the time, and his demands for democracy, independence and the withdrawal of Soviet troops made him famous over -night , not only in Hungary but also abroad.”⁹¹ But in 1989 it was impossible to recreate the spirit of 1956 as this would have meant to overlook the 33 years of Hungary’s peculiar experience with communism. After all, in 1989 there were still Soviet troops stationed in Hungary which made it difficult to fully engage in the spirit that the young Viktor Orban tried to evoke on June 16, 1989. In addition there was the legacy of Kadar’s ‘little freedoms’ and what Western observers of Hungary used to call ‘goulash communism’, a truly uncommon development in Eastern Europe under Soviet rule. But what sets Hungary apart from other transitions in Eastern Europe and, until today, must be seen as a unique model of transition, was more than just ‘goulash communism’. Rudolf Tokes lists six factors that made the Hungarian experience unique⁹²:

- The exceptional harshness and the seer dimensions of Stalinist political, economic, and social mobilization between 1948-1953
- The revolution of 1956
- Janos Kadar's coercive-terroristic, and subsequently consensus-seeking political leadership
- The regime's sustained commitment to legitimacy building through economic reforms
- Mutually self-limiting instrumental interaction between the regime and its internal opposition and
- The outgoing and the incoming political elites' pragmatic cooperation that spawned the National Round Table Agreement (NRT) of September 1989.

The Hungarian uniqueness of transition also created quite a contradictory legacy.⁹³ What looked so smooth at the beginning and short term was not necessarily more acceptable long term.

Post-Transition Difficulties

Transition theory and the impressive literature on the way Eastern and Central Europe managed the process of transition from communist authoritarianism and state run economies to Western type democracies and market principles predominantly posited that soft communism, such as the Hungarian model, would limit the chances of radical right wing parties. Herbert Kitschelt, one of the leading authorities of political party developments in Eastern and Central Europe after the collapse of communism, for example, in an article written together with Lenka Bustikova stated that "In Countries with a legacy of national accommodative communism, early differentiation of major parties on socio-cultural issues and strategies of social policy compensation kept reform losers at bay, which limited voter success of radical parties."⁹⁴ As a short term proposition Kitschelt's observation is undoubtedly correct. The radical right in Hungary remained weak at the beginning of the transition process. MIEP and its leader Istvan Csurka were at best a fringe phenomenon. Another school of thought put forward the idea of "spatial dependence" or "proximity to the West" as the best explanation for the lack of radicalism and the chances of success for democracy and free markets.⁹⁵ But in spite of Hungary's geographic closeness to Western Europe, the prospect of belonging to the European Union was

not universally accepted. Public opinion polls conducted in 1995, five years after the beginning of transition, revealed the following.⁹⁶

More Hungarians (79%) than among any population in post-communist Europe (including post-Soviet states) say that the ‘direction of the country’ is ‘wrong’.

Fewer Hungarians (38%) than in any nation of East Central or Southeastern Europe (including the Baltic states but excluding all other post-Soviet states) regard the market economy as “right”.

Fewer Hungarians (20%) than in any other nation in East Central or Southeastern Europe (with the exception of Bulgaria at 13%) express “satisfaction with [the] development of democracy” in their country

Fewer Hungarians (26%) than in any other East Central or Southeastern European population think that the future of their country will be most closely tied to the European Union.

These data point to a pervasive malaise and a sense of insecurity after the transition to democracy and towards a European style market economy. The leader who put Hungary on a trajectory of European integration was Jozsef Antall, head of a new post-communist right of

center political party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). Antall, well known in the old Hungarian elite, but almost completely unknown to the general public in Hungary, won a landslide election victory in the national elections in the spring of 1990. He formed a coalition government with another conservative party, the Smallholder Party. These two parties, in a coalition with the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) commanded a solid majority in the Hungarian Parliament, but much to the chagrin of the core membership of his own party and its conservative and nationalist roots, Antall also forged an alliance with an opposition party, the liberal Free Democrats (SzDSz).⁹⁷

What looked clever at first sight and was designed as a maneuver to secure power for Antall turned out to be a risky strategy in the new domestic environment of Hungarian national politics. When the new government was faced with its first economic crisis as a result of the decision to increase petrol prices by as much as 65%, strikes and demonstrations followed which drove the governing coalition apart. The SzDSz, a partner of the government took the side of the striking taxi drivers and haulage companies.⁹⁸ It came as no surprise that the MDF/SzDSz partnership, in particular after the premature death of Jozsef Antall in 1993, ended in defeat after only four years in office.



In the 1994 national elections the new Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) that emerged from Hungary's old Communist Party, was able to present itself as a force of stability and with the reputation as a pragmatic political party already acquired under the old communist regime, Hungarians opted for a low risk approach to transition. Gyula Horn, a former communist party official, who was instrumental in the transformation of his party into a party in the mold of European Social Democracy, took over as Prime Minister. A Former Foreign Minister under the old regime, he was the man who as Foreign Minister presided over the opening of the border between Hungary and Austria.⁹⁹ There was little concern at the time about the genuine acceptance of the new Socialist Party that emerged from the old system, but underneath the surface the deep rooted nationalism and the wounded pride were still there.

EU Options Dealing with Hungarian Ethno-Nationalism

Hungary is now a test case for the ability to prevent the erosion of democracy and to show the European Union's capacity to govern under difficult economic and social conditions. But the EU faces a paradox. As much as it is desirable that there is no vacuum at the top of EU decision making and that Europe has a strong leadership, it must also be clear that the power of EU institutions is limited. The EU is not an empire that can be governed from the center. It has to aim for stable nation states, strong societies as well as stable economies and, if necessary, support the periphery for this purpose, not unlike what the United States did after WWII with Marshall Plan in Europe. Now the EU has to use its resources to make sure that political, economic and social stability is preserved within member States. After all, for the European project to succeed, the EU has to be a **solidarity community**, too, based on the principle of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is the key concept for the purpose of mellowing the power of nationalism and ultimately its mainstreaming.¹⁰⁰

The problem is that on the EU level the instruments to deal with extremist political parties and movements are limited. First, European political parties are still a work in progress. There is no European legal framework for political parties,

although the elections to the European Parliament led to the creation of European political parties and Political Groups within the European Parliament. Some elementary funding is beginning to emerge for the necessary work and the functioning as a political group in the European Parliament. Political Groups in the European Parliament need a European political party in the first place in order to be capable to act and, more importantly, to campaign.

Since 2004 funding for European political parties is now available from the European Parliament. Up to 85% of the eligible expenditure of a party can now be provided from public sources (tax payers of the member States in other words) whereas the rest of the total operating expenses has to come from other sources, in most of the cases donations and membership fees. The legal basis for such grant making is Article 10, paragraph 4 of the Treaty on European Union and article 224 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.¹⁰¹ Through the funding mechanism of the European Parliament Jobbik, too, could benefit from European funds to which the Association of European National Movements, if eligible, would be entitled. In 2010 and 2011 AENM was unable to secure funding from the European Parliament, but in 2012, in spite of much criticism from Members of the European Parliament, AENM received 289 000 Euro. The EU's strongest crit-

ics will also be eligible for public party financing for the 2014 when the European elections. As understandable as the criticism of AENM funding from European public sources is, the exclusion of these parties would be a mistake.¹⁰² Exclusion instead of engaging critics would only benefit the extreme right and confirm their anti-European positions in the first place. Engagement, on the other hand, has at least a chance to contribute to the mellowing and, ultimately, the moderation of these forces even if their objective is to replace the current EU integration model with a different, stronger national nation based – and anti-integration - model.

A good example of combining a policy of containment of authoritarian trends with a strategy of engagement is the Tavares Report.¹⁰³ The Report was triggered by a series of actions the Orban government took immediately after the 2010 elections. Having lost the 2002 elections after he first came to power in 1998, Viktor Orban saw the 2010 electoral results as a 'revolution at the ballot box' and proceeded to act accordingly. Since the elections the government quickly adopted a new constitution as well as altogether 648 laws, including so called 'cardinal' laws.¹⁰⁴ Attempting to avoid another electoral defeat like the one in 2002, FIDESZ used its new powers to protect its majority from electoral changes. The Council of Europe – through

its Venice Commission - as well as the European Commission as the guardian of the EU Treaties began to voice concerns over developments in Hungary already with the drafting of a new constitution shortly after the Orban government came to power in 2010. Less than a year after the elections, in April 2011, the government, based on its 2/3 majority in Parliament, was already in a position to present a new constitution. It was adopted on April 18, 2011, signed by the President of Hungary on April 25, 2011 and took effect on January 1, 2012. Until that day in 2011, Hungary was the only country in Eastern and Central Europe that had not adopted a new constitution after the collapse of communism. The Tavares Report correctly criticized the fact that the draft text of the constitution was prepared just by members of the governing coalition within the exceptionally short time frame of one month "thus restricting the possibility for a thorough and substantial debate with the opposition parties and civil society on the draft text."¹⁰⁵ More worrisome, however, was the substance of the changes Hungary's new constitution will introduce, in particular on the administration of the courts; the forced retirement of judges; the de-registration of churches as well as the media law.¹⁰⁶ Critics claim that the new constitution has created a new form of government in which the current Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, "can operate with a free hand" and "can continue to control poli-

cy far beyond any electoral mandate it may have, constraining future governments with the decisions it makes now."¹⁰⁷ Another reason for concern is the ethno-national definition of the Hungarian nation which might play into the hands of Jobbik with its much more radical ethno-nationalist agenda. As a result, the political calculation that the constitution might draw Jobbik voters into the arms of FIDESZ could backfire and strengthen the more radical ethno-nationalist movement at the expense of FIDESZ and its current majority in Parliament.

Orban's reaction to the criticism voiced by the European Parliament, the European Commission as well as the Council of Europe and OSCE left no doubt that Hungary plans to stay the course. More importantly, with statements of members of his party and Orban himself, Hungary also went on the offensive, accusing the EU of colonialism, Stalinism and as the equivalent of the Soviet empire. Orban even declared that he is determined to wage a 'war of independence' against the European Union if necessary.¹⁰⁸

The European Commission scored a major victory in its dispute with Hungary by referring the attempt of the Orban government to force some 300 judges into early retirement to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The European Commission won its court case. More recently, on Janu-

ary 17, 2013, the European Commission launched accelerated infringement proceedings against Hungary in the case of the Hungarian National Central Bank. In this case the Commission identified breaches of Article 139 TFEU stipulating full independence of the Central Bank and of Article 127 (4) TFEU, requiring consultation with the ECB ‘on any draft legislative provision in its field of competence.’¹⁰⁹ Here, too, the Commission as the guardian of the EU Treaties might succeed.

But a legal strategy only has limits. One example is the effort of the Monitoring Committee of the Council of Europe to open a so-called Monitoring procedure with respect to Hungary. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International strongly supported the procedure but failed to achieve a majority in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Legal procedures in an effort to achieve a mainstreaming effect often run into difficulties, in particular when law enforcement enters the realm of politics.¹¹⁰ A more robust institutional arrangement is necessary in order to render EU institutions more effective in enforcing EU values. A top down approach in a community of sovereign countries is bound to run into difficulties. This is also true for Jan Werner Mueller’s proposal to create a “Copenhagen Commission” which was then taken up in the Tavares Report.¹¹¹

In essence Mueller’s proposal would create a Commission of independent experts with the objective to provide “a credible agent of legal-political judgment capable to act as guardian of Europe’s ‘acquis normatif’.”¹¹² The proposal is certainly a more flexible tool than the use of article 7 and the involvement of the ECJ either for cases of treaty violation or infringement proceedings. Since the creation of such a Commission would require action on the part of the European Council, a lot will depend on how a Copenhagen Commission would look like as far as membership, staff and its actual powers are concerned. The core idea is to create a mandate strong enough to enforce necessary changes such as the ones the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, the European Commission and the European Parliament have suggested. Based on independent political and judicial judgment a Copenhagen Commission would speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. This in itself would put more weight on any request for reform the Commission might propose, particularly if a ruling of the ECJ if necessary.



A similar process would be the result of the new initiative by four Foreign Ministers of EU Member States (Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden). Their ‘Rule of Law Initiative’ is very similar to the proposal for the creation of a Copenhagen Commission. In a letter to the President of the EU Commission dated March 6, 2013, the four Foreign Ministers acknowledge that there are limits to the institutional arrangements when it comes to ensuring compliance with the EU Treaties: “Neither the procedures enshrined in the Treaties nor the EU fundamental rights charter provide for sufficiently targeted instruments. We therefore believe that a new and more effective mechanism to safeguard fundamental values in Member States is needed”.¹¹³ The options to foster compliance in their view are the following:

- a structural dialog
- bringing the issue to the Council at an early stage
- concluding binding agreements between the Commission and the relevant Member State and as a last resort
- suspension of EU funding should be possible.

Success of the Rule of Law Initiative, too, would depend on its final mission, its composition, and its powers. Political pressure is certainly a way to influence governments of Member States to comply with essential values of the EU: the respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”(Article 2 Treaty on European Union). But it is the duty of national governments of the European Union to ensure compliance of national political parties with regard to democratic values and principles of the EU, including the protection of minorities.

Hungarian Criminal Law Options

Notwithstanding the national responsibility for EU law enforcement, the European Union, on November 28, 2008 adopted a Framework Decision on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia.¹¹⁴ The objective was to approximate criminal law provisions and to combat racist and xenophobic offences more effectively by promoting full and effective judicial cooperation between Member States. A common criminal law approach was considered to be necessary in order to “ensure that the same behavior constitutes an offence in all Member States and that effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties are provided for natural and legal persons having committed or

being liable for such offences”. But from the beginning, the EU recognized that full harmonization of criminal laws is not possible, given the different legal and cultural traditions in each Member State. Therefore, the Framework Decision could only ask Member States to provide written reports on actions taken with regard to the Framework Decision.

Hungary has its own legislation against hate crime that, on the surface, appears to be in line with the Framework Decision. In Article 269 the Hungarian Criminal Code criminalizes incitement to hatred against any national, ethnic, racial group or certain groups of population which is punishable with imprisonment up to three years. Symbols of despotism such as a swastika, an arrow cross, hammer and sickle among others are also punishable with a fine (Article 269 B). In addition to that Article 174B criminalizes violence against members of a community.¹¹⁵ In practice, however, Amnesty International discovered a number of short comings in the response of the Hungarian criminal justice system to hate crimes, such as a lack of capacity of the police force, their training and the way such crimes are investigated.¹¹⁶ What was possible, though, based on Hungary’s hate crime legislation was the dissolution of the Hungarian Guard. Jobbik’s leader Gabor Vona took the case to the European Court of Human Rights in an effort to strike the decision down. He claimed that the

dissolution of the Guard violated his freedom of expression. The Court unanimously upheld the decision of the Hungarian courts. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in a concurring opinion to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights added that based on the Framework Decision of the European Council as well as several other international treaties and conventions, for example the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, “states have the duty to criminalize racism, xenophobia or ethnic intolerance.”¹¹⁷

There is no explicit legal framework for political parties in Hungary. What the current constitution wants to make sure is that a return of fascism as well as communism must be precluded. The Fourth Amendment to the constitution adds greater detail to regulating political parties only with regard to Hungary’s communist past. In this case, the Fourth Amendment states that the “Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, its legal predecessors and the political organs created in the communist ideology for their service were all criminal organs and their leaders are responsible without statute of limitations.” The legal successors to the Hungarian Communist Party share the responsibility of their legal predecessors. The fascist past of Hungary and of those who acted in the name of the short lived Arrow Cross regime which actively participated in the holocaust on behalf of Nazi-Germany was not

addressed. With regard to anti-Semitism the Horthy regime, too, would have to accept responsibility. But the new constitution specifically points out that self-determination of Hungary was “lost on 19 March 1944” and “restored on 2 May 1990”. The fact is, however, that Hungary under the Horthy regime fought on Hitler’s side since 1941 and passed the first anti-Semitic legislation already in 1920. In 1938 and 1939 two additional Jewish Laws followed, the first limiting to 20% the ratio of Jews in the free professions, administrative positions as well as for employees of commercial and industrial companies. The second Jewish Law - de facto following the German race based anti-Semitic legislation- introduced the definition of *Jewish* on a racial basis and further limited the economic activities of Jews.¹¹⁸ The Orban government and FIDESZ – and also other governments of Hungary before the new constitution entered into force - never held the Horthy regime accountable for its cooperation with Hitler or for its anti-Semitic policies. On the contrary, Horthy enjoys a kind of revival and statues of him are erected in Hungarian cities and squares named after him.¹¹⁹

The text of the Fourth Amendment is worrisome in one other respect. The requirement that “*The exercise of one’s right to free speech cannot be aimed at violating another person’s human dignity*” and that “*The exercise of one’s right to free speech cannot be aimed at violating the dignity of the Hungarian nation or the dignity of any national, ethnic, or religious minority group*” could have negative consequences for the public discourse. As a group of Hungarian lawyers pointed out in their Amicus Brief for the Venice Commission on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary, the protection of the dignity of the ‘Hungarian nation’ is problematic “as it might have a chilling effect on political speech, which would then induce self-censorship in public matters.”¹²⁰ Orban’s view that a Hungarian cannot be in opposition to the Hungarian nation could also discourage opposition in general.

On the basis of the new constitution and the Fourth Amendment, radical right wing parties have little to fear as far as their political propaganda is concerned. The broad conditionality of “dignity of the Hungarian nation” and “dignity of any national, ethnic or religious minority group” plays more into the hands of Jobbik than it limits their propaganda. In theory Article 5 of the Fourth Amendment could restrain Jobbik’s anti-Semitism and anti-ziganism if the Orban government would use all its powers to prosecute Jobbik inspired hate crimes. The 2009 court

decision to outlaw the Hungarian Guard pointed in that direction, but as it turned out only temporarily. The Guard was able to reconstitute itself under a different name and continued its uniformed marches into Roma communities intimidating Roma families. Long term it is the Hungarian civil society that has to build political, social and cultural barriers against rightwing extremism and violence.

Banning Political Parties

The possibility of seeking to outlaw extremist political parties and movements, a legal process that on the basis of the German constitution is available to the German government does not exist in Hungary or on the European level. In Poland article 13 of the constitution includes a possible ban of political parties as well as other organizations:

“Political parties and other organizations whose programmes are based upon totalitarian methods and the modes of activity of nazism, fascism and communism, as well as those whose programmes or activities sanction racial or national hatred, the application of violence for the purpose of obtaining power or to influence the State policy, or provide for the secrecy of their own structure or membership, shall be prohibited.”

The practical experience with banning extreme political parties and organizations is not only positive. In Germany both extreme right wing and left wing political parties have been outlawed in the past and efforts of once banned parties to re-emerge under a different name can be outlawed, too, if it can be established that the new organization is a direct successor organization of the outlawed party. The basic idea is that of a democracy willing to defend the principles on which this democracy rests (*‘wehrhafte Demokratie’*). The fact is that both on the left and on the right new parties with similar programs as the old ones re-emerged albeit with a time lag. It proved to be impossible to outlaw the ideas and the ideologies of hate, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and other forms of extremism. Germany in that respect is a special case where the fear – at home and abroad - of a return of authoritarianism produced hyper-caution. German critics of the concept of *‘wehrhafte Demokratie’* see the instrument of a complete ban of a political party as an ‘authoritarian break’ with the concept of a liberal democracy.¹²¹



Most Western liberal democracies out of respect for the core principles of liberal democracy do not use a legal procedure comparable to Art. 21 of the *Grundgesetz*. Liberal democracies accept that a pluralist society has to live with political forces bent on eliminating the very foundations on which the concept of democracy is based. The assumption here is that the political process by way of elections and an open discourse has to contain these forces, including the possibility of eliminating these forces at the ballot box, i.e. voting them out of office but not through judicial acts or acts of the government. A solution through the ballot box would be the best outcome for Hungary's problems with the Jobbik Party.

Conclusion

After enlargement a new narrative of Europe's post-national model of governance based on universal values, integration and solidarity needs to be developed. To preserve the normative power of the EU against the backdrop of authoritarian forms of governance, including oligarchic models within the borders of the European Union will not be easy. Too much weight and emphasis was put on pre-accession strategies and support for market principles, EU regulations and the *acquis communautaire*. As far as democratic stability is concerned, too much was left to short term institution building

and too little for long term stability and the implications of the rule of law. It was a mistake to give up all official EU democracy support, training, education, research and exchange programs the moment full membership of candidate countries was achieved. The most important programs in this respect now focus on democracy and the rule of law exclusively in the European neighborhood in the East and in the South of Europe as well as in developing countries. This new focus is certainly justified and necessary, but it should not come entirely at the expense of the necessary political and cultural discourse within the European Union. Adjustment to the *community of law* the European Union wants to be requires more time for the necessary institution building on the European level. This is true for political parties, the institutions of the civil society and the entire non-governmental sector. Europe's post-modern system of governance based on pooled sovereignty and democratic structures beyond the nation state needs time to sink in and reach the local level of government as well as the individual. At the same time Europe's post-modern societies are becoming more complex and less homogeneous. In spite of the enormous economic and social progress that European integration has achieved, significant gaps and discrepancies with regard to a common standard of living remain. The current economic and social crisis of the European Union might even widen the gap between rich

and poor as well as between different regions. European integration was never meant to be a one-way street model of operation with a one-size-fits-all strategy of standardization. On the contrary, different ways of life, political cultures, traditions as well as different strengths and capabilities will not disappear. Diversity makes Europe stronger, not weaker.

Not unlike of what the founding fathers of the United States of America had in mind when they first declared America's independence and then created the constitution of the United States, European governments, in the spirit of 'E Pluribus Unum', are determined to create 'an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe', including a 'citizenship common to nationals of their countries'. A radical ethno-nationalism is not compatible with the aspirations of the European Union, and governments of Member States have the duty to overcome obstacles within their own societies that might stand in the way of achieving the fundamental goals of the European Union and to arrive at the *community of rights* that Europe wants to be, namely a system where "law determines power, and power does not determine law."¹²² Rather than on the 'dubious legacy of the past' and an often questionable inheritance, European identity has to be built on

the principles of the community of law that the union itself has created.¹²³ The Hungarian constitution commits Hungary to be part of this European project.

Footnotes

- ¹ See for example Andras Biro Nagy, Daniel Rona, "Rational Radicalism". Jobbik's Road to the Hungarian Parliament 2003-2010, Paper presented at the workshop "On Moderation and Immoderation of Religious Political Parties in Democratic Politics, University of Eichstaett, Germany, June 16-18, 2011, p. 3
- ² The AENM currently consists of eight EU Member State parties: Front National (France), Jobbik (Hungary), Fiamma Tricolore (Italy), National Party (Great Britain), Movimiento Social Republicano (Spain), Front National du Belgique (Belgium), Partido Nacional Renovador (Portugal), and Nationaldemokraten (Sweden)
- ³ On the lack of cross border and transnational cooperation of extreme right wing political parties see for example Michael Minkenberg, Transnational Dimensions of the Central and Eastern European Radical Right Today, Draft Paper for the International Conference "Far Right Networks in Northern and Eastern Europe, Uppsala University, March 25-27, 2010
- ⁴ See on this issue Tamir Bar-On, Intellectual Right Wing Extremism - Alain de Benoist: Mazeway Resynthesis Since 2000, in: The Extreme Right in Europe. Current Trends and Perspectives, edited by Uwe Backes and Patrick Moreau, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Goettingen 2012, p. 333-358, here p. 340
- ⁵ See Thomas Grumke, Globalised Anti-Globalists- The Ideological Basis of the Internationalization of the Right Wing Extremism, in: The Extreme Right in Europe, op. cit., p. 323-332, here p. 323
- ⁶ Ibid., p. 329
- ⁷ See Spiegel online, November 12 and 13, 2013
- ⁸ See the Opinion of the Venice Commission the case of Romania available at [http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD\(2012\)026-e.aspx](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2012)026-e.aspx)
- ⁹ On recent developments in Bulgaria see for example Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 25, 2013, p. 1
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ The text of the letter (in French) was made available to the author by the German Foreign Office.
- ¹² See on this point Alexandra Witorek Sarlo and Maia Otashvili, Can the EU Rescue Hungary?, Eurasia Review, August 1, 2013, p. 1
- ¹³ See the World Bank Study on the European Economic Model "Restoring the Lustre of the European Economic Model" by Indermit Gill and Martin Raiser, The World Bank, Washington Dc, 2013
- ¹⁴ See the Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June, 1993 available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf
- ¹⁵ On this point see "Kritik des Ethnonationalismus", Hannoversche Schriften 2, Herausgegeben von Detlev Claussen, Oskar Negt und Michael Werz, Verlag Neue Kritik, Frankfurt am Main 2000. The quote is from the introduction by Michael Werz "Verkehrte Welten des short century", page 7
- ¹⁶ See Detlev Clausen, *Das Verschwinden des Sozialismus. Zur ethnonationalistischen Auflösung des Sowjetsystems*, in: Kritik des Ethnonationalismus", op. cit., p. 16-41
- ¹⁷ This is a point that Michael Minkenberg makes following Tony Judt's seminal work "Postwar". A History of Europe Since 1945, Penguin Press, New York, 2005, p. 638. For Michael Minkenberg see his paper cited above in footnote No. 3
- ¹⁸ See in particular the findings of Freedom House on Hungary's Jobbik Party available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/blog/hungary-jobbik-and-%E2%80%98enemy-within%E2%80%99>
- ¹⁹ See the report in: *searchlightmagazine* available at <http://www.searchlightmagazine.com/news/international-news/jobbik-to-hold-demo-against-%E2%80%99Cgypsy-terror%E2%80%99D-after-countryside-stabbing>
- ²⁰ On economic data for Hungary see the OECD Report on Hungary March 2012 available at <http://www.oecd.org/eco/49852285.pdf>
- ²¹ See the 2012 Transition Report on Hungary of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ See the text of the Ten Points in Hungarian Spectrum, December 12, 2011 available at <http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2011/12/12/jobbiks-campaign-promises-are-being-fulfilled-by-fidesz/>
- ²⁴ See the data at <http://countryeconomy.com/unemployment/hungary>
- ²⁵ Freedom House op.cit.
- ²⁶ The numbers are based on the data provided by Peter Kreko, Research Director of the Political Capital Institute in a power point outline on the subject of "Jobbik-Voters: Who they are, what do they think? (Without date)

- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Ibid.
- ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ The Hungarian Ecopolis Foundation has commissioned a study of the causes and consequences of the interethnic conflict that broke out in the spring of 2011. The facts and figures about the events in Gyöngyöspata used here are based on the ECOPOLIS Foundation study. See "Gyöngyöspata 2011. The Laboratory of the Hungarian Far-Right." A case study of political mobilization and interethnic conflict. Ecopolis Foundation, Budapest, 2012
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ See the article on Hungary's Roma in *The Economist*, Vol. 408, No. 8848, August 10, 2013, p. 47
- ³⁴ Ibid.
- ³⁵ See *Emerging Europe*, September 2, 2010
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ For a discussion of the 'uniformed crime' legislation see the newsletter of Ferenc Kumin, Deputy State Secretary for International Communication on "Fighting Hate Crime, Protecting our Citizens", August 14, 2013
- ³⁸ See the text of the EU initiative available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52011DC0173:en:NOT>
- ³⁹ See the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Steps Forward in Implementing National Roma Integration Strategies June 26, 2013 p. 6 available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/com_2013_454_en.pdf
- ⁴⁰ Ibid.
- ⁴¹ Will Guy and Martin Kovats, EU-funded Roma programmes: Lessons from Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Report of the Minority Rights Group International (without date)
- ⁴² See the findings of Freedom House
- ⁴³ See 'Back by Popular Demand', *RiskandForecast.com*, Political Capital In-depth analysis November 2, 2010, p. 2
- ⁴⁴ See the *RiskandForecast.com* press release of December 22, 2010 about a conference of the Central European University on December 15 on "Anti-Semitism Conspiracy Theories".
- ⁴⁵ See the Huffington Post article available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/07/world-jewish-congress-jobbik-party_n_3231080.html
- ⁴⁶ See the 2008 Survey of the Anti Defamation League available at http://archive.adl.org/PresRele/ASInt_13/5465_13.htm
- ⁴⁷ See Freedom House findings
- ⁴⁸ See the Independent available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/csanad-szegedi-poster-boy-of-hungarys-fascist-right-quits-after-jewish-roots-revealed-8054031.html>
- ⁴⁹ See the *ynetnews* article available at <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4312434,00.html>
- ⁵⁰ See the official website of the Jobbik Party available at: http://www.jobbik.com/vona_israel_operates_world%E2%80%99s_largest_concentration_camp
- ⁵¹ Ibid.
- ⁵² Ibid.
- ⁵³ See the story in the New York Times, August 13, 2013 p.3
- ⁵⁴ Text made available to the author by the Hungarian Embassy in Washington
- ⁵⁵ See *The Times of Israel*, March 11, 2013
- ⁵⁶ Ibid.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid.
- ⁵⁸ See *hvg.hu* June 28, 2013 available at http://hvg.hu/itthon/20130628_magyar_garda_szeteses and http://hvg.hu/vilag/20130627_TEK_magyarok_is_harcolhatnak_Sziriaiban
- ⁵⁹ Ibid.
- ⁶⁰ See Aaron Y. Zelin, Foreign Jihadists in Syria: Tracking Recruitment Networks, Policy Watch 2186, The Washington Institute, December 19, 2013 available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/foreign-jihadists-in-syria-tracking-recruitment-networks>

- ⁶¹ See the numbers of the Institute at <http://icsr.info/2013/04/icsr-insight-european-foreign-fighters-in-syria-2/>
- ⁶² See Spiegel online October 21, 2013 available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-camp-collection-point-for-german-jihadist>
- ⁶³ See Presseurope, August 16, 2012 available at <http://www.presseurope.eu/de/content/article/2532601-viktor-orban-sucht-seine-wurzeln-asien>
- ⁶⁴ See the article by Michael Knueppel, Zur Ungarischen Rezeption der sumerisch-turanischen Hypothese in der zweiten Haelfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, Zeitschrift fuer Balkanologie, No. 42, 2006, 1+2, p. 98 available at <http://www.zeitschrift-fuer-balkanologie.de/index.php/zfb/article/view/76>
- ⁶⁵ See Emel Akcah and Umut Korkut, Geographical Metanarratives in East-Central Europe: Neo-Turanism in Hungary, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 53, No. 5, 2012, pp. 596-614, here p. 600
- ⁶⁶ This is what the former Deputy Chairman of Jobbik, Csanad Szegedi advocated. See *ibid.*, p. 601
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 606
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.* p. 609
- ⁷⁰ Quoted *ibid.*
- ⁷¹ Quote from an interview with Gyoengyoesi *ibid.*
- ⁷² See Spiegel online, January 30, 2013
- ⁷³ See Paul Lendvai, *The Hungarians. A Thousand Years of Victory in Defeat*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2003, p. 373
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.* p. 375. The citation is a quote from Thomas von Bogyay.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 378
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- ⁷⁸ Numbers taken from Paul Lendvai, *ibid.*, p. 425
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 379
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁸¹ See the article by Lili Bayer "Hungarian Government accused of illegally funding political party for ethnic kin in Romania", Politics.HU, available at <http://www.politics.hu/20130423/hungarian-government-accused-of-illegally-funding-political-party-for-ethnic-kin-in-romania/>
- ⁸² See his article "Longing for Greater Hungary", *London Review of Books*, Vol. 34, No. 12, June 21, 2012, p. 12-13.
- ⁸³ See Paul Lendvai, *Hungary Between Democracy and Authoritarianism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2012, p.6. This is also how Jan- Werner Mueller characterizes Hungary in his excellent article "Longing for Greater Hungary", *London Review of Books*, Vol. 34, No. 12, 21. June 2012
- ⁸⁴ Paul Lendvai, *ibid.*
- ⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 20
- ⁸⁶ Jacques Rupnik, Jan Zielonka, "Introduction: The State of Democracy 20 Years on: Domestic and External Factors", *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, Volume 27, Number 1, February 2013, p. 3-25, here p. 18
- ⁸⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁸ Paul Lendvai, *op.cit.*, p. 8
- ⁸⁹ I am grateful to Charles Gati for his comments on this issue.
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- ⁹¹ Paul Lendvai, *Hungary Between Democracy and Authoritarianism*, *op.cit.*, p.3
- ⁹² Rudolf Tokes, *op.cit.*, p. 114-115
- ⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 115
- ⁹⁴ See Lenka Bustikova and Herbert Kitschelt, The radical right in post-communist Europe. Comparative perspectives on legacies and party competition, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 42 (2009), p. 459-483, here p. 459
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- ⁹⁶ See the data in an article by Daniel Nelson, "Regional Security and Ethnic Minorities" in *Dilemmas of Transition. The Hungarian Experience*, *op.cit.*, p. 301-321, here p. 305
- ⁹⁷ See Paul Lendvai, *op.cit.*, p. 36

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 40

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ See on this point Nicolas Berggruen and Nathan Garrels, *The Next Europe. Toward a Federal Union*, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013, p. 134-142, here p. 135

¹⁰¹ For an overview of the Funding of European political parties see website of the European Parliament available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/grants/grant_amounts_parties_03-12-2012.pdf. See also the chart in the annex.

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¹⁰⁵ See the text of the Draft Report on the situation of fundamental rights, standards and practices in Hungary, op. cit., p. 10

¹⁰⁶ See in particular Human Rights Watch, *Wrong Direction on Rights. Assessing the Impact of Hungary's New Constitution and Laws*, May 2013, summary p. 1-3

¹⁰⁷ See Miklos Bankuti, Gabor Halmai and Kim Lane Scheppelle, *From Separation of Powers to a Government without Checks: Hungary's Old and New Constitutions*. In: *Constitution for a Disunited Nation*, op. cit., footnote No. 90, p. 237-268, here p. 238

¹⁰⁸ See the Hungarian Spectrum, July 2, 2013

¹⁰⁹ See the Press release of the European Commission dated January 17, 2012

¹¹⁰ This is a point made by Jan Werner Mueller in his paper on 'Safeguarding Democracy Inside the EU. Brussels and the Future of Liberal Order', Transatlantic Academy Paper Series, February 2013, p. 21

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 25

¹¹³ The text of the letter of the four Foreign Ministers was made available to the author by the German Foreign Office.

¹¹⁴ See the text in the Official Journal of the European Union available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:328:0055:0058:EN:PDF>

¹¹⁵ On the Hungarian legislation on hate crime see the Amnesty International Report on "Violent Attacks Against Roma in Hungary, Amnesty International Publications 2010 available at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR27/001/2010/en/7ee79730-e23f-4f20-834a-deb8deb23464/eur270012010en.pdf>

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ See the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of July 9, 2013 available at [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122183#{%22itemid%22:\[%22001-122183%22\]}](http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122183#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-122183%22]})

¹¹⁸ See the article on Hungary from 1918 to 1945, The Yivo Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe available at http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Hungary/Hungary_from_1918_to_1945

¹¹⁹ See Spiegel online June 6, 2012 available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/right-wing-extremists-cultivate-horthy-cult-in-hungary-a-836526.html>

¹²⁰ See the text of the chapter of the Amicus Brief "Political speech subjected to a limitation based on the dignity of the nation and dignity of public officials (Article 5 of the Fourth Amendment" available at http://halmaigabor.hu/dok/437_Amicus_Brief_on_the_Fourth_Amendment4.pdf

¹²¹ See for example Uwe Backes, *NPD-Verbot: Pro and Contra*, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, No. 18, 2012 available at <http://www.bpb.de/apuz/133376/npd-verbot-pro-und-contra?p=all>

¹²² Hans- Gert Poettering, Former President of the European Parliament as quoted in: Mario P. Chiti, *From a Community based on the Rule of Law to the European Union as a Community of Rights*, available at: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=111066>

¹²³ See Mario Chiti, *ibid.*



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