


Where is heading **Ukraine** ?



Conference
proceedings

edited by **Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz**



CENTRUM STOSUNKÓW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS



ROBERT BOSCH STIFTUNG

This book has been prepared in the framework of the CIR project:
**“Towards a New Partnership
NATO and the EU vis à vis Russia
and the Post-Soviet Area”**
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On the 4th and 5th of April 2003 a conference took place in Warsaw, the main focus of which was an attempt to answer the question “Where is Ukraine heading?”

This question seemed to be both important and legitimate, particularly considering the new shape of relations between NATO and Russia and connected with this a new evaluation of the significance of Ukraine as factor for stabilization in the region, and the operational and territorial changes within the European Union. This question is also important because in countries neighboring Ukraine, which conducted accession referendums, the number of votes “for” was above 70% (in Poland 77%, on Slovakia 92,5%, and in Hungary 84%). Ukraine received a clear signal from its closest western neighbors that it should clearly show that it is on the path towards civilized development.

Ukraine’s clear statement declaring its aspirations to membership in both essential integration structures of the North-Atlantic area, NATO and the European Union, places before Ukraine new, great challenges. At the same time however we have forceful voices both in Ukraine and abroad, questioning this choice, and some actions which blur the principle aims of Ukrainian policy. And so, Ukraine’s efforts to join together with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan into a new common economic-political structure can undermine beliefs regarding its pro-western orientation. Also, the attitudes of Ukraine’s nearby and more remote neighbors in relation to the European and Atlantic aspirations of this country are not always clear.

On the other side however, Ukraine’s commitment to the mission of stabilization in Iraq and the fact, that the Ukrainian contingent is second in size to the Polish, and also because the suspicions about sales to Iraq of advanced radar systems were not confirmed, the image of this country significantly improved, particularly on the other side of the Atlantic.

The program of this conference allowed us to raise a number of issues. The arrangement of this book corresponds to the order of speeches. For editorial reasons we were forced to omit discussions, some of which were very interesting. The general topics of these discussions are contained in the conference preliminary report published by the Center for International Relations*.

* Wojciech Borodzicz-Smoliński, *Where is Ukraine heading?*, Center For International Relations, May 2003. www.csm.org.pl.

In closing it is worth mentioning that according to the principles agreed upon during the conference, the opinions and views expressed during the conference and contained in the published materials are the speakers' opinions and are not necessarily the views of the institutions represented by them.

J. O.

Table of Contents

1. Preface	9
Janusz Onyszkiewicz	11
2. Introduction	13
Bronisław Geremek	15
Borys Tarasyuk	22
3. Ukraine and European Union	27
Yewhen Perelyhin	29
Oleksandr Moroz	35
Zdzisław Najder	39
4. Ukraine, NATO and Democratic Control of Armed Forces	47
Georgij Kriuczukow	49
Christof Weil	58
Kazimierz Sikorski	63
Andrzej Karkoszka	68
5. Ukraine and its Neighbours	73
Vitalij Shybko	75
James Sherr	78
Stanisław Ciosek	85
William G. Miller	89

I. Preface

DR. JANUSZ ONYSZKIEWICZ

Senior Research Fellow, Center for International Relations, Former Minister of Defence

I would like to warmly welcome everyone to this conference organised by the Center for International Relations, as part of a program supported by the Robert Bosch Foundation. I particularly would like to welcome Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek, as well as former, present and perhaps future ministers, members of parliament, representatives of embassies, and give a particularly warm welcome to those who will present their thoughts both today and tomorrow on the subject of our conference. I would like to remind you that the main session will take place tomorrow, and it will consist of three parts. The first will be devoted to Ukraine and the EU, the second to Ukraine and NATO and the last will cover issues relating to Ukraine and its neighbours. I greatly regret that Vladimir Lukin the Vice Speaker of the Russian Duma, will not be among us, at the last minute he was detained by his important parliamentary duties. Unfortunately, we were not able to find another representative from Russia and because of this the last part of the discussion will be particularly lacking.

Recently almost all conferences have begun with references to the 11th of September 2001. I wouldn't like to disappoint you and therefore I will also begin in this way, because it seems that after this date the perception of the Ukrainian issue changed significantly in the West. First of all because Ukraine for many years had been dealt with only in conjunction with Russia. The problem of Ukraine, of establishing its independence, and pro-western orientation had been treated as an element in solving the Russian problem.

After the 11th of September, Russia declared its cooperation with the West in a very clear way, (although it had already signalled this earlier). Because of this cooperation with the European Union, NATO and the USA, having shown itself to be a country that accepts the *status quo* in Europe, it seemed that Ukraine began to lose its significance with at least some politicians in the West. In addition, we have the sometimes legitimate and sometimes exaggerated fears regarding how the situation in Ukraine will develop and the future of democracy in Ukraine, as well as doubts attributable to problems with President Leonid Kuchma. In addition, issues have been emerging considering the political orientation of Ukraine and where Ukraine is heading.

It seemed that this question had been answered almost a year ago, when Ukraine passed a resolution stating the intent of Ukraine to enter the integration structures of the Euro-Atlantic area, both to European Union (which had been stated earlier, though not so distinctly formulated), and NATO. This was a signifi-

cant decision, but many things were still not was entirely clear, in view of such facts as the readiness of Ukraine to enter into a new integration structure, together with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which recently was confirmed by the decision of President Kuchma. The natural question appears in relation to this: how does this fit in with its plans of entry to the EU and the necessary adaptation of laws, state structures and economy to the standards of the EU, which are quite different from those in Russia or Belarus.

Aside from this question which stands before us, and which is connected with the title of our conference “Where is Ukraine heading?” I think it is proper to pose a similar question—where should Ukraine be heading? Obviously the answers to this question will vary. This will also depend on the place individuals, and the political circles of each country see for Ukraine. The most important answers of course will come from Ukraine. These answers may change with time. In Poland this has been our experience.

In the early nineties it did not appear that Polish membership in NATO had been widely accepted. In 1996 Jacques Chirac, a prominent western politician said that extension of EU eastwards was extremely risky because it would cause an avalanche process, which would cause the EU to blur entirely and its purpose would be lost at the same time. As reason for these fears he suggested that Poland after its entry to the Union, would not accept being the most eastward country in the EU and would try to force the acceptance for membership of countries farther east, and this could ruin whole the European scheme. I do not want to add to such doubts and such questions here, but I will remind you of various critical statements concerning the membership of Ukraine in the EU from such politicians as Romano Prodi and Joschka Fischer. Despite all these fears and restrictions, there is still a good chance that the conviction expressed by Zbigniew Brzeziński will prevail in the West, (it is obviously natural that this has already been happening in Poland), he said that Ukraine has a great meaning not only regionally, but also for Europe and the whole North-Atlantic system. Others, such as Sherman Garnett, have expressed a similar opinion, in his book about Ukraine he described it as a cornerstone or better still a keystone for the whole range of countries spreading from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea, which will be fundamental to the safety of our whole region.

Let me conclude the opening of this conference with these few comments and invite two very prominent politicians to speak. I believe that they need no introduction, as it happens that they both are former (at least at this time) Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Poland and Ukraine. And perhaps in alphabetical order first I would like to ask Professor Bronisław Geremek to speak.

2. Introduction

PROFESSOR BRONISŁAW GEREMEK

Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Poland

Thank you very much Mister Chairman.

In the concluding passages of his book on the history of Ukraine in the twentieth century Jarosław Hrycak states that the fates of war between Persia and Greece in the fifth century AD decided the fate of Europe, and possibly the fate of the world as well. If we imagine that this war had turned out differently and the Persians had been victorious, we would live in a different world. These words are the reference point for his conclusion that the present fate of Ukraine will impact the rest of the world. He believes that both because of its geographical position, geostrategic importance, and ambitions Ukraine has influence on the future of the world around us.

I quote these words of the Ukrainian historian first of all to say that I am convinced that such is the importance of Ukraine at this very moment. Ukraine has impact on what the world around us will be like. In our pasts Poland and Ukraine, had common historical experiences. Historical fates both united us and divided us. There is a river of blood that has been a dividing force between these two nations. We remember our common history; common fates in last decades and even back to the beginning of the twentieth century. When Marshal Józef Piłsudski said that the independence of Poland is unimaginable without an independent Ukraine and that the independence of Ukraine depends on an independent Poland and Polish independence, these words might have seemed very distant from reality.

Ukraine was not independent, it had experienced what sometimes is called the Ukrainian revolution and an attempt at building an independent Ukraine, but this attempt was just a breath of history because its duration was dramatically brief.

In Polish thought regarding Ukraine, there was of course consideration of Polish interests and Poland's place in world. When the Polish émigré community spoke to the issue of the independence of Ukraine in their Parisian magazine *Kultura* it was connected with their wish for Polish freedom and independence. It is a very beautiful and important tradition that the discussions concerning the relationship between Polish and Ukrainian independence took place in the columns of the Parisian Polish émigré magazine *Kultura*. Sometimes the discussions about what the relationship between Poland and Ukraine should be was between Ukrainians and Poles, and sometimes only among Poles. Last, but not least the discussions were about the future of Ukraine. This is a very important heritage of Polish

political thought, which after 1989 had a great impact on creating Polish foreign policy. It is worth mentioning that in these debates in *Kultura* magazine the fates of Poland and Ukraine were not set against Russia, but were connected with the hope that Russia would become democratic and, therefore a vision of a future Russian democracy became part of our political outlook.

Referring to this historical recollection, I would like first of all to talk about the present day and about the current relationship between Poland and Ukraine, and I would also like to recall an important issue: namely, that after 1989 in foreign affairs Poland immediately established a policy of parallel relations with the Soviet Union (which at that time still existed) and other countries that were subject to the control of the Soviet Union, but which aspired to their own freedom. This policy seems to be a continuation in the political thought of the period between the two world wars in Poland, called the Promethean philosophy, but its basic tenet was the support of nations in their endeavours for freedom. It happened that this policy which seemed to be in contrast with *Realpolitik*, became a real policy itself.

It is very important today when we consider the state of relations between Poland and Ukraine and when we try to answer the question of where is Ukraine now and where is it headed not to limit ourselves to only diplomatic generalities. My friend Borys Tarasiuk and I had an opportunity to practice diplomacy—I would say, Minister Tarasiuk more professionally, and I with the feeling of adventure—but I think that both of us would agree that it is a good principle between friends to also talk with some sharpness, which does not fit within the canons of diplomatic language.

It is possible to ask the question whether Polish policy, which after 1989 first supported the endeavours of Ukraine for independence, and then recognised good relations with Ukraine and support for its independence as one of its priorities, failed. Polish political journalists sometimes state that Polish policy towards Ukraine failed. Because I am convinced that this is not true, I would like to consider why we encounter this pessimistic assessment of the situation. We encounter it because in the present view of Ukraine both its internal policy and foreign affairs cause some concerns; both policies seem to be unstable and unclear.

The most important thing is that despite all this, despite its own internal failures, Ukraine is an independent country and its independence is an important element of present day international politics and the situation of the world today. While talking about Ukraine I would like to avoid my words being interpreted as an attempt to give lessons or private classes.

Both our nations stood up and faced a very difficult challenge of transformation, building an economy based on rational principles, building an honest and democratic country. Both our nations responded to this challenge and therefore it seems worthwhile to think about this as our mutual experience and mutual les-

sons—to say that it is important for Poland what Ukraine will be like and where is it heading.

During the process of forming the European Union one of the great creative processes was the process of reconciliation. It was a painful and difficult process. The Germans had to reconcile with the French and what was even more difficult the French had to reconcile with the Germans and they had to forget about what had divided them for centuries. Also the English and the Germans had to forget about what divided them during the last war. Reconciliation between the nations is the first problem, which applies to the relationship between Poland and Ukraine. On the Polish side there is the problem of the truth about the Wisła Action, and responsibility for this action undertaken by the communist government of Poland against the Ukrainian population. On the Ukrainian side there is a problem of the truth about Wołyń, concerning these operations of hatred, which cost so many human lives. Confirmation of the truth about Wołyń and the truth regarding the Wisła Action will have a clarifying power. It had a cleansing power when the truth about Katyń was presented, and when during the long process the facts became accessible and people were allowed to talk about the crime committed by Stalin and the Soviet Union against Polish officers.

It is a paradox that in Polish-Ukrainian relations it was not until now that this process gained strength and became a cleansing power. I would like to say that recent statements by prominent Ukrainian politicians regarding the Wołyń crime have importance for us. And we expect similar actions in regard to the Eaglets' cemetery in Lvov. It is reasonable to expect that if on both the Polish and the Ukrainian sides, the truth will be presented, the historians' truth, but also the truth of peoples' consciousness, then Polish-Ukrainian relations will have a solid moral basis.

We defined Polish-Ukrainian relations in terms of a strategic partnership. Politicians sometimes use words that are very difficult to define. And when words are difficult to define, they fit in all situations. Strategic partnership may be such a notion. Strategic partnership means not only good relations with neighbouring countries, but also refers to common interests and the possibility of cooperation. What is difficult to define is this added value, which supplements the notion of strategic partnership with the principle of good relations with one's neighbours. In many ways we were successful in this area, specific examples being our cooperation on the Balkans, the Polish-Ukrainian battalion, and our experiences in diplomatic cooperation. I recall with gratitude the diplomatic cooperation, which I had the chance to share with Borys Tarasiuk when he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I believe it was easier for the political voice of Poland to be heard in the world, when we had the support of Ukraine and it was easier for the voice of Ukraine to be heard when it had the support of Poland. This applies as well to many forms of political cooperation; between presidents of both countries, between governments of both countries, and between non-governmental organisa-

tions. The turn for the worse in the international perspective on Ukraine was in my opinion a very painful experience for Poland.

The reason for this view is an insufficient progress towards the creation of a democratic country, the lack of respect for the principles of the state rule-of-law, a rise in corruption and organised crime, and a lack of economic reforms. Now it is time to think about how to change this. Definitely the simplest answer is that it depends on Ukraine's citizens.

This is the problem and challenge that Ukraine is facing now. But we should also consider what place this negative view of Ukraine has in the present political arrangement. Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz mentioned this when he was talking about the new international context. After the 11th of September 2001 it could seem that the strength of the coalition, which was coming into being at that time, would create new possibilities for communication and new forms of international cooperation.

Now as we are having our discussion the war is still going on and during the course of this war we see the world divided more than it has been for a long time. We also see the international institutions, in which both our countries participate or which they aspire to, in a state of deep crisis. The Atlantic Alliance, of which Poland is a member, is at a turning point in its history, not to say in crisis, because this word is perhaps too dramatic. When the Atlantic Alliance stood before the question of whether to answer the request of one of its members—Turkey, about the use the fourth Article, the weakest article of Euro-Atlantic alliance, and it turns out to be difficult to reach agreement during the debates, then what about the fifth Article—the fundamental article of the Washington Treaty and the basis of our feeling of security—us, meaning those who are the part of the Alliance or all of those who want to join it.

This is also a question about the future of the EU. When I try to convince my French friends that the relations between Europe and America are in a surprisingly volatile state then I use the argument that we never expected that we would face the choice of whether to support the French-German-Russian alliance, or the British—American Coalition. And I tell them that we do not deserve to face such a choice after our experiences during the twentieth century.

The European Union with its common interests is trying to parlay its economic success into one of political community faces now the crisis of not being able to define its common policy in the face of the challenges of international policy.

The United Nations is no longer young. The United Nations articles do not apply to the challenges of the new situation. But we also know that there is no other system of international law other than the one that originated from the United Nations Charter and that there is no alternative institution of cooperation on a global scale. The painful conclusion is that UN is so helpless that it is not able to implement its own resolutions.

The passing of resolution 1441 shows however that it is possible. I believe that when the Security Council voted unanimously to pass this resolution there was a hope that the UN would be the institution to step up to the challenge of a new world philosophy of international policy, based on human rights. This hope was not fulfilled. And now we can say that excluding the UN from decisions that have influence on the rest of the world, makes the future of this organisation questionable.

Therefore the political context of the future of Ukraine and the positions of Poland and Ukraine have changed dramatically. The brief period of happiness in Europe when the cold war ended and the totalitarian system fell it seemed that the “autumn of nations” in 1989 would create a new international order. However we now have a feeling that none of the elements of this arrangement gives us any certainty. Uncertainty and chaos characterise this new arrangement, as stated by international affair specialist Teresa Delpech. If so, then does this somewhat rhetorical formula of strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine makes any sense at all?

I would like to express the thesis that the pro-Ukrainian policy that Poland was and is engaged in forms a consistent component of Polish politics. Consistent in that even when we hear negative opinions about Ukraine, it does not change and should not change our position. Therefore there is a community of interests between us, not only one of temporary sympathy or political orientation.

We observed with a great deal of interest how constantly, although very slowly, Ukraine has defined its aspirations. They first of all concerned the relations of Ukraine with NATO. It is interesting how the polls of public opinion have changed, how Ukrainian society has changed its opinion concerning NATO and how slowly this position has changed regarding the Atlantic Alliance, which during Soviet times was the object of an extensive and hostile campaign and still retains its imprints in the collective consciousness even though NATO is no longer an enemy, but a friendly alliance. Polls show that Ukrainian society perceives its place to be in the Atlantic Alliance. A similar change in public opinion concerns the perception of the EU and now we can say that this tendency in social consciousness is growing and therefore Ukrainian society increasingly accepts the relationship between their country and NATO on the one side and the EU on the other.

However the intentions of the Ukrainian government concerning both these issues, entering NATO and the EU are not clearly defined. Therefore the question of whether Ukraine can become a member of the Atlantic Alliance and the EU needs to be raised.

I think this question which will be answered by the future, should be answered in a realistic way. Whether Ukraine wants to enter both organisations—is a Ukrainian problem. Whether these organisations want Ukraine to become a member is an important political question for Poland both as a member of

NATO and as a future member of the EU. I think that Poland should support the ambitions of Ukraine in both cases. This fact prompts us say that the entry of Ukraine into NATO is not on the agenda at the present moment, but there is a possibility that Ukraine will become a member of NATO before the year 2010. From the Polish point of view the earlier the better. Not long ago it seemed impossible that the Atlantic Alliance would accept countries such as Bulgaria or Romania as members in the near future, but experience has shown it to be possible. The experience in this case meaning the commitment both political, and military by Romania and Bulgaria to the Atlantic Alliance. The Alliance itself should be treated in a different way than before. The Alliance, whether it is consistent with its founding philosophy or not, becomes not only a military-political alliance, but also it becomes an effectively functioning security structure. If so then the presence of Ukraine strengthens the chances of stability in Europe as a whole.

Does this reasoning apply also to the EU? In a considerably lesser degree, It seems that at present the EU is somewhat terrified by its own courage. It decided in Helsinki to accept twelve or thirteen countries, and now it is accepting ten new countries and this dramatic decision should be sealed on the 16th of April in Athens with the Accession Treaty. The EU is accepting countries with 40% of average European capital, including countries with one third of the average European level of prosperity like Latvia or Lithuania and also considerably more prosperous countries such as Slovenia, considerably above the average GDP in EU. Is it possible to imagine the European Union being able at this time to undertake a similar decision concerning a country as large as Ukraine, a country with a considerably lower level of prosperity?

It seems possible, that if Ukraine could guarantee a stable level of economic development, honest functioning of the country based on the rule of law, then within the horizon of 2010–2015 the entry of Ukraine into the EU becomes realistic. It is very hard to say this to an ally, that it is still a long way off and is measured in years. Historians can say, that 5 years is hardly a speck of time, and even 10 years is a very short period. The most important thing is to first build hope—I think it is an important element of politics, and secondly the creation of structures preparing for the entry to both NATO and the EU.

In NATO there are previously defined frameworks, through which Ukraine can occasion cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance, and prepare for membership. The problem is whether the EU could create such forms that would allow Ukraine to participate, and not only cooperate with the EU.

This question leads me to some preliminary conclusions.

The UE not only has the experience of full economic integration and perspective of full political integration, but also the experience of creating a platform for economic cooperation. Here I am thinking of such organisations as EFTA.

The notion of creating an economic platform means first of all application of the four EU freedoms: the free movement of people, the free movement of

goods, the free movement of services and the free movement of capital. This is in the interest of both Europe and Ukraine and I am convinced that this is also in the interest of Poland. First of all this creates a challenge for Ukraine. It is hard to imagine the free movement of people when borders are not being fully controlled and the free movement of people when organised crime is not countered by adequate action. It is also hard to imagine the free movement of capital when the rule-of-law does not fully function and when there are no full guarantees for the safety for capital. In order to have guarantees of safety from the EU there has to be certainty that it is a legitimate capital, and there has to be the certainty on the Ukrainian side that it will not be speculated capital, and that it will serve investments stimulating the Ukrainian economy. I believe that this is the essential challenge for Ukraine.

Coming to my last conclusion, I am convinced, that cooperation between Poland and Ukraine can become a very powerful factor in international politics, if Ukraine evolves in the direction that the Ukrainian democrats wanted and want it to lead. This cooperation will not only be the sum of two demographic potentials and two countries divided by borders of international organisations. Because Poland, unlike Ukraine, is already both a member NATO, and the EU, it can be an essential element in this particular international situation, in which all seems insecure, in which threats grow and guarantees diminish. If this type of cooperation which has already begun between our countries, is pursued wisely then I am convinced that it will benefit Ukraine, Europe and Poland.

AMBASSADOR BORYS TARASYUK

Chairman of the Committee of European Integration of the Highest Council of Ukraine

Thank you Janusz, thank you for your kind words. Mr Prime Minister, Ministers, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentleman this is a great pleasure to be present at this conference and to have the honour to speak before you.

For me this is a very happy moment because I have the honour to be with you and to sit together with my two best Polish friends, two Ministers, two well known Polish politicians, known not only in Poland but over the world Bronisław Geremek and Janusz Onyszkiewicz.

We did have very close co-operation while in office and for all of us, it seems to me, it is quite a consistent sign of policy that we paid so much attention to the relationship between our countries.

Let me remind you that the first visit I paid in my capacity as a foreign minister abroad was the visit to Warsaw. By organising this conference the Centre for International Relations actually demonstrated once again the consistent policy line, the policy line of Polish institutions, that is, to support the Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic integrational course.

This is the continuation of the chain of conferences which were organised by Poland literally every month and let me remind you about the conference which was organised on the initiative of the Polish President and Prime Minister here in Warsaw on Ukraine's role and place in Europe—October last year.

The development of the strategic partnership relations with the Republic of Poland is the priority of foreign policy of Ukraine and this priority is being demonstrated not only by Presidents, Governments of both countries, but also by the Parliamentarians, parties, non-governmental organisations, intellectuals and ordinary people.

Such relations are based on our common historic, cultural and economic ties between our countries. Since the beginning of the nineties of the last century, Ukraine has consistently supported the willingness of our neighbours, especially and first of all Poland, to join both the EU and NATO. Ukraine has positively reacted to Poland's joining NATO. Ukraine has always welcomed Poland's successes on its way to EU as well as we are positively estimating the policy line by the Polish government concerning Ukraine–EU relationship and here I mean the Polish paper “Eastern Dimension of the EU policy towards its neighbours”.

Poland is a real friend of Ukraine. Poland welcomes the development of co-operation between Ukraine and NATO, Ukraine and EU. Poland supports the strategic objective of Ukraine to join NATO. One of the examples of support

Poland is providing to Ukraine and of our common co-operation is the idea which we have been discussed with both my friends Janusz and Bronisław on creation of a Polish-Ukrainian battalion which is currently serving in Kosovo. Another positive example—the agreement to proclaim next year, year 2004 as a year of Poland in Ukraine and the year 2005 as a year of Ukraine in Poland. So today's Polish-Ukraine's relations are not only the value for our countries and people but a serious factor of the European architecture. And let me remind you the speech of our good friend Zbigniew Brzeziński, who referred to the very fact that Poland and Ukraine together are capable to do in Central and Eastern Europe what Germany and France did in Western Europe and together these countries may create an arch of stability for the whole of Europe.

My good friend Bronisław touched upon a very delicate issues in our bilateral relationship. He mentioned very painful pages in our common history that is the Wisła Operation, the Wołyń Tragedy. Yesterday I was lecturing at the University in Lutsk, that is in Wołyń and the professors, the students, the journalists paid a lot of attention to this common painful page of our history. Believe me, there is a very painful perception of this tragedy not only in Poland but in Ukraine as well.

Actually I think that the way we will overcome this next test in our bilateral relationship will be the test of our strategic partnership. It will be the test for our achievements. It will be the test of our European identity. And to my mind the best way to overcome this test will be the formula “forgive us and we forgive you”, because the “searching for the truth” will not produce the result we are desiring. We have to think not about the past, we have to think about the future.

Now, let me come to the subject of our conference. “Ukraine in Europe” conference of October 14th last year, gave seemingly unanimous conclusion among the Ukrainian participants—both the governmental officials and the representatives of different political parties, “there is no alternative to Ukraine's European choice”—the conclusion was to make it short. While thinking about the answer to the question title of this conference “Where Ukraine is heading to?” or “Quo vadis Ukraine?” the spontaneous answer came to my mind: I don't know!

First of all let me underline here that I was, I am and I will be the consistent supporter and active participant of the development and realisation of Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic choice.

But let me answer where this confusion comes from. It comes from the controversial and contradictory declarations and deeds of Ukraine's President and of his team. While in Brussels or meeting the Western leaders the policy line is certainly being described as unequivocal quest for membership both in EU and NATO. While in Moscow the policy line is the opposite one—“deepest ever in history integration with or rather in Russia and Belarus”. So I have a great sense of sympathy for both our partners to the west and to the east. None of them can be sure “where Ukraine is heading to?”. Perhaps this is too emotional assessment

but let me present my vision of present development of relationship with both EU and NATO and their perspective.

Both tracks have their commonalities and differences. Both have been officially declared as foreign policy objectives. Unlike in EU case, though NATO membership objective was declared May last year as a strategic objective. In both directions Poland was and continues to be our most consistent supporter. Both have more or less common criteria in sense of democracy, democratic institutions, rule of law, civil society etc. The list could be continued. And about the differences. We have the different attitudes and concepts on the part of EU and NATO.

When it concerns EU: from “unique and strategic partner” in 1999, Ukraine is being transferred to a kind of “neighbour” of EU and member of so called “ring of friends” of the EU together with Northern African countries. This approach is contrary to a crystal clear policy demonstrated by NATO towards Ukraine and other countries—that is the policy of “open door”. The difference is also in the perception both NATO and EU enjoy in Ukrainian society and among the political parties. The difference is also in the different level of future preparedness of Ukraine towards eventual membership.

What is the perception of both EU and NATO in Ukraine? As to EU the public opinion polls is predominantly demonstrating the support of membership in the EU. The average figure is close and about 60% support. Even in the east and south of Ukraine where I am organising the round tables on the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, the support is more than 50% and the public opinion polls in the southern and eastern regions in Ukraine demonstrates that the majority of seemingly so called “pro-Russian” regions is for European model of the development of Ukraine. More than 50% would like to see Ukraine developing in the European model not in the Russian, Chinese or Belorussian. As to NATO we are witnessing the decreasing support from 32% support for membership till last June to 21.5% recently. This is a very alarming tendency. The other reasons are the contradictory and controversial signals coming from the authorities. The negative campaign in mass-media, controlled by the authorities and by the oligarchs. As a result we have the lack of adequate information about NATO. People tend to mix NATO with US—British military operation in Iraq and thus influencing the negative perception among the population about NATO and the whole West.

As to the parliament, we may claim that currently we have the most pro-Euro-Atlantic, the most pro-European parliament of all parliaments of renewed independent Ukraine. Let me demonstrate this very fact that when the parliament voted on the recommendations after parliamentary hearings on the EU–Ukraine relationship the support was more than constitutional majority 328 votes “for”. And when the parliament decided on the very first day of the Prague NATO summit 21st of November the relationship between Ukraine and NATO there was

a majority of 263 votes for. But let me tell you that this was a historic decision because for the first time in its history Ukrainian parliament clearly voted in favour of Ukraine's membership in NATO.

Iraq, I can not avoid but mention this issue as well. The events around Iraq and the Iraq war have as their consequences the damage to transatlantic links, the damage to integrity within NATO, EU and downgrading the authority of United Nations and that is a fact. As to Ukraine, Ukraine has chosen to provide its humanitarian assistance to the people of the neighbouring Kuwait by sending its NBC 532 men strong battalion. Which certainly was a very difficult decision which caused the division between the political parties, in the society and even within coalitions like "Our Ukraine", to which I belong.

At the conclusion let me express my conviction that Poland's support of Ukraine in both EU and NATO track is very positive. We need the enlargement of so called "ring of friends of Ukraine" and we hope that Poland will help to organise this "ring of friends of Ukraine". Let me express also the hope that the conference will help to better understand what should be done to help Ukraine. But the end—result depends certainly on Us, in Ukraine. Internal reforms, political and economic this is our responsibility and the answer.

Thank You very much for Your attention.

3. Ukraine and European Union

YEWHEN PERELYHIN

Director of the Department of European Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

Thank you Mister Minister. First of all I would like to thank our Polish colleagues both in governmental, and non-governmental organisations for the attention given to Ukraine in the context of European integration. It motivates all of us: Ukrainian officials, government representatives and the members of non-governmental organisations to continue our work and to apply the European approach to the question of integration.

I believe that the future relations between Ukraine and European Union depend first of all on two main factors: the internal development of Ukraine and the future make up of the European Union. I believe none today can say what the new European Union will be like in even a few years, certainly not ten years from now. We know that today there are two visions—referred to as the “new” Europe and the “old” Europe. We do not know the final form of the European Union Constitution, which is now being worked on by the Convention. There is also a lack of clarity on many other issues, especially those concerning the borders of the enlarged EU.

Ukraine bases its methods for building future relations with the EU on two principle foundations.

First the European Union will continue to develop based on a policy of integration. This will enable the development of relations between Ukraine and the enlarged EU through a consistent and all-embracing integration of Ukraine with the European Union. Introduction of this principle will also create a basis for answering the challenges which the new EU will create. This is the basis for us. The process of integration can not be stopped.

Next, we have the issue of the European Union being open to all other European countries fulfilling the requirements for future membership. Ukraine, which has professed the desire to join the European Union and is consistently implementing integration policy, expects the EU to confirm the prospects of Ukraine for integration.

Moreover, while discussing the scenario for development of relations between Ukraine and European Union it is necessary to analyse the present circumstances of Ukraine, present regulations regarding relations between Ukraine and the EU as well as the goals of Ukraine.

As we know the basic document describing the regulation of relations between Ukraine and the European Union is the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation. To be honest, this document does not apply to the present situation.

This document is outdated both in its content, and in regard to the present political situation. The legal framework of this document does not correspond to the need for the development of a strategic partnership between Ukraine and the enlarged EU, and the fulfilment of the primary geopolitical goal of our country, which is accession to the European Union.

The mechanisms and tools that can be applied according to the existing Agreement are inconsistent with the intent of the European Commission to deepen cooperation with Ukraine. Therefore, future relations between Ukraine and the EU can not develop based solely on the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation. It is necessary to look for new forms and frameworks for legal relations between Ukraine and the European Union.

You know, that for the last three or four weeks there has been a stormy debate concerning the appeal of the European Commission to the Council of European Union and The European Parliament within European countries, particularly in Ukraine. This document aroused in me and also in many Ukrainian politicians and officials what we call in English 'mixed feelings'. In the final version of the European Commission statement the original British concept of relations between an enlarged European Union and its eastern neighbours (first of all Ukraine) was transformed into a concept of relations between the enlarging European Union and its eastern neighbours, including Mediterranean countries and Russia. Why does this decision raise so many questions and doubts?

Today the European Union has a clear strategy for relations with Mediterranean countries. This refers of course to the Barcelona Process. The European Union is linked with Russia however, by the Northern Dimension policy. For three years there has been extensive work done on creating a common European economic framework between Russia and the EU. It in this context the paradigm of future relations for the next 7–10 years becomes clear. As far as future East European Neighbours of the EU, especially Ukraine is concerned, there is no far-sighted or long-term concept for relations and therefore the necessity of creating the so-called Eastern Dimension appeared, meaning the new Eastern Policy of the EU. I am against using the term Eastern Dimension, because it is a broad term referring not only to the three neighbouring East European countries. We would like to suggest redefining this concept as the East European Dimension in the future external policy of the enlarged European Union. The European Commission endeavoured in this the way to unify its strategy, suggesting the same principles of conduct both for the countries, which because of their geographical position will never accede to the European Union, and for countries for whom a European destiny does not raise any doubts. Whether or not Ukraine enters the European Union, depends first of all on Ukraine and whether it will manage to do its homework, namely if it will implement internal political, economic and legal reforms.

Another contradiction in the strategy accepted by the European Commission is that on the one hand at the beginning it was stressed that the prospect of European membership, was the most effective stimulus for the introduction of internal reforms by the candidate countries. On the other hand the document later states that the issue of prospective membership for any East European countries is not discussed in this document. After all Ukraine isn't formulating the question about membership yet, we are realists and understand that such questions are not yet possible. Ukraine is talking about its prospects for membership and whether the European Union will be accessible. I want to stress this, so there is no misunderstanding. This only regards prospects because afterwards everything depends on the country and how it implements the reforms of the program.

To conclude my analysis of this questionable strategy, I would like to examine the possible introduction by the European Commission, of the "3 + 1" formula for regional cooperation. The intention is for it to be used as one of the main instruments of future cooperation in this region. What I am referring to is the formula embracing Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia and Russia. Why does this raise questions? Because between these four countries a framework of cooperation already exists, and its future functioning as well as further integration within this framework exclusively will not bring any positive results in the field of political and economic reforms. A positive effect can be achieved by extending regional cooperation to all countries of the region. What I mean here is the cooperation between Ukraine and countries of Visegrad Group. We can also talk about cooperation in and development of the integration processes within the framework of the Riga Initiative. Until now the following situation existed between Ukraine and the European Union: on the one hand both sides recognized the need for acceleration of relations, and even the creation of a new framework for it. On the other hand, these relations were unnecessarily limited by the cooperation characterising contacts with countries having no European prospects. We believe that it is time to implement the rule: from partnership to association and from cooperation to integration.

Because in the new agreement there should first of all be consideration of the four issues now forming the basis of cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union.

First is the issue of policy and security. We have already gone beyond the framework outlined by the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation. Today we need a more active political dialogue between Ukraine and European Union.

I mean that according to the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation all decisions of common institutions, such as the Cooperation Council, have an advisory character, in contrast to institutions of the candidate countries within the framework of the Association Council. The new agreement can not be just between neighbouring countries, as the European Commission suggests. Ukraine

proposes in the new agreement to make the decisions of common institutions obligatory.

Another issue that requires common legal frameworks—is the matter of the European system of security. Independent Ukraine has proved its ability in practice to bring a concrete contribution to the European security system. I will bring up only two examples. Ukraine is leading active discussions with the European Union about the implementation of the agreement by the EU to use Ukrainian long-range aircraft to transport the Common Joint Task Forces (CJTF). Ukraine is also active in peacekeeping under the aegis of the European Union. You know that Ukraine, under the auspices of the European peace mission, voluntarily sent its representatives to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, together with representatives of all European Union member countries, and along with the candidate countries there are now five policemen from Ukraine. This is a concrete contribution to stability in this region. Yet cooperation in the field of security is today still based on a one sided approach, namely the European Union decided that it will allow Ukraine a role in the European security system, but it is not regulated by any agreement on the side of the EU. Therefore, Ukraine is standing on the sidelines of this process. Therefore Ukraine claims that it is time for the contribution of Ukraine to the European security system to be part of a mutual agreement.

The second essential element, which should be considered in future relations between Ukraine and the EU, concerns economic issues and trade. Among experts we often hear voices of just criticism regarding the fact, that Ukraine did not reach a suitable economic and trade level to become an attractive partner for the European Union. According to data by the end of 2002 the European Union share of Ukraine export was about 24%. If we add to this count the 10 countries, which will become members of the EU next year then the common share will rise to 33%. During this time all the candidate countries reached the 50% level, therefore the trade between member countries and the European Union equals 50% and more in some cases. Let's look at this issue from a different perspective. Why didn't Ukraine reach and can't it reach such figures in the near future? The first cause is one of a historical nature and has to do with our relationships within the CIS. Obviously during the last ten years trade developed within the framework of relationships from the time of the Soviet Union. Therefore it is necessary to have time to find new markets and create trust among new trade partners. On the other side, all candidate countries—and even the Balkan states which are not EU candidates today—participate within the internal markets of the European Union. Only Ukraine has a favoured nation status, which in comparison with being a part of the free trade zone has less meaning and that is why it is so difficult to access the markets of the European Union. There is also the issue of antidumping procedures against Ukrainian enterprises as well as the limiting of the access of Ukrainian goods to the EU market. Taking into account these difficulties, Ukraine established a goal of the quickest possible entry to the WTO as well as to gain the

status of a country with a free market economy. We expect from the European Union only appropriate preliminary action. We believe that in the matter of giving Ukraine free market status the EU should not apply double standards, and should solve this issue in our favour in the near future. The creation of a free trade zone would be an essential component of the new Agreement. Ukraine can not remain among the few European countries, which have not signed an agreement with the European Union regarding the free trade zone. The old Agreement on Cooperation and Partnership expresses only the possibility of the creation of such a zone. The Ukrainian side proposes a new legal document clearly describing specific actions with the aim of creating a free trade zone, obviously taking in to account the transitory period and asymmetric basis of it.

The third essential element of future relations concerns judicial matters and internal affairs. We know that legal issues and internal policies in relations with other countries are priority issues for the European Union. They include struggles with illegal emigration, organised crime, terrorism, with illegal arms trade and drug trafficking. Ukraine, as one of only three states, has signed a unique agreement with the European Union; this document is a plan for European Union operations concerning Ukraine's internal affairs and matters of justice. Such a document or its equivalent is just now being offered to other states, while in Ukraine it has been functioning for two years. On the other hand it is a 'one sided approach' document, concerning one-sided operations. Ukraine appears in this document as the object of cooperation. The Ukrainian side however wants Ukraine to become the subject of cooperation.

Therefore, these three pillars are a priority for both the European Union, and for Ukraine. The Ukrainian side is considering future concentration of its efforts towards creating new forms and scope of cooperation acceptable to both sides.

I would like to raise one more issue—the matter of technical help—before I finish discussing future relations. Poland knows perfectly well, what part technical help can play in fulfilling an agreement between the two sides, and also in internal reforms. I will quote just one example, to show you the difference between the technical help given to the candidate states, including Poland, and the help given to Ukraine. TACIS—is a help program aiming to help us by giving advice on how to act. PHARE and other programs are aiming towards help by creating an opportunity for institutions of these countries to cooperate in the European environment. Therefore, today Ukraine does not raise the issue of more money for technical support, but the change of philosophy for granting such help to Ukraine. Decide for yourself whether help, which is regulated and granted on the same conditions to Mongolia and to Ukraine, with its European ambitions, can be effective? I would like to inform you that Ukraine receives the same technical support and on the same conditions as Mongolia. In front of us we have a necessary task of using the new philosophy, I would even say a new ideology of cooperation in granting technical support to Ukraine. The Ukrainian side is working on these

tasks, and the European Union has recently recognized the legitimacy of this problem.

In conclusion I would like to talk about one more issue. Until now the new strategies of the European Union unfortunately have not been providing a clear vision of future foreign policy of the enlarged EU towards Eastern Europe. In Ukraine, especially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we expect that along with the accession of Poland, Czech Republic and other states of Central Europe, as well as the Balkan states, in the centre of the united European Union there will be countries, which because of their own experiences will be able to convince the officers of the European Union, first of all in Brussels, but also within the old member states, that relations between the enlarged European Union and Ukraine should be built and developed exclusively through the prism of the future European prospect of Ukraine.

Thank you.

OLEKSANDR MOROZ

Leader of the Socialists Party of Ukraine (SPU)

Often, while talking about the issue of Ukraine's choice the discussion is limited to: Ukraine–EU, Ukraine–NATO, Ukraine–WTO or neighbourly relations etc. Politicians who express the wish to join the EU or NATO, (and some believe that this pair is necessary) take an appropriate, pro-European position. In reality it is not so, and the example of the Ukrainian world of politics confirms this. I would like to share with you some conclusions.

First of all the 'European choice' is the most important internal issue in Ukraine. This does not mean finding an answer in a formal way or even joining the EU, but rather creating in Ukraine the standard of living, which exists in developed European countries. I am not talking only about the level of affluence, but also about the social norms for the citizens, civil groups, organisations, political parties, government representatives and institutions. It concerns the standards of democracy in Ukraine. If there is a possibility of controlling the government, there is also the possibility of participating in solving important problems within family, group, region or the country itself.

Secondly, the situation in Ukraine causes anxiety; not without reason, because the lack of democracy could bring with it degradation of the economy, the destruction of the high technology industry, and a total collapse of the agricultural sector. Not to mention the social, spiritual and other spheres. What might happen however is the reinforcement of corruption (the grey economy comprises about 60% of the total) and criminalisation. Today there is a very dangerous process of concentration of investment capital in the hands of a few families. This concentration takes place through the secondary property market, and the secondary funds market, which (under the patronage of the president's administration and the President himself), is not being privatised, but at no cost distributed among several clans—Dnepropetrovsky, Donetsk and Kievsky. The process of privatisation in Ukraine is ending, and income from all these years amounts to 1.2 billion dollars, while in Hungary, a country with a smaller productive potential, but proportionally similar, income from privatisation amounts to 12 billion dollars. If we compare these numbers based on the size of the population we will get a number 40–50 times larger—this is an indicator of how state property and state goods are stolen. It is not surprising that several citizens of Ukraine are among the ten richest men in Europe. However there is no single German on this list. The oligarchs buy votes and set up their government, using its mechanisms to protect their own businesses. Government, business and criminal elements unite; in

Ukraine today they are one and the same. Competition is not in the interest of this conglomerate, therefore it destroys the small and medium enterprise in the centre of the country and blocks foreign investments. If even the most favourable agreements are made with the European Union, if they are not in harmony with the interests of some oligarchs, or are in some way deal with the export–import of high technology and raw materials, then these agreements will not be implemented in Ukraine. Under these conditions civil rights and liberties, the electoral right, freedom of speech, access to information as well as all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution become meaningless. Intimidation, blackmail, lies, forgery, corruption and similar activities become tools of power. I can support each of the aforementioned abuses of power with dozens of examples. Ukrainian socialists believe that without democracy in Ukraine there won't be an efficient economy, respect for civil rights and liberties, and no guarantee for the sovereignty of the country. I will not analyse these three problems now, but I will repeat again that I can support each of these items with a short lecture, proving the truth of the situation I have described.

What should be done to change the existing situation? The system of distribution of power should be changed, taking as an example the experience of European countries. This is the real 'European choice'. Government should be organised as it is in European countries. The opposition in Ukraine represents this way of thinking. In this respect the opposition is for the 'European choice'. The government however pulls Ukraine in the direction of the Asian Middle Ages.

Yet the 'European choice' can not be one-sided. We also need your support, which should consist not only of credit, investments and mutual agreements—all this is obviously essential. The Ukrainian situation needs observers and should be assessed by neighbouring countries as well as by international and inter-parliamentary institutions. This will be the external factor which brings about a change in the existing state of affairs in Ukraine and will help the opposition bring about the victory of good over evil, and democracy over dictatorship.

As you surely know, President Kuchma, in trying to take the initiative, submitted for nationwide debate his proposal for introducing changes in the Constitution, the introduction of which would mean moving to the parliamentary-presidential form of government. I will not explain it further here, although I was the first one in Ukraine to conduct a detailed analysis of the President's proposal. Take my word for it. The president proposes not a parliamentary-presidential form of government, but a yet unknown model of tyranny. The essence of the presidential proposal boils down to the elimination of parliamentarism, prolonging his term of office to lifetime duration, as well as demolition of constitutional order by approving new laws and introducing constitutional changes by referendum. Let me repeat again that these are our problems. It is your role however to give an objective assessment, and also to objectively judge the apologists of the pseudo-democratic transformations. I hope that Europe is not indifferent to what

is happening beyond the eastern border of Poland, whether the European standards of democracy will be introduced, or whether Ukraine becomes a Tatar-Mongol yoke of dictatorship. I used the term 'Tatar-Mongol yoke' purposely here, because during a recent conference in Kharkov the President said that Moroz, that is me, is a disaster for Ukraine comparable only to a Tatar-Mongol yoke.

Have any of you asked yourself whether the European Union needs Ukraine at all? To which borders will the European Union extend? Borders are indispensable. The problem is not a question of membership, but in choosing a path. Maybe because of that it's more important to investigate this situation in the context of relations between Ukraine and the EU, and in the context of relations with neighbouring countries, who will become members of the EU, especially Poland. Everyone knows this is a painful process, I became convinced of this while analysing the situation in countries which have joined the European Union recently. This process requires serious structural transformations, first of all in the economic sphere. There is an obvious need, for Ukrainian and Polish experts to analyse what will happen after Poland submits to the European Union rules of the game, and to decide in what ways it is possible to use this new situation for the profit of both the Polish and Ukrainian sides.

Europe perceives the European Union and NATO as guarantees of stability and security. Yet the reality is that both organisations do not accomplish these tasks. I remember that several years ago, when I was chairman of the Parliament, my doubts about the role of NATO and its eastward expansion were received with humour. Now it is time for reinterpretation. Let's suppose that Ukraine becomes a NATO member and the rest of the world belongs to NATO as well. Will it be more stable because of this? The events of September 11th 2001 have already shown that NATO does not fulfil its function as a guarantor of safety. 8 years ago, we, the socialists of Ukraine, were already convincing the leaders of European countries of the necessity of holding a convention devoted to the issues of security and cooperation in Europe, because we faced quite a different situation. We need to work out new principles for relations, which would take into account today's challenges to the task of maintaining peace and security; military-political, economic, energy, ecological, religious, ethnic, terrorism, arms trade, drug trade, job migration etc. We continue to act on stereotypes, we enter blind alleys, instead of creating the European standards for coexistence and introducing these key conditions into each country: the guarantee of democracy, human rights and liberties, respect for the letter of the law, and constitutional order. This does not mean just a declaration of intentions as in Helsinki in 1985, but to draft a treaty and ratify it in every country. We should create common institutions for monitoring democracy as well as ways of responding if these principles are violated. It would be binding on the governments and institutions of every country, it would counteract the emergence of local dictators, and all this without bombing and human victims.

This system of European order should be jointly introduced. Our representatives—the parliamentarians in the European Council, and also Vitalij Shybko, who is present here, have already twice proposed this initiative. Let's give them our common support. Let's turn to different countries and their leaders. Nobody will secure European order and peace if we don't sit down together and work out methods for bringing about order in Europe.

In closing one more issue. Time passes quickly. Globalisation, integration—these are in large measure objective processes which will be profitable for Europe only if they develop according to the principles of logic and democracy within every country of the European associates.

Thank you.

PROFESSOR ZDZISŁAW NAJDER

University in Opole

You have already heard a great deal of information and explanations given by the two previous speakers. My task is made simpler as well by three publications that have appeared recently, which I recommend to all of you. *Poland and Ukraine: a Strategic Partnership in a Changing Europe* by Mr. and Mrs. Wolczuk, who are professors in Birmingham, and two booklets published by the Centre for Eastern Studies: *Ukraine—Another View* by Paweł Wołowski as well as *Eastern Policy—The Perspective of the Visegrad Countries*. I will try to integrate this material somewhat, and in my reasoning I will refer to examples and issues contained in these publications. I would also like to add that in talking about structures of the Euro-Atlantic relations of Ukraine—I found a recent booklet *Ukraine and NATO* by Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz to be useful.

In my speech I will cover these four topics:

1. Ukraine's attitude towards the EU
2. The EU's attitude towards Ukraine
3. The role of Poland
4. Prospects for the future

1. We have already heard a lot of Ukrainian proclamations relating to the “European choice” of this country. This European choice was announced five years ago by president Kuchma, later however when the “Zlenka doctrine” appeared, it practically eliminated this choice. There were many programs, there were new ‘Europeanising’ regulations and offices, but the lack of state reform, to which Chairman Oleksandr Moroz referred still exists. There has been no separation from the pattern of oligarchy entangled with democracy and undermined by corruption, a lack of fully formed political parties, and the media are controlled and pressured by the government.

I believe that the political criterion for membership in the European Union is not appreciated within many circles in Ukraine. Even if Ukraine's economy develops twice as quickly, without fulfilment of this criterion we can not even talk about the association treaty because the rule-of-law and functioning democracy requirements are fundamental to the EU.

After obtaining independence Ukraine justly proposed a new geopolitical view for this part of Europe, but this was a NEW and surprising view for all, with the exception of Poland (and Russia, which saw in it as serious threat to its interests and did not spare any effort to oppose it). Ukraine was supposed to play a key

role as a country liberated from Soviet-Russian domination, building a dam against Russian imperialism—while at the same time creating the potential for a durable stabilisation of Eastern Europe. Zbigniew Brzeziński who was quoted many times today wrote a great deal about this. It required a new approach. Unfortunately Ukrainians offered Europe declarations, papers but not actions. What James Sherr, who is present here today, wrote five years ago: “Ukraine’s political leaders have sometimes acted as if they could achieve integration by declaration”—integration by decree—“or simply by joining and participating in international organisations and political clubs rather than undertaking concrete structural changes.” And four years later the Wolczuks, who as far as I know are Mr. Sherr’s students wrote: “notwithstanding declarations by Ukrainian foreign policy officials, the European choice barely figures in the domestic political debate and does not inform policy making in Kiev.” Ukraine is certainly very important for Europe, but only because of its size, as a result of the importance of its population, economic deficiencies and political immaturity a gigantic problem is created, from which it is easiest and most comfortable to simply run away.

The actions of Ukraine’s government suggest that it is an escape. The main signs of inconsistency are not only the lack of internal change, especially political, about which we have already talked, but also its unclear relationship with Russia, the lack of clear demarcation of borders, as well as guarding these borders, and the still ambiguous membership of Ukraine in the CIS. From what Minister Tarasyuk said we can draw the conclusion that gymnastic splits become the speciality of Ukraine: one thing is being said to Moscow, and something else to Brussels. This can look good on the balance bars, but in practical life causes trouble.

One last example. On the 15th of March *Rzeczpospolita* published an interview with Serhij Tyhypko, the president of the National Bank of Ukraine. I quote: “we will do everything possible to allow Ukraine’s integration into the European Union as quickly as possible, but at the same time we will not give up cooperation with neighbouring countries. We want to begin with the creation of a free economic zone for Ukraine and Russia.” [*Rzeczpospolita*, 15–16 March 2003.] At this stage these are two conflicting goals. Mister Tyhypko should have noticed, how many problems Poland had in its accession negotiations with the EU caused by our internal special economic zones; so you can imagine what would happen if it was an economic zone, which had embraced the Russian Federation!

In a Centre for Eastern Studies report Paweł Wołowski writes: “the European choice [of Ukraine] can be seen as a project implemented without consistency, exerting however a certain influence on the thinking of the elite and the functioning of the state. It also seems to be a strategy, the goal of which is not to participate in any structures dominated by Russia.” [P. Wołowski, *Ukraine. Another view*, Warsaw, 2003.] I agree but it should be added that it is a strategy of dodges, not bringing them any closer to the goal.

2. The EU's attitude towards Ukraine. It is an attitude of indifference or in the best case one of restraint. It is possible to be appalled by it and I myself am often appalled by it, but these are the facts and our feelings will not change anything. We should take action; the question is in what way. That is the goal of this conference. Today Ukraine is practically nonexistent in the European political consciousness, and in the American. Since Ukraine relinquished its atomic weapons, it has faded into the background for the USA. Especially following the 11th of September 2001, when Russia went around Ukraine to the west, becoming an important ally for President Bush.

Recently the European Union has been talking about being neighbours more willingly, and about the 'New neighbourhood', rather than partnership, this document was mentioned by Mr. Perelyhin. Not a word has been said about association. In Kiev this creates understandable disappointment and criticism from within the government as we have heard from Mr. Moroz's mouth. To the long list of Ukrainian acts of negligence and avoidance I will add two examples from my own yard, which I am observing closely. First: three and a half years ago, following the conference in Paris organised by the French Institute of International Affairs (the IFRI) and the Eastern Institute in Lublin, a Polish-Ukrainian-French dialogue committee was created. This committee still isn't functioning because Ukraine never appointed its representative. Second: if I remember correctly for three years now there has been no Ukrainian ambassador in Paris. These are facts, which speak for themselves.

Neither individual governments of the member's states of the EU, nor their societies are particularly interested in Ukraine. And I do not only mean that the subject of Ukraine is absent in the foreign policies of their governments. It is possible to convince a government somehow; it's harder to deal with the indifference of its citizens. This is the greatest difficulty to overcome. However I would caution against trying to overcome it using the formula of 'old and new Europe'. This is the trap set up by Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and it should be avoided. I will refer to what president Vaclav Klaus said the day before yesterday: If we follow the road of dividing Europe in this way, then it will turn out badly for everyone. The point is that until a citizen of the European Union, an average citizen, at least feels the possibility that when he goes to Ukraine he feels that he is still in Europe—until then we will not be able to change this attitude of indifference and reluctance. And at this time it is hard to even talk about such a feeling.

I visit Ukraine two or three times a year not because I have family connections there, but because I want to go there and each time I experience a mixture of very positive and negative feelings. I will not explore this further, but we need to understand this basic fact: If we are lucky it will take us fifteen years to join the EU. The basic component of this gradual approach to entry was that people from the west could come to Poland and feel more or less like they were in a very poor province of their own country. Obviously, Poland has considerably better geo-

graphical position and has had more luck historically, not to mention having a better political and economic situation. This isn't about whose fault it is. What is important is a real feeling of the practical possibility of travelling, staying overnight, relations with the government, and the atmosphere of public places beginning with gas stations and ending with local administrative offices. In one word: it is about adapting the country to a more civilised level, and not the president's declarations that will create the time horizon for serious consideration of Ukraine's accession to the EU.

At the end of last year Turkey appeared as very serious competition for Ukraine, a competitor, from whom it was possible to learn a lot. Turkey is obviously a country less European than Ukraine in the cultural sense, it raises many political doubts, its relations with minorities (or rather with one big Kurdish minority) are considerably worse than in Ukraine, but what our Ukrainian guests ask about justly, the initiation of the candidate country prospects for Turkey was however, supported by Germany and France, because of their concrete interests. Namely that there are many Turks living in Germany, and France has a relationship with Maghreb region. Moreover—and this argument speaks to others, and first of all to the British- they see in Turkey a way to lessen the tension between the world of western culture and the world of Islam. It is not a certainty however, that Turkey will ever join the European Union and if it does, then whether it will be the same Union, that has been existing so far.

The point is that Ukraine does not have the same advantages, there are none that speak on behalf of Ukraine at this time. In saying this I realise that it may be unpleasant for our Ukrainian friends to hear, but they have to realise and remember, that with the exception of Poland no one wants to talk about Ukraine now. This does not mean that Poles demand some kind of privileges or special gratitude. We support Ukraine not only out of sentiment or because of historical reasons, but also for our own security. I mention this, not out of Polish boastfulness, but as an appeal to realism. Ambassador Jerzy Łukaszewski warned several times and warned justly, that we should not over do our promotion of Ukraine, because we first have to enter ourselves, and we can not be a candidate as a single woman with a child, much bigger than herself. This is the matter of tactics and the need for particular tactics tells us a lot about what we still have to do.

The Wolczuks mention Ukraine's tendency to remain in a Russian zone. Not only does President Leonid Kuchma seem to be a powerful advocate of this attitude, but also there is yet another factor that we haven't mentioned during this conference. Russia will not remain passive. The Russian Ambassador in Kiev is not just a diplomatic officer; the fact that he is a former Prime Minister has a symbolic dimension. Russia will not sleep. We have to openly state that there is conflict of interest between Poland and Russia. We would like to attract Ukraine to the west and the western framework, while its in Russia's interest not to let Ukraine go to the west. It is that simple.

The Attitude of the EU could be influenced by a common foreign policy and security policy, but in the Eastern dimension such a policy does not really exist. Suggestions referring to the attitudes of the EU towards Ukraine are various. The experts of the Visegrad Group which wrote *The Centre of Eastern Studies* booklet, that I have mentioned, talk about a common program for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldavia. Our Ukrainian guests want a separate program for Ukraine; from the Polish perspective this is the proper approach. Only placing Ukraine on the European horizon gives it a chance, there should be at least two separate Eastern policies, one concerning potential candidates for the EU, and a second for Russia, which will never be a candidate. Here we encounter a difficult paradox; on the one hand for Ukraine Russia is of the utmost importance, economically, historically and population wise, but on the other hand only by separating from Russia can Ukraine become a visible political partner for others. Some experts assert that Ukraine will never make this choice, which is something that Tadeusz Olszański reiterates. He is a pessimist and claims that Ukraine will never decide to layout and protect the border with Russia, because it would be too painful. He is not the only one who said this, and it is not only in Poland where this is being expressed, it is a common opinion in the west—and at the same time is the position of the Russian government. The choice is in the hands of Ukraine. The choice is to follow the European political model, or the Russian one. Chairman Moroz expressed it in a rougher way: either with Russia or with the Union.

This does not mean to be against Russia, not at all. Finland, in choosing the European model, did not enter in any new conflicts with Russia.

3. The role of Poland. Two years ago, a discussion was initiated by Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, about the weakness of Polish instruments of economic and political influence on our eastern neighbours. I believe that we have made many mistakes in our policy towards Ukraine. The government of Poland and Polish opinion makers pay too much attention to border and visas issues. (President Tyhykko has a positive opinion on the economic function of the introduction of visas; claiming that it will result in a greater economic order. His opinion pleased me, because I am not an economist myself and have claimed the same thing for a long time now). However it was considerably more important and also more difficult to support the development of civil society in Ukraine. It pleased me greatly, that Chairman Moroz encouraged us to offer opinions on the public issues of Ukraine and to encourage others to do so. There was also a heated discussion among Polish friends of Ukraine about whether or not we should tell the Ukrainians the unpleasant truth. Should we talk openly about how far from fulfilling European criterion and expectations they are? Or to stroke them and say like Jacek Kuroń: “I understand Ukrainians”? Of course we understand, but from this understanding nothing results. When a doctor says that he understands his patients, they both feel good for a while, but it does not help the progress of therapy. It is obvious that

Ukraine as a state and as a society requires intensive therapy, and there is a necessity of a deeper and more widespread consciousness concerning the diseases and what treatments should be applied. I was pleased to hear the opinion of Mr. Moroz. A few months ago when we attended a conference in Przemyśl with Minister Onyszkiewicz, Prime Minister Mykoła Żułyński expressed the same opinion: “tell us the bitter truth, it will make it easier for us”. I believe this should be the unpleasant role of the Polish friends of Ukraine.

But now we have to look critically at ourselves. As I mentioned, the change of position and tactics of the European Union towards Ukraine can be influenced by the CFSP. Until now the approach of Poland to this common policy was passive or even reluctant, and now suddenly Poland demands common action for the sake of a country with as little security as Ukraine. So on the one hand we are not interested in the CFSP, but on the other we bet on a very risky card. There is an internal contradiction here. I remember that Brzeziński said that an independent Ukraine is more important for Poland, than membership in the North-Atlantic Alliance. This is a very radical view, but it demonstrates a certain way of thinking. We have to be clear about our principle goals as well as what our resources are.

I repeat stubbornly that membership in NATO is a means to reach our goals, it is not a goal in itself, that membership in the EU and its institutions should be treated as a means to reach our state and national goals, and to achieve our common European goals. No one can force Ukraine to be independent, Ukrainians must decide for themselves about that. Our goal is to strengthen its independence, and to look for ways to do it. I believe we are looking in a very incompetent way. The development of events in recent weeks illustrates this. The situation is worse than it was half a year ago. Poland in the matter of the dispute between the U.S. and a majority of EU states, first of all France and Germanys, made a choice. It made this choice in a reflexive way, without thinking and in my opinion caused its marginalisation in Europe. We did not strengthen the United States and weakened our own position, hurrying too much to raise our hand although nobody asked for it. I believe that automatic support for Washington by Warsaw is to the disadvantage of Ukrainian interests. Therefore, if we were able to maintain a position between the two extremes (like Holland did), or at had least consulted others within the framework of the Weimar Triangle then we could have had a larger influence on events, and European ears would be more open to our opinions. At this time Europeans are barely listening to us, because they hear in our voice only the echo of Washington. As a result, the already weak influence of the only country supporting Ukraine’s accession to the EU, has become even more limited. For me this confirms the thesis, that Poland should have one foreign policy, and not separate eastern and western policies. We have certain goals in the east and we should achieve them by all means. The way to achieve our goal of reinforcing Ukraine’s independence is a closer political cooperation with key states of the continent, namely Germany and France. Without them we will not accomplish

anything or accomplish very little. After I criticised Ukraine for its mistakes I moved on to criticism of our own mistakes—which is our basic duty, because we are first of all responsible for ourselves.

4. Prospects. I am finishing in a pessimistic mood because I do not know how we will get out of the present crisis. The results of the war, which is going on at this moment will not play a large role because it is not about victory—the victory will surely come—but because we do not know what will happen later. However because of the lack of long range thinking about our goals and how we want Poland and its neighbours to be like in twenty years, we got muddled up in our foreign policy. Now even President Kwaśniewski affirms that Prime Minister Miller rushed too quickly, to sign the letter of the eight. I am afraid that we can't easily make up for this rush. The only consolation for me is that both our situations deteriorated and our common problems can connect us and both sides will draw from these unpleasant experiences some useful but bitter lessons.

Thank you very much.

4. Ukraine, NATO and Democratic Control of Armed Forces

GEORGIJ KRIUCZKOW

The Chairman of the National Security and Defence Committee of the Highest Council of Ukraine

Honourable chairman, honourable colleagues. First of all I would like to thank you very much for inviting me to participate in this unusually pithy discussion as well as making it possible for me to present the position of political strength I represent as a Ukrainian communist.

It has already been mentioned that Ukraine in her strategy concerning NATO is inclined towards Euro-Atlantic integration and has expressed the desire for a Distinctive Partnership with the Alliance, with the final goal of joining this organisation, which is the basis of the Pan-European security structure. I would like to emphasize Pan-European. The majority of the Supreme Council of Ukraine has supported this goal.

In this place we should consider several circumstances. First of all this, when will full membership in NATO be possible for Ukraine? The date mentioned here was 2010, the American ambassador in Ukraine however mentioned the year 2006.

This raises the question of whether both NATO and the European Union want to see within its ranks Ukraine as it is today. The legal matter of what to do with Ukraine's declaration of neutral status is essential. This is not a simple question, because the Supreme Council, at that time was still a part of the USSR, in its Declaration of Sovereignty in 1990 declared the desire of Ukraine to become a neutral state, without nuclear weapons. The status of a state not possessing nuclear weapons was retained. When on the 24th of August 1991 Ukraine proclaimed its independence, in the Independence Act it was recorded that the nation announces its independence on principles described in the Declaration of National Sovereignty of Ukraine. In other words, the Declaration, in which Ukraine announced itself to be a neutral country, without nuclear weapons, became law. This Act went into force on the 1st of December 1991 by referendum. The Ukrainian nation expressed its opinion on this matter unambiguously. This raises the question of how, in the eventuality of Ukraine's entry to NATO, to reconcile its status as a state not possessing nuclear weapons with the military-political character of the Alliance?

The next question: what kind of NATO will we enter, considering the transformations that the Alliance is undergoing at present.

And one more issue. The situation of our society at present is such that the government has to pay attention to the will of the nation. About 90% of society opposes any actions, and despite that, they are still taking place. I am convinced

that we can not ignore a situation in which a considerable part of Ukrainian society opposes the entry to NATO.

Like many countries, Ukraine does surveys and public opinion polls. The results of these polls do not always agree. I trust most the polls done by the Sociology Institute of the Ukrainian Science Academy, which has tracked social attitudes since the beginning of Ukrainian independence. This data is quite fascinating.

On the question: ‘What is your feeling about Ukraine’s entry into the European Union?’ in the beginning of 2002 the following answers were given: “it is hard to say”—40.1% (in 2000—34.4%), mostly negative—15%, mostly positive—44.4%. This is less than in the year 2000—at that time 56% gave a positive answer. Yet, opinion among the people is that Ukraine despite everything should enter the European Union. According to our view of the European Union, in our country, people want to live like the inhabitants of the leading countries of the EU.

On the question: ‘What is your feeling about Ukraine’s entry to NATO?’ in 2000 41.5% answered that “it is hard to say” and in 2002—42.6% gave this answer. A mostly positive attitude was expressed by 24.9%, and now by 18.8%. Mostly negative was 35.5%, and now is 37.9%. It is worth remembering that these polls were taken following the aggression of the USA and Great Britain against Iraq. Similar polls were also taken this year and the dynamics of change are similar. Why is this? This question was also asked yesterday.

How can we explain the attitude of our citizens towards NATO? Without a doubt the picture of NATO formed during the rivalry between hostile blocks, when the Soviet Union perceived the Alliance as an aggressive organisation, weighs heavily on the feelings of our people. However I would not overestimate the importance of this factor. After all life goes on, society gathers experiences, perceives changing realities, new circumstances and draws new conclusions from these new facts. I would like to mention several of them.

At the beginning of the 90’s Ukraine gave up being the third largest nuclear power in the world and gave up its status as a nuclear power. What did we receive in return? Unfortunately we did not receive the help promised by several countries (the USA in particular) necessary to dismantle rocket silos, to utilise weapons, to decontaminate the soil et cetera. Has any other state in the world followed this (according to me) noble example? The number of countries possessing a nuclear capability has only become larger.

Ukraine, reacting to the voices of the world, and first of all to European public opinion closed the atomic power station in Chernobyl. This is yet another case where Ukraine did not receive the help it was promised. All these facts are connected with NATO in the eyes of public opinion.

On the request, or rather under the pressure of USA Ukraine halted delivery of energy equipment for an atomic power station in Iran. Our country lost hun-

dreds of millions of dollars on this. In spite of promises we did not receive any compensation. This is a 'strategic partnership'!

Ukraine suffered huge loses due to destruction of the Danube waterway during the aggression directed against Yugoslavia. Public opinion connects this event directly with NATO. These events caused such an eruption of emotions, that Ukraine's Supreme Council condemned this as an act of aggression, and NATO—as the aggressor.

The Iraq issue. Colleagues let's think over the following matter. Formally NATO as an Ally had nothing to do with the operations undertaken by the USA and Great Britain, because it did not officially take a stand on this matter, therefore there is no legal basis upon which to blame NATO for the resulting situation. Yet public opinion connects this action with NATO because the Alliance is often identified with the dictates of the United States and this frequently determines the negative opinion our society holds towards this organisation.

I apologise for my honesty, but I am a politician not a diplomat and I call things as I see them. I have visited NATO headquarters twice; as chairman of a parliamentary committee I had frequent meetings with foreign politicians, with state activists and with diplomats both in Brussels, and in Kiev. I am deeply convinced that for the NATO Command the question whether Ukraine should join the Alliance does not even exist. All these discussions about "Action Plans", about "The Task Plan for 2003", about "defence inspections" and about what needs to be done at home—are just chats not having any essential or decisive meaning. Ukraine will become a member of NATO when the command of the Alliance, and first of all the United States, decides it suits their purposes in relation to what is happening in the rest of the world. And whether Ukraine is a Kuchma style dictatorship or democratic or something else—will not have any relevance. The membership of Ukraine in NATO depends how much the command of NATO as well as, I repeat, the United States finds it suits their purposes. Of this, I am deeply convinced.

It is worth mentioning here that Romania has not given up its territorial claims against Ukraine, and will still be admitted to the Alliance even though the NATO charter states that there should be no disputes between states. NATO needs Romania.

The Ukrainian president has been treated as *persona non grata* for a long time in the West, for well known reasons, but when a suitable number of anti-Iraq coalition members was needed and the Ukrainian government gave the "bribe", the position of the West changed. The American Ambassador told me that the issue of "Kolchuga" had been put aside because Ukraine could not prove that it hadn't been delivered to Iraq, and America could not prove that Ukraine had delivered it. Therefore the matter was put on hold. Americans revised their relationship with Ukraine and assumed the Ukrainian president would hold his office till the end of his term. Ukraine found itself in the exclusive company of 48 countries

which the American president called “the anti-Iraq coalition” together with such countries as the Republic of the Congo, Micronesia, Marshall Island and Palau. There are however some nuances.

Some NATO members and an even larger number of European Union countries are reluctant to allow the possibility that a country like Ukraine would enter their organisations. Ukraine’s economy, standard of democracy and compliance with human rights clearly does not meet European standards.

According to western analysts the Gross Domestic Product of Ukraine is 4.1% (I recently even encountered a figure of 3.7%) per person in relation to average income in the EU. Dear Sirs this is—25 times less! Even if we accept the data of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine—16%, then the difference is still huge.

Social sphere. I do not want to add to what the President said last year in his speech before the Supreme Council: 40 out of 48 million citizens live in poverty, their income is below the official minimum standards of living, and 7.9% live below the subsistence level.

I could say a lot about the democratic standards and about human rights and liberties in Ukraine. I would like to apologise to my colleague Oleksandr Moroz, if I repeat some things he covered in his speech, but I was not familiar with his thesis.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces are now in a difficult position. The yearly defence budget of Ukraine amounts to about 15 American dollars for each citizen, in Russia—\$48, in Poland—\$90 dollars, in Germany—\$380, in France—\$650, in the USA—\$1240. Our army has about 400 thousand people, of these 310 thousand are permanent military, and the defence budget is about 750–780 million dollars. In Hungary (yesterday I had a meeting with the Hungarian Minister of Defence) the army has 36 thousand people, and the budget is 1.2 billion dollars, meanwhile in Poland if I am not mistaken, the defence budget is 3.9 billion dollars. Our army receives practically no new equipment or military technology. During the parade in Kiev in 2001 the modern tanks on display were probably the finest in the world, but some of them had to be sent back because our military was not able to pay for them. This is the situation of the Ukrainian army. I wonder whether the European Union and NATO need this kind of new member, and if so, then in what way will Ukraine fit into these organisations.

Please forgive me for my honesty, but I have the impression that it is in the interest of the United States for Ukraine to remain in a poor and humiliated condition in order to be on her knees in front of high officials begging “please, accept us into NATO”. Some Ukrainian politicians encourage Ukraine to express our intention of joining NATO as soon as possible.

The attitude of our party regarding the EU and NATO is not static or dogmatic. Just the opposite, this attitude evolves with developing events and the changing geopolitical situation. Our position is based on the national interest of Ukraine taking priority, on the necessity of assuring security and defensive abili-

ties. We see Ukraine as a European country and therefore integration with European as well as Euro-Atlantic organisations is not a problem for us.

Aside from relations with the Alliance, we could discuss why NATO survived despite the break-up of the Warsaw Pact. This discussion however belongs to the historians. Today we have a completely different situation and discussions on this subject would in my opinion be unproductive. NATO is a reality—a dangerous and serious reality. We should cooperate with NATO, ignoring it would be unwise, reckless and, I would say, dangerous, especially in circumstances of new challenges and dangers. I have in mind the development of terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

We, communists opt for a pan-European common security system, which could be based, and surely will be based on NATO, as it is the most effective structure.

Yet we support this position with two restrictions. First of all we are against the division of Europe, into two opposing camps, especially when the border of Europe will be at the eastern border of Ukraine. This is comfortable for someone, but it is not good for Ukraine, or the Ukrainian nation. In our opinion, from the point of view of the geostrategic position of Ukraine this would be a tragedy.

The following ultimatum bothers us: either choose the Europeans or an alliance with Russia and member countries of the CIS. We are bothered by some political forces both in Ukraine, and outside its borders, trying to pit Ukraine against Russia, trying to distance these states from one another, to make us act according to the motto “as far as possible from Moscow”.

Secondly, NATO should act in full accord with the requirements of the UN charter. The NATO declaration concerning the possibility of undertaking operations beyond allied borders behind our negative reaction. Obviously, we should take into consideration that threats sometimes need to be neutralised beyond the borders of the Alliance; therefore it may be necessary to use such means. Yet we believe it should only be done with the consent of the UN. Now, after the American-British attack on Iraq, when the UN role has been undermined, the situation is troublesome. We are convinced that undermining the role of the UN is the most serious consequence of the Iraqi conflict. The UN is being accused of being unable to settle the problem of Iraqi disarmament. These accusations are deceitful.

We are deeply troubled by the transformation of the world into a unipolar world. We are deeply troubled by the situation in which a super-power grants itself the right to decide who can and who can not rule a particular country; using double standards or acting only according to its own interests, as is the case with the Ukrainian president. We are convinced that our citizens should decide the fate of our country and its government.

We observe with interest the changes occurring in the world, and obviously first of all in Europe. At present the world is encountering the emergence of new centres of power: Europe, China, Russia. New centres of gravity. Right now these

new processes are just becoming apparent, but they are irreversible and will advance. We observe transformations in Europe, the tendency to transform the European Union into a confederation, and the thirst for possessing its own, European, armed forces.

The position of France, Germany and Belgium in the Iraqi matter has deeper sources in our opinion and was not just formed today. I remember a conversation I had in 1999 with a vice-minister of one of the NATO countries. He claimed that Europe is undergoing a process of re-nationalisation of its external policy. He did not explain further, but it was clear to me. The next day I met with the ambassador of one of the European NATO member countries, who is a widely respected authority. I repeated, without betraying personal data, the opinion I had heard. He was silent for a while, and then said, “we are tired of our older brother’s protection”.

We can not afford to stop paying attention to these issues. We draw the conclusion from this, that the process of the integration of Ukraine into European and Euro-Atlantic structures will not be an easy or fast process.

Here are several conclusions.

The national affairs of Ukraine, protecting its sovereignty and national security should always be of primary importance. Ukraine’s entry into NATO should be considered in this context not only from the point of view of membership in the Alliance, but in strengthening our security as well as the security of the whole European continent, creation of a pan-European system of security, creating a truly united Europe, without dividing it into opposing blocks.

The fact that a ‘new iron curtain’ is being created on the western border of Ukraine should worry us. This is evidenced by the considerable sums, allotted by the EU, for protection of the borders between Ukraine and its western neighbours.

Our motto is “Europe to Ukraine”, and not “Ukraine to Europe”. This means that we have to raise the level of our economy to meet European standards, so it becomes competitive. Here the question comes up: Does Europe need a strong, economically developed Ukraine as competition? The issue of the An –140 plane says a lot about that.

As far as the agricultural sector is concerned, Ukraine has the capacity to produce agricultural products for nearly the whole of Europe. How will other European countries, important producers of food themselves, react to this?

We have to attain the European standard of living in our country.

Thorough political reform is needed with the goal of creating a democratic system, with a true guarantee of civil rights and liberties in the Constitution. This may be a very difficult process, as evidenced by the battle over reform of the political power structure and amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution.

The spiritual sphere also needs to be healed. This of course does not mean borrowing from western mass culture. It means creating the conditions necessary

for the creative development of the national culture. There are however many problems connected with the pursuit of this goal. The Ukrainian film industry has been practically destroyed. Since Ukraine declared its independence there has been no literary work, awakening widespread interest. It would not be an exaggeration to say that recent years have been characterised by a spiritual depression, which may have more serious consequences, than the economic crisis.

No one will solve these problems for us; nobody will work to strengthen our motherland for us, to improve the quality of life and spirituality of this nation. This task belongs to us.

Certain questions arise from this. The first one concerns the possibility of the spread of nuclear weapons to the territories of new members, to the lands of our neighbours. Recently we were invited to visit the NATO Military Staff. We had a discussion there, during which I asked the chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Gen. Kujat: “What is your reaction, to the idea that new members of NATO, our neighbours, would first have to officially announce that they would not allow the distribution of nuclear power on their territory?” His answer was “As a military man, I am against creating zones free of nuclear weapons”. Of course this answer did not satisfy me, and it worried me. I also asked Gen. Kujat whether if Ukraine becomes a NATO member it would have to rescind its status as a country free of nuclear weapons. Gen. Kujat understood at that point that he had said something inappropriate. He said that Ukraine could make such a declaration. I do not know, whether this proclamation will occur or not, but I would like to talk about this issue. From Ukraine stand point whether it will be a member of NATO, or the EU, it will always be a part of Europe. Yet we would like to get certain guarantees. Though this does not save the situation, but has some political meaning.

What are weapons of mass destruction? Are they only nuclear, chemical and biological weapons or smart bombs as well? We believe this should be clarified in some international document.

If the chairman allows me, I would like to say a few more words about the actions taken by Ukraine to adapt to NATO structures as well as the implementation of the Ukraine–NATO Action Plan. The Action Plan for the years 1999–2003 has at last been published after a thorough public debate and the Action Plan for the year 2003 has also been completed. Preparations for the defence review are ongoing. We plan a reform of the armed forces as well as other state military institutions. The President formed a government committee headed by the Prime Minister to decide the size of our army, its structure, and issues connected with modern armaments and the needs of a small army, which is mobile and able to execute the tasks outlined by the constitution. There was also a committee created to deal with social issues (headed by the first vice-prime minister), which become dangerously volatile within the Ukrainian armed forces.

As chairman of a parliamentary committee I would like to talk about the creation of the legal basis for national security and defence. The Ukrainian parliament passed laws taking into account all aspects of defence provided for in the constitution of Ukraine. While working on the laws we took into account the experience of NATO and countries that are members of the Alliance. We did this not because we want very much to be in NATO—I personally do not—but because it is in the interest of Ukraine to use proven NATO or EU solutions. Recently the following resolutions were passed: “Concerning counter-espionage actions”, “Concerning the fight with terrorism”. A law was passed recently concerning state control over export and re-export of military goods of dual destination. At present the law concerning democratic and civil control by state organs over armed forces is being prepared. I would like to take this opportunity to sincerely thank Andrew Karkoszka for his help, which we have received in the past and are still receiving from The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Thanks to this help we conducted numerous ‘round tables’ and conferences considering this issue. In its first reading the law concerning the principles of national security of Ukraine was approved. In the near future the government will work on and approve the war doctrine of Ukraine. It is a very complicated document, which still requires a lot of work.

The creation of modern laws is of essential importance. Not of lesser importance is the implementation of the laws. Unfortunately issues relating to implementation are the weakest link in our state. The Supreme Council supported the decision of the president of Ukraine to send a biological and anti-chemical defence battalion to Kuwait, in violation of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine. This brought about an ambiguous reaction in society because at the time the decision was made the law concerning ratification of the agreement between Ukraine and Kuwait had not yet come into force. Moreover, we did not solve the problem of social protection for the soldiers who were sent there.

Legal nihilism, and disrespect for laws unfortunately are characteristic features of the present government. The 22nd article of Ukraine’s Constitution forbids limiting the scope and content of previously agreed upon rights and social guarantees, when introducing new laws and amendments to existing laws the government brutally violated these principles. The Constitutional Tribunal recognized these acts to be in violation of the Constitution.

It is hard for me to talk about this, but I have to say that Ukraine is a country ruled by lawlessness and abuse of authority, and the ruling power is corrupt, cynical and not free from a criminal element. The nation is depressed, deprived, and the lumpenproletariat is not able to organise a civilised protest. And this is but one of the causes of the situation. Unfortunately I am afraid that the coming elections will not improve this situation. These are our problems and neither NATO nor Poland, nor the United States will solve these problems for us and they don’t have the right to solve them. These are our problems, but as friends we tell you

about them. We would like our nation to create order in the country and for the political direction to be defined not in Washington, Brussels, or Moscow, but in Ukraine by its nation and its legitimate representatives.

Thank you for your attention.

Dr. Christof Weil*

Head of the Eastern European Partners Section, Political Affairs Division, International Staff, NATO

Thank you very much. Thank you for your warm welcome. It is great pleasure to be back with friends in Poland.

I was very much impressed with what Mr. Kriuczkov just said and before going into the short presentation I have improvised for this conference, I would like to, if I may, pick up on a couple of points.

First of all, I think the Communist Party of Ukraine should be congratulated. It should be congratulated because it has, I think, come to terms with NATO, as you said. You do recognise NATO as one pillar for the Pan-European security structure and that I find extremely encouraging, because it does show that perceptions can change.

Now, clearly, you have mentioned relevant Poles, it will still be an uphill struggle to project into Ukraine the picture of what NATO is today, modern NATO, not a monolithic military bloc but, as I said, I think what you've presented to us I find encouraging.

NATO, of course, does not want Ukraine on its knees, if I understood you correctly and begging for membership, of course not. NATO consists of nineteen democratic states that one, for reasons of their own-self interest, a self-confident Ukraine but a European Ukraine and a Ukraine at hearing to the values of the Trans-Atlantic Community, that is why, Sir, I take issue that the statement you made, that no matter what happens, if one or two or three allies so decide, Ukraine one day will be in NATO—of course not. It will be a consensus decision by nineteen states and I think what the historic precedent set by what one can now “the first two rounds of enlargement of NATO, that aspiring states will be measured on a whole range of issues”.

One comment I really must take up is, and I'm not sure if I understood you correctly, concerning the stationing of nuclear weapons in new member countries. I am sorry, this simply is not wrong. For one thing there are NATO nations, like, for example Norway, which have always refused the stationing of nuclear weapons an ally has and others.

As regards new member states I would like to quote from the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine signed in Madrid in July '97 and it can't be any clearer than that, and by the way you will find similar provisions in the NATO–Russia Founding Act of '97. Paragraph 18 of the Charter

* Text has not been authorised.

reads “Ukraine welcomes the statement by NATO members that enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO’s current nuclear posture and therefore NATO countries have now come the famous three nuclear no’s, NATO countries have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapon on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture on nuclear policy. I think that is as clear as it can be.

May I now make some, just a few short comments on where I think we are on NATO—Ukraine relations and I would like also to comment or pick up on some points that were made yesterday and this morning.

The title of this conference, “Where the Ukraine is heading to?”, where is Ukraine heading to? I think for NATO we take what we have. You rightly mentioned several times, Sir, that Ukraine wants to define its national interest, yes, by all means, and apparently Ukraine has, through Ukrainian leadership. Ukraine has declared last May that it has the strategic goal of one day joining the Atlantic Alliance.

We take that at face value, of course you also gave the question, what kind of NATO will Ukraine be joining and indeed you may be moving towards a moving target. NATO has tremendously evolved in the past fourteen years and it will continue to evolve. And I am in no position today to tell you what this Alliance will look like ten years from now. We have an evolving NATO–EU relationship, we have a capability debate, we are enlarging again and this Alliance will change and it has to change to survive.

But I think I can tell you where I think NATO is heading with Ukraine, and that is, I repeat myself, we have taken Ukraine by its word as witnessed and laid down in the NATO—Ukraine Action Plan and an implementing document called “An Annual Target Plan 2003” that was agreed by the foreign ministers of the NATO—Ukraine Commission meeting in Prague last November and I’ll take the liberty of coming back to that Action Plan in somewhat more detail in a minute.

But I wanted to pick up what you said Minister yesterday—lumping Ukraine and Russia together. Now, I beg to differ somewhat. And of course NATO has not been lumping Ukraine and Russia together, we have developed a strategic relationship with Russia just as we have developed a distinctive partnership with Ukraine. This is not mutually exclusive and that takes me to something which I felt this morning during this discussion, it seemed to me—and here I would entirely agree with you—to be a somewhat artificial choice that seemed to be put to Ukraine. A European model *vis à vis* a Russian Model, Mr Moroz even mentioned the alternative Europe or Asia, what are we saying here, what are we insinuating?

Are we excluding Russia from Europe? Professor Najder mentioned Sophocles and Aristotle, we can also mention Dostoyevsky and Tchaikovsky. It should be a complementary process, the NATO–Ukraine relationship and the NATO–

–Russia relationship. I don't want to be a misty-eyed romantic, I think we have to monitor closely how Russia exercises its influence in the region.

But aren't we falling somewhat into a trap ourselves of "stare myślenie" in a way? Don't we think that Russia also in its own way is Europeanising and committing to European norms and standards? I found interesting by the way at the NATO-Russia summit last May in Rome, where as you know the Rome Declaration was adopted by heads of state and government of Russia and the 19 NATO states founding a new NATO–Russia Council, that President Putin was asked at the press conference he gave with Prime Minister Berlusconi and Lord Robertson what he thought that just recently a few weeks earlier—and I don't think that was a coincidence that it was a few weeks before the Rome Summit—that Ukraine wanted to become in the long term a member of NATO? Putin replied that Ukraine is a sovereign country and will decide for itself. Again, a statement at a press conference, but I think for the time being we have to take it as it stands.

Again, I agree, let's not put Ukraine in front of an artificial choice, a good Russian—Ukraine relationship is not an impediment to a closer relationship with NATO as long as everybody plays by the rules and it is based on the respect of sovereignty of Ukraine. By the way, Russian capital as such is not something negative, capital is capital. And I think again, if everybody plays by the rules, Russian capital as such, per se, needn't harm Ukraine, on the contrary.

Similarities and differences in the two relationships. Both strategic documents were signed in 1997: the Founding Act between NATO and Russia, founding a new forum, the now defunct Permanent Joint Council and the Charter which founded the NATO–Ukraine Commission. But there were differences from the start. Ukraine for example engaged from the start very much in the Partnership for the Peace Programme, Russia did not and over the years the record tremendously improved.

Ukraine now has a 90% implementation rate in the measures foreseen in its individual partnership programme. Ukraine and NATO are much more closely engaged in cooperation in civil emergency planning and helping Ukraine counter the natural disasters and the floods of recent years. And one thing I want to stress, and perhaps General Szkurszky and Andrzej will go into more detail, the NATO–Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, Sir, is not a talking shop. This is serious business, trying to help Ukraine define its own interest and assist Ukraine in implementing them as far as the downsizing and reform of the Armed Forces is concerned.

Another striking difference, Russia pulled out of the Permanent Joint Council after the air campaign on Kosovo started, Ukraine stood by NATO and we continued working together in the NATO–Ukraine Commission. Another element, NATO's flag so to speak flew much earlier over Kiev than it flew over Moscow. We have a presence there since I think 1998 the NATO Information and Documentation Centre works in Kiev and the NATO liaison office is very much

involved in PfP and Defence Reform issues. Overall I think these are complementary processes in part of this evolving European Security Architecture, enlargement of NATO and the EU on the one hand and the network of integration and cooperation and a close relationship of the Alliance with both strategic partners.

The role of 9/11, Minister Onyszkiewicz, which you mentioned yesterday and which was also raised this morning, suggesting that Ukraine disappeared from the radar screen of Western nations or of NATO with the tremendous focus on Russia, true. 9/11 proved to be a catalyst for the relationship between the West and Russia and for founding the new NATO–Russia Council, but let’s not forget that Ukraine immediately also put the money where its mouth was not only in political solidarity but opened its air-space and proved crucial in transporting coalition troops to Afghanistan, this is not forgotten. In Kosovo, the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion over the years and the contribution it made, it is a valuable partnership, it is so valuable that it survived considerable burns over the last years. You mentioned the Kolczuga affair, I would also like to recall certain strains that came into being over Ukrainian shipments to Macedonia at a moment when the NATO peacekeepers were much engaged in that country to prevent a civil war. So, we survived and not only that, we moved to a new level.

And now I come to the NATO–Ukraine Action Plan if I may, I would strongly recommend it to your reading. It is on the website of NATO, it’s on the website of the Ukrainian government. I would like to pick up what was mentioned by Professor Najder, regarding NUAP, that there is “integration by declaration”, well frankly these times are over. We now have black on white strong commitments by Ukraine and the Alliance, we have benchmarks, we have measures and Ukraine will be measured against the commitments it undertook black on white, this is not a fluffy diplomatic document. As I said, and recommended to your reading, we agreed jointly on principles and objectives and the objectives are spelled out and in the Annual Action Plan in detail, forty pages of it, through all the areas that are mentioned: security, internal politics, economy, defence and military, spells out specific measures that Ukraine undertook to take. 80% of the action committed to in the Annual Action Plan, 80% are on Ukrainian soldiers. NATO will help, NATO will assist, bilateral programmes will assist but basically it is on Ukraine’s shoulder. Internal political issues, they are all there, all the concerns you have raised, Mr Moroz raised, others raised yesterday are mentioned: freedom of the press, relevant legislation in that area. What I find a very important provision, is the principles of the foreign and security policy, full integration into Euro-Atlantic security structure is Ukraine’s foreign policy priority and strategic goal. In this context future internal developments will be based on decisions aimed at preparing Ukraine to achieve its goal of integration into a Euro-Atlantic structure, why do I highlight that in particular, because as a post war West-German I see our experience there. What Ukraine has committed to here is the marriage of its inner and outer “raison d’etats” and it will be measured against that.

To conclude, the NUAP, so to speak, put beef on the community of values that we want to forge together and in a way of course Ukraine got what it wanted, what it said it wanted and it may have gotten a bit more than it asked for, but that is the way that it is now. NATO in the NUAP agreed to semi-annual assessments where the progress will be measured based on a yearly report that is not drafted by Ukraine but by NATO staff with input from nations and from Ukraine. Of course NATO is not the WTO, it's not the Council of Europe, it's not the OSCE but when we assess Ukraine's progress we of course also build on the foundations of these institutions. Ukraine inside has established all the necessary mechanisms, we have a State Council on Euro-Atlantic Integration headed by the president, that is the strategic level, there is Mr Horbulin's National Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration where all ministries and government agencies are represented, there is you mentioned the State Commission headed by the Prime Minister on defence reform. The mechanisms and institutions are all there. They are indispensable. Now of course mindsets will have to follow, these bodies have to be staffed properly and they cannot, and I come back to the perception of NATO in Ukraine, they can not work in a vacuum. An enterprise of such scope as moving Ukraine closer to NATO will need the support of the whole society, of parliament not least of the press and for that stereotypes will have to change further and our small NATO Centre for Information and Documentation will not be able to do that alone. Allies will have to help a lot and Ukrainian society will have to, if it commits to that goal, enlighten the public as best as it can.

Dates, I do not want to commit to any date at all. 2006, 2010—let's take it step by step frankly. A lot can happen in seven years, very little can happen in seven years, what we have now is a road map, again, benchmarks and we have the political commitment on the part of the Alliance to support that road. Patience will be needed and patience is a strategic commodity. We have to watch that patience doesn't run dry—it needs so to speak permanent replenishment and first steps and continuous progress I think will be needed to replenish this strategic patience from day to day.

Thank you very much.

BRIG. GENERAL KAZIMIERZ SIKORSKI

Adviser to the Head of the National Security Bureau

Mister Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to share some comments with you regarding the military goals and tasks of NATO–Ukraine cooperation as well as several different observations and experiences, related to the subject of our conference.

Allow me to speak from my practical experience, from the part of my life spent as a military representative at NATO headquarters in Brussels, it is from this perspective that I would like you to consider my opinions, not from the point of view of my present position at the National Security Bureau.

The military aspects of the key Objectives of NATO–Ukraine cooperation

- Cooperation and mutual action with the goal of stabilising a secure environment in the Euro-Atlantic area.
 - Common political values and goals in the Euro-Atlantic area.
 - Increased involvement in NATO led operations supporting peace in the Balkans.
 - The Polish-Ukrainian Battalion gained a great deal of political capital (it made a big impression on the NATO Military Committee during their visit to Kosovo last year). It is very important, but for several years it has often been used as the only example of Ukraine’s commitment to cooperation with NATO, therefore its political value has diminished.
 - Future cooperation could also include operations such as crisis management in situations of natural disasters, peace enforcement, anti-terrorist actions and countermeasures against weapons of mass destruction. Therefore Ukraine’s declaration of intent to send Ukrainian troops into the region of the Iraqi conflict was very well received by a majority of the allies.
 - Please believe me, all NATO member states including Poland, are interested in good relations with Russia and Ukraine as well as in stabilising the situation to the east of the allies’ borders. Poland is one of the countries that is most interested in this, because if a large “house” such as Ukraine starts falling down then a lot of rubble will fall on our heads. Not all countries have managed to build a solid “house”, resistant to shocks; therefore we aim to expand the security zone in Europe and in the whole Euro-Atlantic region.

- Strengthening of mutual trust and cooperation in order to improve security and stability, including the bilateral cooperation of the Ukraine and its neighbours in matters of defence.
- The next aim of the cooperation between NATO and Russia is to support the efforts of the Ukraine in strengthening democratic and civil control over the Military.
 - Ukraine, like Poland borders with as many as seven countries (4,663 km of border): Belarus 891 km, Hungary 103 km, Moldova 939 km, Poland 526 km, Romania 531 km, Russia 1,576 km, Slovakia 97 km (+ the Black Sea 2782 km)
 - Developing transparency in action planning in the field of security through participation in the Partnership for Peace as well as creating multinational units with neighbouring countries
- Supporting the efforts of Ukraine in strengthening democratic and civil control over the Military.
 - Let me now refer to some earlier statements, for example a statement by Mr. Kriuczkw questioning the existence of “democracy” in the Ukrainian system of state administration. I have to say that after hearing this, I experienced a moment of horror; because if the Ukraine is building civilian control over the Military, and democracy doesn’t exist there, then this kind of control fills me with doubts and questions. As a member of the military I don’t want to question the necessity of civilian control over the armed forces—I will leave this subject to my colleagues representing the political perspective to discuss, only voicing my serious doubts about this situation.

The task of military cooperation NATO–Ukraine

- Improving the Ukrainian contribution to cooperation.
- Improving the ability of the Ukrainian military to cooperate with NATO forces and those of other allied states. The transformation of armies according to changing needs.
 - Ukraine possesses a great potential, having over 300,000 soldiers, 4,000 tanks including 1200 T72s and 900 T80s, 4000 armoured transporter (1500 BWP2s and BWP3s), 4000 artillery units, 240 helicopters, 2000 battle aircraft, over 100 ships including a submarine, a modern missile cruiser, several frigates, corvettes, missile assault boats, oilers, numerous landing craft and transport ships of different sizes. Of special importance are the An-72, An-124 “Ruslan” (150 ton capacity), and An-255 “Mrija” (250 ton payload) transport planes. Even the United States does not have aircraft of comparable capacity. Germany and Poland used these planes to transport their armies to Afghanistan.

- Ukraine also has S-300 anti-aircraft systems, comparable to the American Patriots, designed to intercept fast aerial targets including both ballistic and cruise missiles. It has Radar devices, including the renowned Kolchuga passive radar system. Ukraine also maintains aerospace systems including stations for the control and tracking of satellites, military communication as well as space and land observation satellites. (A greater potential than any European country in NATO). Their space technology is in the forefront of the world: for example their rockets designed to carry heavy payloads (“Dnipro”) in recent years were used commercially by numerous countries (China, India, France, Great Britain, USA).
- Increasing the ability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to cooperate with civilian institutions and society in case of crises within the country due to natural disasters, but also to counteract terrorism, especially in cases of biological or chemical weapon involvement.

A few observations and experiences.

It is my feeling that it is very important for the Ukrainian political elite to be aware of the need for the implementation of democratic reforms, but it is also essential to cultivate this consciousness within society, for example through stimulating and supporting non-governmental organisations.

The meeting we had in Kiev, organised in February 2003 by Mr. Vadim Greczaninov and Mr. Oleg Kokoszkin of the Atlantic Board of Ukraine, devoted to Polish experiences with NATO impressed me. It was an honest exchange of opinions among representatives of different levels of government and administrations as well as non-governmental organisations. We had the opportunity to share experiences and explore many doubts.

Functioning NGO’s are an essential factor in creating a system of democratic structures of state administration. In NATO the ability of NGO’s to function freely is considered to be a measure of the maturity of democracy within countries and is one of the fundamental criteria for NATO membership.

Here it seems worth noting the progress made in strengthening democratic freedoms by the Ukrainian parliament the day before yesterday (3.04.2003), through the passing of a resolution forbidding censorship of the media.

Returning to the issue of NATO–Ukraine cooperation, I would also like to mention the ‘International Week’ organised in Kiev by the NATO Defence College and the Ukrainian Academy of National Defence under the name “NATO after Prague”. In addition to the very positive impression it made on the officers of NATO countries, it is important that over 600 Ukrainian officers had the opportunity for direct contact with “NATO people”, to ask questions and talk informally in the lobby.

Information about NATO gained in this way surely has a significant impact, and as mentioned by minister Tarasyuk—the needs in this area are great. These needs are not only for direct contacts in Kiev and not only within the framework of the Special Partnership with NATO.

The benefits resulting from the actions of the Partnership for Peace are not always acknowledged. Representatives of all 19 NATO member countries and 27 other countries who are part of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council take part in working groups, conferences, seminars and other undertakings organised by the Partnership for Peace. This is an excellent forum for promoting Ukraine, explaining what Ukraine is doing and its relevance for NATO. Among many allies and especially partners, knowledge of Ukraine is not very comprehensive; therefore it is difficult to convince them that Ukraine is as necessary for NATO, as NATO is for Ukraine.

Therefore strong representation and action in Brussels by Ukraine is of utmost importance; especially because, as Ukraine and Poland have discovered many times previously, the world perceives us not as we really are, but as we are seen from afar. Opinions are often based on the impressions of the media or tourists, and therefore are very subjective and often harmful as they are based on stereotypes of Eastern Europe as wild and primitive. Through actively participating in the various actions of the Partnership for Peace in Brussels we have the possibility to change this situation.

We used this opportunity best when Poland was in the process of joining NATO; later other countries invited into NATO followed our example, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia and Romania in particular. At this time Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland have dominant roles—but Ukraine does not.

Professor Bronisław Geremek pointed out that NATO is now at a turning point, as it transforms from a military-political organisation into a security organisation. This trend can be observed, however all members agree on retaining the defensive abilities of NATO, as its basic mission. New NATO members express this opinion particularly strongly, and soon they will constitute 40% of the members of this organisation. In this light NATO will probably keep its character as a defensive organisation—and in this way will still play an essential security role. The difficulty is to adapt the defensive abilities of NATO to new needs.

The NATO–Ukraine Committee is a very important tool enabling and helping Ukraine to move closer to becoming a part of NATO as well as increasing the interest of members in this process. I have participated in many meetings of this committee; I would like to say from my own experience that it can also have the opposite effect, particularly if the only topics of committee meetings are the situation in the Balkans, the Polish-Ukrainian battalion and the lack of progress in implementation of principle elements of the project of cooperation. This atmosphere is not conducive to a constructive approach to problems that face Ukraine by the majority of NATO countries.

The changing character of threats, the necessity of undertaking a determined confrontation with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction has created a situation in which no country can defend itself independently, and has no other choice but to create alliances.

The assertion—as long as everybody isn't safe, nobody is safe, is true as never before.

This opinion is commonly shared by NATO countries and is increasingly accepted in Ukraine. Therefore in conclusion I would like to express my optimism in the development of relations between NATO and Ukraine.

Thank you for your attention.

DR. ANDRZEJ KARKOSZKA

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

While preparing for this speech I looked through the working documents, prepared by Ukraine and NATO during the last decade, since the entry of Ukraine in 1994 into the Partnership for Peace framework of cooperation with NATO. I have to say that their content is surprisingly rich and informative. Ukraine shows a great degree of progress in military cooperation, and in its readiness to expand this cooperation. It is possible to say, while looking through Ukraine's plans for development of its armed forces, and military structures (implementation by 2005), introducing democratic elements (implementation by 2010), technical modernisation and other components of defence policy (implementation by 2015) that their impetus and reliability make a big impression. After I had reviewed these plans I decided however that I would not talk about techniques, structures, or armed forces. I came to the conclusion that the technical aspects of integration of Ukraine with NATO are the simplest factors. Sooner or later these forces will in some way cooperate and respond to the principle of an even distribution of armed forces in the area of Ukraine, will conform to other norms of law, and international agreements. The subject of my speech will be political matters, related to social attitudes, or the more general problems of the Ukrainian security sector.

Visiting Ukraine regularly every two or three months and taking part in various meetings and assignments I came to the conclusion that Ukraine represents, like other former Soviet states, a syndrome, in which the change of political system, and the introduction of a democratic system of government and all the consequences connected with it, evolved from the top to the bottom. These fundamental changes did not come as a result of social pressure from the bottom. It wasn't the society that demanded these changes, but their political elites. The people of these countries are now often averse to and tired of them. What's more, they often do not understand why certain things happen. This in large part relates to changes in Ukrainian security policy.

We could say that the military was at the forefront of these changes, that they went furthest in accepting democratic forms. They are at present clearly the most distinct element of the structure of power and security in Ukraine. They accepted democratic control, and they are being rearmed and modernised in times of very difficult financial circumstances. They are not engaged in stormy political debates and disputes. Yet they have no tangible impact on the policy of Ukraine pertaining to matters of security and relations with NATO.

In the course of our discussions yesterday and today we became aware of an improvement in the attitude of Ukrainian society in relation to NATO. Although in 2000 46%, and in 2001 48% of Ukrainian society saw NATO as a potential aggressor, and as an aggressive coalition, in 2002 this view was shared by only 35% of society. So it can be said that a large shift has occurred. However, extrapolating from the well-known earlier influence of NATO operations in Kosovo on the present Ukrainian attitude then I dare say that as a result of the operations of the American coalition in Iraq their attitude towards NATO will again be antagonistic. Because, whether we like it or not, the truth is that the operations of the American-British forces and the smaller Polish and Australian contingents will be linked with NATO, which will once again be seen as an aggressive coalition. As a result the conditions for further cooperation between Ukraine and the Alliance will deteriorate. Is it possible to talk about the integration of Ukraine with the Alliance when over a third of Ukrainian society sees the Alliance as an aggressor? On the question of whether or not they would vote for Ukraine's entry into NATO as many as 30% of Ukrainians were in favour of it, but as many as 32.5% were against. So there is no public support for the actions taken by government, or the military, which are undertaken on behalf of integration.

Circumstances are changing, but are still very difficult. I believe a need exists for a systematic effort in the historical and political education of the nation. This means changing the attitudes of several generations of Ukrainians, who grew up in a different political system that reinforced the image of NATO as an aggressive coalition. This will require a considerably larger effort than in Poland where the Alliance with western states was historically inherent, by virtue of their experience during two world wars. The need for this effort can be seen also in the influence of the media on Ukrainian society. When we look at television in the country as a whole, the huge influence of Russian television is obvious. Comparing the commentary on and the presentation of NATO operations in Kosovo we saw a quite different approach to matters of security in Russian and western television. They presented two diametrically opposed views. This now applies to Iraq. This does not mean limiting the freedom of press, but the necessity of access to varied interpretations, to make it possible to choose. The fight for social acceptance is in my opinion, the leading problem for those, who want to accelerate the integration of Ukraine with NATO and the UE.

Let me refer to another characteristic of Ukraine's path to NATO. It is a feature, which I call "mimicry", or declaration policy, political formalism. We observe a great effort on the part of Ukrainian institutions to verbalise the policy of the state, to create norms and important documents. I will allow myself to reveal a small secret: I was one of the consultants on the recently created law regarding democratic control over the military. This document is more than 20 pages long. It includes numerous detailed agreements, relating many details of the relationship between the civilian power and military, and the control of defence policies.

At the same time this entire mechanism, and all its decisions, which will be introduced by the parliament as a new law, can be changed by presidential decree. At the same time we have a complex system of democratic control, and the suggestion that the Minister of Defence should be from the military. A great formal effort, but the final practical effect is rather doubtful. The first reading of this document, which has been worked on for several years, recently took place in the Supreme Council. We do not know when the decision will be made as well as when the executive acts will be introduced.

The advantage of declarative policy over specific actions can be seen in implementation of different initiatives. It is not a matter of one or two years, or only recent times. Let's take the story of the creation of the universally praised Polish-Ukrainian battalion. I checked with Col. Tadeusz Krzastek, who prepared a great book on this subject, but he does not mention it. In 1997, when the plan for forming this sub-unit was already established and money was paid to the appropriate Polish institutions, and the preparatory work on the Polish side had been going on for two years already, it turned out that at the first staff meeting of the battalion the Ukrainian side wanted to send cultural-educational staff. Thanks only to Mr. Horbulin's quick reaction and help this situation was saved. A different division and different men were chosen, and in the end it was successful. Another example of this problem with the implementation of other decisions is the practical consequences of new legal regulations. Among over three hundred decrees of the president of Ukraine in matters of security the majority are not being fully executed. I have a list of laws here, which still have not been executed today. Some are dated 1997, others 1998 or later. I will not quote them because I do not want to exceed my time. I will only give one example, from recent months. The president's decree given recently, in February 2003, relating to the control of the weapons trade and military products is 12 pages long. Among the 22 paragraphs, although there are probably more of them, relating to the creation of government institutions and normative instructions, there is no information whatsoever about when they should be created or implemented. And so it goes. The lack of discipline in implementing decisions is declaratory policy, and it does not make any changes in real life.

The same concerns the decision of parliament, the Ukrainian Supreme Council. Similar to the way it once was in Poland, the Supreme Council formulates a law that 3% of the GDP has to be designated to the military. Meanwhile we know what the real defence budget is. It is a long way from this figure. Therefore the Department of Defence and armed forces have to make up the budget deficit themselves through their own economic activity; by selling off some of its property, offering their services to foreign and domestic civilian institutions. This is a bad situation. If the army provides its own financial means then it acts according to its own methods, beyond parliamentary control, beyond audit controls, etc. It becomes fertile soil for corruption. I was talking about plans for the development

of the Ukrainian armed forces, with implementation date by 2005, 2010, and 2015. We see now that none of these plans has a full financial guarantee. It was also our Polish problem, but in Ukraine this difference between the plans, and the possibilities of their implementation is far more dramatic.

The fourth weakness of Ukrainian defence and security policy, is a lack of respect for rules of transparency and political responsibility for taking or not taking actions, which are the principle norms of functioning in a democratic state. We expected a lot from the president's proclamation in 1997 regarding the release of the Ukrainian "White Book". It was assumed that it would explain the tenets of defence policy and the structure of the military and security policy. So where is the White Book of Ukraine? Where are other commonly accessible publications of this type? The next example relates to information on the defence expenditures of Ukraine. I had in my hands the proposed defence budget for Ukraine, which had to be passed by the Supreme Council. This was not a complex document—perhaps because I saw only the public version. I doubt however, if the members of Ukrainian parliament have much more data when they decide about the defence budget of their country. When we talk about political, legal and financial responsibility of all the officials in the whole executive, from the President of the country, through the ministries, departments and other government agencies it appears that it is almost nonexistent. Otherwise the disregard for the decisions made would not be possible. And without legal, financial and political responsibility a democratic system does not work.

I will move on to the last subject now. The security policy of the state, including its relations with NATO, and of even more importance the potential accession to NATO, do not depend solely on the extent of reforms within the military and their readiness for integration with the Alliance. These are only the technical conditions of cooperation. Far more important are the political conditions and the state of democratic reforms in the entire security sector of the country. The security sector of a country does not consist only of the military. This applies particularly to Ukraine, where secret services, several kinds of intelligence services, armed units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the militia, armed units of the Ministry of Emergencies, and border guards are in total number considerably larger, have a larger budget and a greater degree of political influence, than the Ukrainian army. But has anyone heard about a system of democratic control over these forces? Do we have a clear understanding of their structures, their operations, and the legal basis of their actions? Not always, and not fully. There are three intelligence services in Ukraine: the military, civil and border services. None of them are under parliamentary control. There is no framework for asking questions relating to these matters. Decisions about and opinions on the operation of these services go directly to the highest level of the pyramid, which ends with only a few people. Parliament has never undertaken a study of this topic. We have a situation, where this huge sector with connections to the powerful weapons

industry of Ukraine, businesses selling weapons, state administration, and political parties—all form a coalition that is not subject to democratic transformation. This is the obstacle that stands in the way of Ukraine's full democratisation and its integration with Europe and NATO.

In closing one more technical matter, of great importance. We have said that the border between Russia and Ukraine already exists. It exists physically and on the map. But in practice out of the over 700 roads crossing this border only a small percentage are effectively controlled. In this situation it is not possible to strengthen the state and to protect its economy. We can look at the Moldavian border in the same way. This is a very serious problem for Ukraine, and in the future for Europe. It seems that this border situation does not serve the economic progress of Ukraine, but strengthens the financial position and political influence of an oligarchic system.

I would like to conclude my speech with a controversial statement. I believe that Ukraine's difficulties lie in two areas: first in undertaking decisions, which are not implemented later and secondly in not making other important decisions. This last 'sin' concerns the lack of reforms in the entire security sector of the country. Ukraine has made a great effort, and prepared many documents. The reason for this behaviour is well known. Last week during a conference in Kiev I asked one of my Ukrainian colleagues, what he thought about the security policy of Ukraine and about Ukraine's path to Europe. He answered: "we move forward like a sailboat—we tack. We all know that general direction is good, but we tack from one side to the other. Some people say that we move our legs, the engine is running at high speed, but the forward movement very slow".

Thank You.

5. Ukraine and its neighbours

VITALIJ SHYBKO

International Secretary of the Socialists Party of Ukraine (SPU)

“Where is Ukraine heading?”—this sounds like a truism. We know that Ukraine is in the centre of Europe, and its inhabitants have lived on their ancestors’ land for two millennia. No one can say that Ukraine is not a European country today. We do not have, however the experience of creating a country, this can be seen in operations of both the Ukrainian government and its opposition. Therefore the question constantly appears: on what principles should we build our policy? I believe that we have had this problem since the time of the break-up of Kiev Rus when the Ukrainian nation lost its independence. Experience of other countries also shows how the loss of a country’s independent status at some point in history can affect the present. My observations in Lebanon, where I commanded the Ukrainian mission confirm this. Lebanon came into being in 1920, thanks to the French who integrated these lands into one country. After France withdrew the reconstruction of the country began. Many problems then appeared, leading to a civil war which lasted 20 years and brought with it many terrible consequences. Analysing the causes of this war, it is possible to draw parallels to the present situation in Ukraine. God save us from such a fate. We should however compare our historical circumstances with the experiences of other states to prevent disasters. Where are we heading? If we ask where the government run by the President is heading—we do not know, because its political direction changes every month. The Pro-European option is implemented on one side, but meanwhile our government headed by President Kuchma is trying to combine elements that cannot be combined. These actions seem so absurd that they actually arouse admiration. I offer the following example. Our Prime Minister visits Russia, where he discusses some issues. There is a public press conference held, during which the Prime Minister of Russia announces that in the present situation it is best to create a common economic area. The Ukrainian Prime Minister standing next to him does not comment at all. Both ministers know that is not possible today because of the gas and oil problem. A lot is being said about the European choice of Ukraine being just a declaration. Is it possible to believe that Ukraine will be ready to join the European Union in 2007, that it already has one foot in the WTO or that it could join NATO, if only invited. These issues are controversial not only for Ukrainian society, which in its political preferences divide into pro-President and pro-opposition blocks, but also within presidential circles.

The issue of the WTO. Today there is no agreement about Ukraine’s participation in this organisation. Some people say that Ukraine, as a European country

could already be part of this organisation. Others, especially the representatives of the agriculture and food-processing sectors, foresee, that after the entry of Ukraine to the WTO development of these sectors of the economy will not be possible any more. Even among the public it is not possible to find a common position on this choice.

Are the western neighbours of Ukraine ready to simplify border crossing procedures? Let's talk about countries within the Council of Europe. As a member of the parliamentary delegation of Ukraine to the Council of Europe I was given the task of preparing a report on the following subject: "Enlarged Europe—movement of people between the member states of the Council of Europe". For the committee session we invited experts, among them the representative from Poland, Mr. Marek Kupiszewski, who is an expert in visa policy connected with the Schengen area. We heard him use the new expression: 'the paper curtain'. Ukrainian citizens are facing the question today of how to cross the border, which had been so easily crossed in the past. I have in mind the Polish-Ukrainian border.

One of the issues of *The Financial Times* was devoted to the Copenhagen negotiations on enlarging the European Union. It had a map, with countries marked in four colours: countries belonging to the European Union, countries which will become members of the Union in 2004, and those countries, like Bulgaria and Romania, which are trying to become members. Between the borders of Poland, however, and Ural Mountains—it was just grey. Analysts illustrated on this map their conclusions from the Copenhagen summit that Ukraine is not perceived as a country which has any prospects of entry to the European Union. This sounds cynical, but this is a reality and we can not ignore it. Of course I do not want to blame the European Union. Ukraine had its chance to join the European Union, if in the years following 1991 it had been reasonable. In 1991 those who fought for the independence believed that among all former Soviet Union countries Ukraine had the best chance to become a member of the European Union. But during these 10 years we lost this chance. The EU is now afraid to admit Ukraine as a member and therefore other faults are found, informing us that there is still a long way to go.

Here is an example. On the 11th of March this year the European Union made a public announcement about the future of Europe after 2004. It contains serious warnings, which concern first of all Ukraine. It is said that the doors to the Council of Europe are not closed for Ukraine, but obviously there are some conditions. Ukraine needs to build democracy, respect human rights, and respect the rule of law in order for the market economy to function. This document contains warnings for Ukraine, but also for other countries. For example in relation to Poland it says that after 2004, when Poland is a member of European Union, but before it fulfils the criterion of Schengen Agreement, visas allowing free entry to the Schengen Agreement countries will not be issued. Therefore it is with a special joy that we accept Polish efforts to create between Poland and Ukraine a special visa

policy simplifying the procedures for issuing visas, reducing the costs, opening more consulates as well as creating new possibilities of obtaining visas through the internet or by fax.

Will Poland listen to the European Union's warnings, or rather act with the aim of maintaining relations with Ukraine similar to those we have at present? Poland knows very well that both our countries will lose if a strict visas policy is introduced. I don't only mean that social and family contact will become less comfortable. It also will affect the small and medium businesses in the Polish and Ukrainian border zones, which may be restricted, or even end. This is an important problem and we should consider how to solve it.

The leader of our party, Oleksandr Moroz said today that Helsinki 75 should be repeated, that is we should organise a European forum to discuss the problems which arise within our European community and invite the countries with the greatest influence in the world.

Thank You.

PROFESSOR JAMES SHERR

Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK

It is an honour for a British analyst to be asked to speak about this subject in Poland, because Poland is historically, emotionally and morally much closer to it than we are. In this part of Europe there is an intuitive and tangible understanding of this subject's reality that Western Europeans simply lack. The few individuals in Western Europe who share Polish, Ukrainian or Russian sensibilities about developments in the former Soviet Union often find that they are working against the current of thinking and opinion. Because that is not true here, it is not only an honour to be speaking at this conference, it is also a pleasure.

I should preface this brief presentation in the way I preface all of them. Despite the fact that the Conflict Studies Research Centre is attached to the Ministry of Defence, we operate under a charter of academic independence. I therefore speak as what the Russians call a *dissident v zakone* (licensed dissident), and my views do not necessarily reflect those of the UK MOD or the British government.

I would like to confine myself to three basic points.

First, when it comes to the important issues of sentiment, human relations, economic relations, even political relations, Ukraine has no reason to choose between Russia and the West. Even if Ukraine becomes part of the West and not simply close to it, its relations with Russia will and ought to remain special and unique. Ukraine's geographical position, its history, its culture and the internal balance of the country require that it *not* be forced to choose between the Russia and the West.

This internal balance is complex, but very understandable, and stereotypes about the 'east-west' divide in Ukraine often miss the point. The fact is that the great majority of Ukrainians have an affinity with Russian culture but also have a culture of their own; they have a close affinity with Russian people, but do not consider themselves Russian. In no sense is this majority anti-Russian. Yet this same majority harbours an abiding distrust of *rossiyskoye gosudarstvo*, the Russian *state*, and they have no wish to be part of it. For this reason, even most of those who want the Russian vector to become the primary vector of Ukraine's policy don't believe that it should become the only vector. Even the majority of key players in the movement 'To Europe with Russia!' become apprehensive whenever it appears that the West might lose interest in Ukraine. Even they believe that Ukraine's interests require a Western presence and a Western counterpoise to Russia. Even they dread the prospect of Ukraine confronting Russian interests and Russian ambitions alone.

That is my first point, and I trust it is not controversial.

But my second point is that when it comes to *integration*, there is a choice. This is because the political, economic, business, administrative and security cultures of the former Soviet Union and the West are still highly divergent and, to a certain degree, based upon divergent principles. If Ukraine does not escape from these institutional cultures of the post-Soviet world, it will not be able to integrate with Europe in any meaningful sense. It will not move past the stage of ‘integration by declaration’. Today the dominant interests and powers in this post-Soviet world are Russian.

For the sake of time, let us confine ourselves to business culture. The dominant business culture in Russia, and indeed Ukraine, is not based primarily upon markets but upon networks, *svyazi*. As in Soviet times, it is producer orientated rather than consumer orientated. It relies upon a convoluted and negotiable legal ‘order’, whose main practical effect is to stifle openness, transparency and competition—the staple constituents of Western business—and confine access and initiative to insiders with connections. Connections with security services, tax authorities and local officials are potent assets in this world, where success depends upon *finansovaya-informatsionnaya bor’ba* (financial-informational struggle) and where the norms of business are often little different from the norms of conspiracy. Like earlier modes of administration, modes of business remain inbred, collusive unaccountable and opaque. In sum, business in the former Soviet Union continues to reflect its totalitarian and undemocratic roots.

But post-Soviet business is not only opaque and unaccountable, it is also trans-national. Transnational (and Russian dominated) networks—in energy, banking, defence industry, security and intelligence—can give powerful reinforcement to local actors and undermine efforts to introduce transparent business practices, legal regulation and contract enforcement.

Many claim that President Putin understands that this business culture is an obstacle to Russia’s integration with Europe. There are signs that he does. But however critical Putin might be of this culture in Russia, he has relied upon it in his efforts to create ‘a good-neighbourly belt along the perimeter of Russia’s borders’. And this is a key point if we wish to understand how relations are evolving between Russia and Ukraine.

That leads to the third and major theme, Russian policy, and the third and major point. Russia seeks to improve relations with Ukraine, but it does not seek to strengthen Ukraine’s *samostoyatel’nost’* [Ukr: *samostiynist’*], its ‘ability to stand’. More precisely, it can be said that Russia seeks to improve relations with Ukraine *by means of* weakening its *samostoyatel’nost’*.

But before elaborating upon this point, let us put it into perspective. Russian policy is certainly not the only factor hampering Ukraine’s prospects of Euro-Atlantic integration. EU policy also hampers it. Even more, Ukraine hampers itself. I have no disagreement with the view expressed by Oleksandr Goncharenko that

‘the greatest security threat to Ukraine is Ukraine itself’. Therefore Russia should not be made the scapegoat for Ukraine’s shortcomings and failings. There are many reasons why Ukraine’s aspirations have not been realised, and Russian policy is only one of these. But it *is* one of these, and it is this that you have asked me to speak about. And even when we consider other factors, the Russian factor is unique, because, unlike the EU, Russia *seeks* to weaken Ukraine’s ‘ability to stand’ independently of Russia.

We also need to underscore the point that, today, there *is a* Russian policy. Yet outside the former Soviet Union and Central Europe, this is not well understood. One reason for this is that there is still a great deal of *mnogogolosiye* (multi-voicedness) in Russia. In the second term of Yeltsin’s presidency, *mnogogolosiye* reached such a level that it was not clear at all whether, in operational terms, the Russian Federation was truly a state or whether it had simply become an arena upon which powerful interests competed for wealth and power. The defining theme of Putin’s rise to power and his exercise of it has been the re-establishment of the state and its control over the instruments and levers of power. Paradoxically, he has had more success in accomplishing these aims in relation to the Russian Federation’s neighbours—Moldova and Georgia as well as Ukraine—than within the Russian Federation itself.

A second reason Russian policy is misunderstood is that this policy and President Putin’s cast of mind in general is explicitly and intensely ‘pragmatic’. The term ‘pragmatic’ has very favourable overtones in the West, where it connotes ‘reasonableness’. In Russia, the term connotes hard-headedness: an unsentimental, ‘cool’ and ‘tough’ attempt to reconcile ends and means. In Putin’s Russia, ‘pragmatism’ does not connote the gracious acceptance of the post-Soviet status quo, but the ‘firm promotion of national interests’.¹ As Sergey Ivanov (then Secretary of the Russian National Security Council, now Minister of Defence) summarised Russia’s ‘Concepts of Foreign Policy’, its aim was to ensure that policy ‘better conforms with the general capabilities and resources of this country’.² This formula, too, has favourable overtones in the West, because by comparison with the West, Russia’s ‘general capabilities’ are weak. But by comparison with most of its neighbours, they are strong. For this reason, the creation of a ‘belt of firm, good neighbourliness’ becomes a highly feasible pursuit. Two years before the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union and almost three years before the decision to establish a CIS Single Economic Zone (*Edinoye ekonomicheskoye prostranstvo*), a leading Ukrainian expert expressed the worry that ‘firm good neighbourliness’ would be secured by:

¹ This was the formulation used by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (‘realism, responsibility, pragmatism and the firm promotion of national interests’) in his address to the National Press Club, Washington DC, 27 April 2000.

² RFSC Secretary Sergey Ivanov 28 March, 2000.

making use of weakness in positions of the CIS countries to get their consent for further formalisation of the CIS structures and strengthening of the coercive component within that system.³

A third reason Russian policy is misunderstood is that Russians do not want us to understand it. Either official and semi-official representatives claim that under President Putin, Russia has changed its policy from a ‘big brother, little brother’ approach to one that is more equal;⁴ or, more frequently, they do not mention the subject at all. After all, most Russians genuinely believe that Russia’s policy towards Ukraine and other CIS countries is Russia’s business, not Europe’s business, and they see no reason to discuss it in the West.

What can we therefore say about the aims of Russian policy? Is the aim ‘integration’? This is a problematic term within the circles that support Putin’s policy, because integration implies burdens as well as advantages for Russia. President Lukashenka, for example, is quite convinced that Putin’s aim is not integration. The aim is better defined by the term subordination. This surely comes closer to the official formula set out in the Concepts of Foreign Policy that there should be ‘conformity of...cooperation with CIS states to national security tasks of the country’.

These are said to include:

- ‘joint efforts towards settling conflicts in CIS member states...particularly in combating international terrorism and extremism’;
- ‘serious emphasis on the development of economic cooperation, including...joint rational use of natural resources’;
- to ‘uphold in every possible way the rights and interests of Russian citizens and fellow countrymen abroad’, to ‘popularise the Russian language’ and to ensure ‘preservation and augmentation of the joint cultural heritage in the CIS’.

By implication at least, the latter two aims assign a unique importance to Ukraine: first, as the principal transit corridor for Russian energy to Europe and as a formidable energy complex in its own right; second because of Ukraine’s unique position in Russia’s ‘cultural heritage’, not to say Russia’s identity. The question of identity—‘St. Petersburg is the brain, Moscow the heart and Kyiv the mother of Russia’—has always distinguished Russian attitudes to Ukraine from its attitudes to other neighbours. It has also given point to Vernadsky’s maxim that ‘Russian democracy ends where the question of Ukraine begins’.

³ Oleksandr Potekhin, ‘Russian Foreign Policy Trends under President Putin’, *Monitoring* (Kyiv: Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine), 30 May 2000.

⁴ See for example ‘Summary of a Dinner Discussion with Mikhail Margelov’, 30 September 2002, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington. (Mikhail Margelov is Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council).

What then can be said about the means of Russian policy? Today there are three: to exploit economic levers for political and geopolitical gain, to strengthen internal allies and to exploit splits between Ukraine and its Western partners.

The shift from an inconsistent and problematic policy to a coherent and focused one was sensed by Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council as early as December 1999, when Russia cut the supply of oil to Ukraine for the fifth time. Those given responsibility for resolving the dispute sensed immediately that the rules had changed, that they were no longer dealing with a problem, but a power. In early 2000, Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov (who became Prime Minister in June 2000) linked the dispute to geopolitical issues as well as economic ones. Despite Ukraine's efforts, no progress was made until April 2000, when Putin stated his terms and Kuchma took the first steps to meet them. These terms included a readjustment in the respective weight of the eastern and western 'vectors' of Ukraine's policy (dramatised in September 2000 by the dismissal of Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk and several other 'unconstructive' officials) and agreement on a substantially new framework governing energy, payments and the privatisation of Ukrainian enterprises (codified in the Moscow and Dnipropetrovsk accords of December 2000 and February 2001 respectively).

Where allies are concerned, there is a blatant paradox. Putin is widely associated with efforts to break up monopolies, liberalise prices, strengthen contract enforcement, make the Russian economy more competitive, and, by these means, keep Russian capital inside Russia and attract Western capital. Yet by various means he has sought to strengthen those in Ukraine who are committed to very different objectives. He and his Ukrainian allies have also sought to block projects (e.g., the Odessa–Brody pipeline) that would enable Ukraine to diversify its partners and strengthen its energy independence. Characteristically, whilst 14 documents were signed in Dnipropetrovsk concerning energy privatisation, common industrial policy, shipbuilding and the aerospace complex, these have not been published, and even Yushchenko's government was only allowed to see many of them in excerpted form. How do the proponents of an open economy, accountable government and European integration benefit from this policy? They don't, and they are not meant to. As Oleksandr Sushko noted at the time, it merely maintains the linkage between Ukraine's dependency on Russia, its isolation from Europe and the 'dominance of authoritarian tendencies in the system of [Ukrainian] political power'.⁵

Finally, the first serious fissure between President Kuchma and the West, the so-called Honhadze affair, enabled Putin to shift the primary means of influencing Ukraine from pressure to support. Between January–February 1994 (the months in which, respectively, the Ukraine–US–Russia Trilateral agreement was

⁵ Oleksandr Sushko, *Monitoring: Occasional Report no. 3* (Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine), February 2001.

signed and Ukraine joined NATO's Partnership for Peace) and May 1997 (the month in which the Russia–Ukraine 'Big Treaty' and Black Sea Fleet accords were concluded), NATO and the United States in particular were regarded in Kyiv as de facto guarantors of Ukraine's sovereignty. From November 2000, the tape scandal (which has led not only to Western recriminations, but moves to expel Ukraine from the Council of Europe) enabled Russia to assume this role—a role which most Ukrainians and Westerners would have found implausible, if not unimaginable even a short time ago. So artful, adroit and *gramotno* has this shift been that the Russian newspaper *Izvestiya* implied—to be sure, with delicacy—that the principal beneficiary of the scandal, the Russian Federation, is likely to have been its author.⁶

What conclusions should we draw about Russian policy towards Ukraine? The policy is well summarised by the proverbial Russian question: *protiv kogo viy druzhite?*—'against whom are you waging friendship'? Whilst many Russians 'love' Ukraine, they do not love its independence. Under Putin, love has given way to a hard and objective calculus of interests and a 'pragmatic' and opportunistic calculus of the means required to advance them. In Putin's Russia as well as Yeltsin's, friendship continues to be associated with 'drawing closer', not with the strengthening of Ukraine's 'ability to stand'.

What conclusions should be drawn by the West? Today there is a serious imbalance between Russian and Western policy towards Ukraine, indeed several. Worrying as this is, it also stands to reason. Ukraine represents a vital interest for Russia, but with the possible exception of Poland, it is not a vital interest for most Western countries, though its future is vastly more important for the future of Europe than many of them realise. Still, Western policy is open to question in more ways than one. Russia has identified its friends in Ukraine, and it supports them politically, economically and by other less conventional means. The West supports its friends politically and rhetorically. American pressure played a definite role in President Kuchma's decision to appoint Viktor Yushchenko Prime Minister in December 1999. But what did the West do to support Yushchenko in power? Beyond rhetoric, nothing of significance. The policies and 'conditionalities' of the EU and IMF stayed in place (which was certainly not the case when key players in the IMF decided it was essential for Yeltsin to be re-elected President of Russia in 1996)! In fact, several observers have noted that whereas the West was relatively forgiving when Valeriy Pustovoytenko was Prime Minister, once Yushchenko embarked upon real reforms, the West increased its demands.

⁶ 'Kuchma—Our [P]resident: Putin Needs to Meddle in the Internal Affairs of Ukraine' [*Kuchma—nash (p)rezident: Putinu pridetsya vmeshat'sya vo vnutrennie dela Ukrainiy*], *Izvestiya*, 13 February 2001. For a more extensive discussion, see James Sherr, 'Viktor Chernomyrdin's Appointment as Ambassador to Ukraine', CSRC Occasional Brief 82, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Camberley, May 2001.

Hence, by the time Kuchma came under compelling internal (and Russian) pressure to dismiss Yushchenko, he had no compelling incentive to resist it. Far from being cynical, the West's approach to Yushchenko merely revealed its underlying naiveté about the nature of 'reform' in post-Soviet conditions. Nearly all Western entities have treated reform as a set of technical and administrative challenges rather than a political undertaking that can only advance by challenging relations of power. Those who accept this challenge risk nothing less than their careers, their livelihoods and in some cases their own safety. Very few will entertain such risks without the conviction that their efforts are valued, supported and joined by more powerful partners.

Finally, what conclusions need to be drawn by Ukraine? Ukrainians who know better do not help themselves or their country by privately complaining about Russian pressure whilst publicly reciting the mantra that relations are improving. How is the West to understand the facts of the matter when Ukraine officially denies them? Georgia, with a fraction of the institutional resources and strengths of Ukraine, has been very outspoken when it has come under pressure from Russia. The result has been heightened Western vigilance and on occasion a sharp Western response. If Ukrainians seek a different Western response from the one they encounter at the moment, they will need to ponder Kipling's question: 'If I am not for myself, then who will be for me?'

AMBASSADOR STANISŁAW CIOSEK

Former Ambassador of Republic of Poland in Moscow International Relations Advisor to the President of Republic of Poland

This will not be the point of view of the President. I am not “my master’s voice”. I am an adviser. An adviser formulates opinions and gives advice, and President accepts or rejects it. It remains the President’s decision whether he will agree with me or not, so I am able to freely express my opinions.

In fact without dealing with the decision about Russia, these observations will be incomplete, because today this is the key question on our continent, after the Iraqi issue is settled in some way, what should we do with Russia? What do we do in the East?

Here I would like to praise Polish foreign policy for consistently advocating the same position “Europe does not end at the Bug River”. Independently from the political orientation of the government, the political position of Poland on this issue has remained consistent. I believe this is wise. The political consequences of the September 11th tragedy underscored the relevance of this belief. If it is somewhere else then the enemy is in the east, and the world will be led in a different direction, judged according to different principles than in the past. The fact that Russia did not join the ‘hungry billions’, but rather joined the one billion ‘rich and prosperous’, even if in some countries, like Poland we have to put this in quotation marks, turned out to be an important factor, rich in consequences. Russia belongs now to the same club, to one community. This happened much earlier than the memorable phone call between Putin and Bush following the attack on the Twin Towers in New York. When I was in Moscow (until 1989, when the Soviet Union still existed and then broke up before my eyes) I wondered what Russia would choose in place of the KPZR (the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), communism and everything that has happened since the Aurora fired. I am sure about one thing, that the Aurora will not fire again, simply because it rusted morally and politically, and this system simply lost. Russians wondered for a long time, during the whole Yeltsin period, what should we choose?

Meanwhile the choice was being made every day. Western civilisation invaded Russia, invaded its factories, shops, television, mentality, culture, everyday life, to this extent, that when the Russians claimed that Poland had turned away from Russia, I told them: For God’s sake, this westernisation, you complain about so much, is more prevalent in Moscow than in Warsaw.

We were invaded because there was no alternative. We took what the world had already accepted, checked, developed and had brought them prosperity. I am talking about the world of this one billion, not about the rest. Russia accepted it

almost without noticing. This is when the real choice took place. Or the choice happened by itself. When you look with perspective it becomes obvious. This is irreversible, no one can prevent it, even if thousands of old KGB-members or some group like that got together, they wouldn't be able to prevent it. These are objective processes. After all over 80% of goods, and property in Russia are no longer owned by the omnipotent state, but constitute private property. The land itself is moving into private hands. Who will ever be able to reverse this? Aurora, I repeat, will not fire, in my opinion, everything is settled.

Will Russia develop by imperial methods, methods of appropriation, and robbery? In my opinion not. These are methods from centuries past, when the advancement of technology and civilisation required vast territories for development. Today this is completely unnecessary. I do not see a strategic threat to Poland, Ukraine, or any other countries, from Russia. Russia simply does not need our land. It has everything necessary for its own development. There are however, in Russia some confused ideas about this matter. I have heard and read many of them. God, how many political scientists, and politicians tell odd stories using this old nineteenth century imperial thinking? There are some political parties, which still use it, but it is not longer necessary. Therefore this way of thinking: whether Poland in the name of the west pulls Ukraine towards western side, or the Russians pull it back towards Russia is in my opinion anachronistic. It may have validity in the area of current political tactics but not in strategic thought. There are some Russians, there are some Poles, and there are elements of this way of thinking in journalism. But it is simply not rational. It does not exist anymore. And it is not our intention and should not be to pull Ukraine to either side. Ukraine has its own identity, its own thinking, and it shapes itself. This kind of approach to Ukraine, as a rope to be pulled, offends Ukrainians. Therefore I believe this is an empty discussion. The process is gone ('paszoł', as Russians say). Russia has made its choice and Ukraine has made its choice. There are, however, some difficulties, and about these difficulties I would like to say few words.

Listening intently to the melody of our Ukrainian speakers, I noticed a certain false note and I want to say openly to our Ukrainian brothers that if they continue in this way, they will compose a bad melody, they can compose a bad future, and build it upon a bad foundation. What is this about?

Many years ago, Janusz Onyszkiewicz (who is here today) and I stood on two different sides of a political barricade, Poland very unambiguously deciding to take the direction of western civilisation. The one from the east lost, bringing negative consequences. Its effect in the end was great social resistance. The government also wanted this change. I was at that time a participant in working groups that wrote prognoses and projects, which are today the object of historical study, and which testify to the fact that we also saw the point of no return for the old system.

We decided to take lessons from the side that prevailed; market economy, democracy, and other ideas, which we are applying, perhaps not very skilfully, because we do have problems. This is simply better. Today we have the backing of the main political powers in the country for these changes, even though many Poles are paying a heavy price. It is hard to talk about the need for these changes to the unemployed. Poland decided to make up for delays and to adjust to the high norms of European standards, even considering the high price. However, I have the impression that the changes in Ukraine came more from the top than from the bottom. In our case they came from the bottom, it was a conscious choice in 1989 and because of that there was a deeper conviction. In Ukraine there is a feeling that it wasn't their choice, a sense of fate. In addition there is a consciousness, that all attempts at creating their own country ended tragically. There is also a certain feeling of victimisation in relation to the external world, to Russians and especially to us, Poles. But this was how history was shaped.

We have to answer a very unpleasant question. Why doesn't Europe want us? The process of enlarging the EU is a result of political calculation, the will of European elites as well as our determination. We, Poles admitted that the civilisation, which we created during the last tens of years was worse. We did not develop sufficiently taking into consideration our potential. We are in many ways worse than Germans, British or other Europeans. We have come to this brutal conclusion. I have the impression that this conclusion has not yet been reached in Ukraine. At least not so deeply, to the root, and the brutal truth has not been expressed. It hasn't been understood and this is why questions such as this appear: why won't the Europeans let us in? Just because they are afraid of us! Simple as that.

They fear our mentality, backwardness, and crime. It was and still is the case with Poland. But we talk about it, we feel ashamed and we want to change this. However, we shouldn't become convinced, that we are wonderful, everything is OK, and they still do not want us, they throw us aside. In 1989 Poland decided to plough itself under, then we had Balcerowicz and others and bless them for this. Ukraine has not done it. I apologise for these bitter words, this is my own opinion, but I tell this to my Ukrainian friends while looking them straight in the eyes. If the Ukrainian government continues this policy: "what do the Europeans want? What is it all about? They did not pay for the removal of its nuclear weapons, they did not make up that, they did not help there" then disappointment and misunderstanding will grow without end. We should also look critically at ourselves, simply take a mirror and draw some conclusions. We have looked at our pimples. And we still watch ourselves. This is painful and sometimes difficult. People should want to do it. The process of adaptation of Poland to the high European norms is not easy. I talked about this. The second issue. Symbols and gestures. The Ukrainian Ambassador to Poland initiated the issue of free Polish visas. However I had to push this idea past the Polish elites because our bookkeepers

were screaming that it would be expensive. I think that we were right, and it was a good gesture. It was an exchange: gesture for gesture, because Poles will not need Ukrainian visas. Gestures and symbols between us are very important, not only between us. Wołyń is important, and Eaglets' cemetery is important. These splinters should be removed. One of the preceding speakers said that people in eastern Ukraine had not known about the Wołyń murders. Just as I did not know, that my clansmen, Poles, murdered Jews in Jedwabne and other places, in a terrible way, and also that we Poles could have such a cruel face. We said this, however, in the ferment of public opinion, and the Polish President did not have a mandate to apologise in the name of all Poles. He apologised in the name of those who were willing to take responsibility. Be we went through it, we said it, although it was a terrible thing for me, and also for many other Poles.

In the newspaper *Deń* Medwedczuk published a superb text about the Wołyń crime, in the spirit in which I am speaking. Let's tell the truth, and we in Poland will not be hiding anything either. It is also time to bring closure to the issue of the Lvov cemetery. The Ukrainians from Lvov need to understand that we do not want even an inch, of another country's land. We feel good in our own borders, history has been good and just to us, but we want to have good neighbours.

I want our Ukrainian brothers, and Russians too, to understand, why we deal with the Ukrainian issue, why we have seminars such as this one, conferences, why we had a big meeting in Belvedere even when Ukrainians had problems in their country and in relation to Europe. Why? In order to make Moscow angry? No! Because we love Ukrainians? They are, after all, Slavs.

But I believe that it also involves the possibility for creating the best plan for the safety of our country. Besides superb airplanes and other tanks and divisions, in the first place we should have good, non-threatening neighbours. The best, safest neighbour is one who can develop from what it has at home and will not need to, in biblical language, reach for our soil, nor our woman, nor after our house, horse, sheep etc. The kind of neighbour who prospers, who has good prospects and has enough of his own resources is the foundation for our feeling of security. Therefore we wish Ukraine well. We wish Russia well for the same reason. I believe that this should be our political—psychological foundation, to build good relations between Poland and Ukraine. The relations are good, though there are also difficulties, but these are matters that can be settled, they do not comprise the essential political problem.

AMBASSADOR WILLIAM G. MILLER*

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It has been such a pleasure to hear these passionate expressions of a desire to have a real relationship based on peace and human understanding. What a remarkable generation this last 10 years has produced in leaders. Remarkable in both good and bad. If we look at the parliaments, that were instituted right after the end of the Soviet Union, the end of the Warsaw pact the beginnings of euphoric hope, for a democratic prosperous for future, what do we see?

We see ‘gulagies’ sitting right next to the people who send them to gulag, we see the security police next to those who detest the security police, we see communists sitting next to ultra-capitalists and we see gorbachovians, Christian-democrats, the full spectrum of intellectual political thought, the full spectrum of political possibility.

This is true throughout the area, but I want to speak about Ukraine in particular. The country that I was very happy to live in for four and a half years and have returned to many times since. The first years certainly up until 1996 were based on consolidating sovereignty and in this the political agenda of all parties, in some cases for necessity, but generally for deep belief, was that the Ukrainian nation had a right to exist and that everything possible should be done to enable it to survive. In this respect everyone in the political spectrum was a nationalist not just “Ruch” but the communists as well. It was Ukraine’s lot to inherit the leadership that was basically that of the nomenclature of the Soviet Union. The so-called democrats did not assume power, they were a minority along with the communists. The majority was, as you termed it yourselves, Ukrainians, the ‘great swamp of uncertainty,’ looking to see what the future might bring and you supported what was called and still is called, the party of power and that is the soviet conception that is, if you are in power you have the resources to stay in power. In Soviet times it was forced, in contemporary times it is the power of money and what money can do. Which include in many cases the use of force.

So the party of power transformed itself somewhat, but it used Soviet methods. It distributed the assets of the state to those that would assure the continuity of those in power, and enlarge the power base by those who agreed to this proposition. Certainly in the beginning years when the only employer was the state and one’s vote perhaps depended on where one worked, there was considerable electoral support. Not much doubt about what was best for the country, it was seen in

* Text has not been authorized.

the persons of the two presidents that Ukraine has had, and much of its governmental structure. Those who could handle the problem of Russia and assure that the sovereign state would continue.

In 1996 there was a very critical self-assessment by Ukrainians at what it meant to be Ukrainian and the result from left to right was a national consensus in the form of the constitution. Mr Moroz and others here were instrumental in writing that constitution and assuring that it was passed. It's a very important document, it is a national consensus, it is a listing of what should not be done by government as well as a list of aspirations of what government should do for its people. It is a framework for governance under the rule of law. It is the result of decades, maybe even centuries of thought about what Ukrainian governance should be, but certainly it was the reflection of several generations of Ukrainians about what they thought they could manage. It is still in my view, and I think in the view of most thoughtful Ukrainians, a valid guideline and definition of Ukrainian democracy, Ukrainian system of governance, and economy.

After the constitution was passed, the beginnings of another great struggle over a power got into full gear and this resulted, as has been pointed out by many here today and all of the audience here knows, in oligarchical control.

Mr Moroz spoke this morning about the cost of state assets being privatised and who benefited. By any definition, the economy of Ukraine has been twisted and distorted in ways that do not benefit the majority of the people. Some at first called businessmen and when they become very rich, oligarchs, and when they were bound together in groups, mafia clans, become the ruling group through their money. But most, as it has been pointed out, in the country became much poorer. The rough rule of thumb is that most Ukrainians live at 40% of what they lived at in 1991. That's also the size of the budgetary allocation, budgets are about 40% of what are necessary to have minimum functioning, whether it is military, education, the arts, transportation, all the sectors of society. A deep sense of injustice attended this distortion, this twisting of the economy, and it's the driving force in many respects for political discontent and the basis for political reform. It is the big issue.

It is more important than the question of whether to enter NATO or EU, but the solution to this more important question would provide the means to enter NATO and the EU. Those who spoke about it here who have come from Ukraine are among those who are in the forefront and they have been in the battle, so to speak, from the very first day and they know, I would say, what the costs and benefits are and they have some idea of how to get out of the mess, out of the cesspool of corruption. The elections of this past year to parliament was the seed change in the electoral demography of Ukraine. I spoke earlier that in 1991, except for the shadow economy, the only employer was the state but now as many of you know the proportions are 70% are not state owned, they are some form of private ac-

tion, whether in the shadow, in a transition state, in oligarchical-controlled industries or in the genuine private sector.

What this indicates, this 70/30 proportion is that the votes may not be tied to employment. The beginnings of electoral independence are evident and in fact that is what has happened. Almost three fourths of Ukrainians either voted for opposition candidates or against the party of power. And this fact was noted by the closest advisors to the president. One very good friend of mine who was very close to the President said it has been a seed change.

And as we know it did not. In the Rada, this popular electoral change did not have an effect, and why was this? Part of it was the incompetence of the opposition that had majority support but couldn't translate it into actual power. Divisiveness within the coalition in experience, and one has to say, great skill on the part of the defenders of the old faith who manipulated, used the rules and used the administrative resources when necessary to gain control over the parliament that was no longer electorally theirs. Nonetheless, even with the setbacks, the change is evident, they were able to keep committee assignments. This was something of an accomplishment and the coalition composed of sometimes Communists, "Nasza Ukraina", the Socialists, Julia Tymoshenko and an assortment of democratic factions is in fact a political majority when they hang together. The issue was whether they will hang together.

So the election of October, this coming 2004 will show whether the electoral majority that was created in 2002 can be sustained and translated into the beginnings of a transfer from a system of oligarchy to a democratic system with the possibilities of an economy developed to meet the needs of its people.

In 1996 the definition of what a Ukrainian was, what Ukraine wanted, what Ukrainians did not want, was made. There is another crossroads now, that is taking place, if the coalition produces a victory in the presidential elections, can that be translated into reform? Can it roll back the corruption of the distribution of assets, can it set the country on a path that will meet the severe social needs? What kind of an economy is Ukraine going to have?—is it going to be on the Swedish model? What proportions will there be between the state and the private sectors? What kind of taxation system will there be to meet these needs?

There is a huge number of fundamental questions that were addressed in conceptual terms in 1996 that will have to be addressed now in very practical terms, of what to do about it today, what kinds of laws can be implemented, how can they be enforced, how to reverse the trend to a lawless state.

So the issues are enormous and the key question that should be asked by outside groups, and I know that those of us who care about Ukraine ask certainly, what kind of help can be useful? I would say, number one, assuring that the election 2004 is as open and transparent and as fair as possible. What can be done to do that? Monitoring in every possible way, assisting in making it clear not only to Ukraine's leaders but to the leaders of the West generally, what is happening, to

assist with the free press. The situation on the media is that there is no television available to the opposition, zero. There are no real national dailies that are open. There are no independent national dailies, there are a handful of very small journals that report courageously and there is the “samizdat” of the internet. And of course there is the method of going on foot from one house to the other and by word of mouth and the kitchens once again are a place of discussion and information. I would say that’s the fundamental need. But in this coming year, this a critical year, it is a crossroads, it is the chance for a turning point, efforts that are being made by countries like Poland foremost need to be redoubled. I have to say that my own country has not been as engaged as it was in the past. It should be engaged, Ukraine is crucially important to American interests, it is crucially important for European interests. It is important because its success as a democratic state will have tremendous meaning, not simply in terms of military security, but as a way of governance, as a way of bringing benefit to most people.

So the issues are very great, but this is a time of regime change, it is a time of dealing with other enemies, but the priority should be here and I think we should all make every effort to assure that in 2004 there is a democratic result.

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