# NATO

## CHALLENGES AND TASKS AHEAD

### INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
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Eugeniusz Smolar
*President of the Center for International Relations*

## INTRODUCTION

The Warsaw conference took place on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of NATO and the tenth anniversary of Poland's accession to the Alliance. There was an atmosphere of celebration and historic satisfaction, as we here – like our friends and partners in Budapest and Prague, in Bratislava and Vilnius, in Riga and Tallinn, in Bucharest and Sofia – have acted in the belief that membership in NATO and in the European Union finally closed one of the darkest chapters in our history.

The human and material price that Poland paid (and is still paying) was colossal. Indeed, it was of such magnitude that we often say that for us the Second World War only ended in 1989. The political and strategic reversal of our geo-political fate – of having two powerful and imperialist neighbours – was a direct result of our membership in the Alliance and its strong security guarantees, as afforded by Article V.

Germany has now become a close ally. Russia, with its 'phantom pains' of an empire lost, its territorial revisionism,

its outdated proposals of a 'concert of nations' and spheres of influence proposals, its concept of 'sovereign democracy', and its dubious human rights record, remains a disquieting 'big unknown' and source of anxiety. As Russia's politics seem to be strongly anchored in the twentieth century, we cannot look elsewhere, pretend that everything is OK and agree optimistically that history has truly ended. It did not end for Russia, so it cannot end for Russia's neighbours. Given our history, we in Central and Eastern Europe are the worrying types.

And so ten years and a few military missions later, Poland is celebrating one of our most momentous historic events – accession to NATO and, five years later, the European Union – with a feeling of satisfaction, togetherness and seriousness of purpose, but also solemnity.

The reason for these conflicted feelings is the state of Alliance itself. The problems are too numerous to list here, and have in any case been analysed in a number of excellent studies recently published in Europe and the US. For us, the most important are differences in threat perception and, consequently, rifts over strategic priorities, including territorial defence versus out-of-area missions, and the strength of Article V commitments. Poland and its regional allies anxiously anticipate the consequences of allied tension related to the growing globalisation of NATO activities.

Even if it is considered self-evident that Poland and many other members of the Alliance do not have global interests, we all, as NATO members, share not only regional but also global security responsibilities – a point stressed by Mr. Bogdan Klich, the Polish Minister of National Defence.

During the recent Security Conference in Munich, President Nicolas Sarkozy asked, 'Does Europe want peace or

does it want to be left in peace?' The Polish response is that in order to safeguard the peace, including peace in Europe, we cannot remain uninvolved in 'far-away countries we know little about'. There was a joke in the 'bad old days': Visit the Soviet Union before the Soviet Union visits you. We must now visit sources of real danger, wisely and in solidarity, before the dangers visit us.

For these reasons, we anxiously await a New Strategic Concept that will address the balance between NATO's traditional defence commitments in the Euro-Atlantic area and other important issues, such as out-of-area missions, new challenges, future enlargement, burden-sharing and so on. Muddling through is not an option. Unfortunately, given the diversity of perspectives and priorities among member states, it seems to be a real possibility. We here do not like it.

During the conference, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated: 'Poland will invest its hopes and dreams, as well as its real and material capabilities, in the strength and might of the North Atlantic Alliance'. His statement reflects the convictions of a great majority of Poles. *We* do not doubt the need for NATO in the future. Our conference was thus convened in the hope that our allies and NATO partners will engage in a value-based but pragmatic and purposeful debate on:

**NATO: THE CHALLENGES AND TASKS AHEAD**

## Donald Tusk

*Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland*

Mr. Secretary General,
Dear Friends of Poland, and of many of us
– also on a personal level,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Anniversaries are a good time for meetings, speeches and presentations, but an occasion such as the tenth anniversary of Poland's NATO accession is also the right moment for an in-depth, political reflection about Poland's participation in the North Atlantic Alliance, and about the very essence of the Alliance in the context of the history of our state and nation. We had the occasion yesterday and today, as well as during these last ten years, to speak extensively about the technical, military and logistical aspects of NATO functioning.

I would like to use this occasion to say a few words about the Alliance's axiological foundations as well as our membership. When Poland joined NATO ten years ago, ours was a country that had experienced dramatic events, and by this I mean the entire twentieth century. Our experiences – both the tragic and optimistic ones – from the 1980–81 and

1989 periods taught us one thing: that only a practical and fundamentally sound solidarity can guarantee Polish security and global order. We often speak of solidarity, but not only due to our national sentiment vis-à-vis this expression. I am convinced that NATO would lose its purpose without solidarity, which remains a key value for all the countries united within the Alliance.

What is Article V of the Washington Treaty, if not the epitome of this ideal, which became so important for Poles, which constituted both the essence and condition of our climb to independence? But this crucial value in terms of the Alliance – solidarity understood in a rather old-fashioned way, in its most simple definition, the way people understand it, meaning one for all, and all for one – this solidarity failed in the twentieth century, outflanked by egoism. Today, we bear witness to, and sometimes participate in, this great struggle between egoism and solidarity. If in the North Atlantic Alliance, but also more broadly in our entire civilisation, this ideal of solidarity shall triumph over egoism, then we will remain calm about the united future of states and nations. The extremely dramatic history of the twentieth century shows, however, that the urge to escape into egoism – and I emphasise escape into egoism, because egoism has its roots in cowardliness – this history shows that in petty, weak leadership, in unfavourable circumstances, in the fall of this axiology shared by NATO states, the threat of escape into egoism and cowardliness is always present. That is why we must bear in mind that this Alliance, this defensive Alliance, must remember the supreme value of solidarity in defence of everyone, regardless of their potential.

There is also a second issue, which we Poles remember very well. The issue that initially led to the very creation of

NATO. Today, we are witness to a completely different geopolitical context. The Cold War days are over. Gone are the days of the confrontation between the Communist system and the free world. But only a naive person, someone without a knowledge of history, could claim that the optimism expressed by some parties, an optimism which speaks of the end of history, can find its application in the domain of security. I would like to emphasise that those values for which Poles had so longed, in the name of which Poles endeavoured to access the European Union and NATO, are not only applicable, not only of topical interest, but also require constant alertness, constant engagement. These are the most traditional values. This may not be a breakthrough discovery, but it is really worth repeating these truths every day, especially when we see that some people have already proclaimed their demise. Here, I mean values typical for each and every liberal democracy: human freedoms, the value of individualism, free market and open competition, respect for the most traditional values, the very essence of our civilization. The North Atlantic Alliance, both when it was created and now, must be a guarantee of the security and strength of the civilisation and community that has grown out of these values.

Deeply believing in the sense of these axiological foundations, Poland and other new NATO states, unlike during the first years of our NATO existence, no longer wish to be countries that can only count on the help of others. Our capabilities are still not the ones we dream about, not yet comparable with the biggest powers that constitute the pillars of the North Atlantic Alliance. But perhaps because of our painful experiences, we want to be active partners, in the sense of being useful for global order and global security. We are ready to help others, and not

only wait for help should – knock on wood – it ever be necessary.

This is why Poland supports a strong political leadership in NATO and supports the enlargement of NATO towards those countries and states in which the aforementioned axiology is also very much alive, or is at least becoming the political wish for these nations' and states' authorities. This is why we support and participate in even the most demanding NATO missions, staying true to the old Polish *cri de coeur*: 'For our freedom and yours.' When Poles proclaimed this motto, they didn't have their own country. When someone brandishing a sabre calls out 'for our freedom and yours', he may become the object of ridicule on the part of the strongest forces. But when this motto – which in its deepest sense expresses the essence of solidarity standing in defence of the most crucial values – becomes the motto of a strong Alliance, it can become the source of a real, true hope for the entire world. I am convinced that both today and in future, Poland will invest its hopes and dreams, as well as its real and material capabilities, in the strength and might of the North Atlantic Alliance. We are here today partly in order to say these words to each other and repeat them.

I am proud to be the head of the Polish government at a time when we celebrate this proud and important anniversary.

Thank you very much.

## Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

*NATO Secretary General*

Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am both very pleased and deeply honoured to be here with Prime Minister Tusk speaking at this 10th Anniversary Conference on the challenges faced by NATO. Let me thank Minister Klich for having invited me. And let me also congratulate Poland and the Polish people most sincerely with their ten years in NATO. It is a very important day indeed. When Poland joined the Alliance back in 1999, Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek promised that Poland would be, I quote, 'a good and credible ally, for good and bad weather'. And I think there is no doubt that your country has more than lived up to that promise by one of the key political figures in its recent history.

Ten years of NATO membership is, I think, an excellent opportunity to look back and to reflect upon years gone by. But it is also a good opportunity to draw some lessons for the future. After all, NATO's enlargement, as Prime Minister Tusk said a moment ago, is an ongoing process. Seven more countries have become members of NATO since Poland joined together with the Czech Republic and

Hungary ten years ago. Two countries are about to enter. And we know that several more wish to follow in their footsteps. We owe it to all interested countries – whether now or in the future – to share your experience and to help them prepare for membership.

I know that the term 'historic' is used too often perhaps nowadays. Yet the significance of what happened on 12 March 1999 can hardly be overstated. On that day, when Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary formally acceded into NATO, the Cold War ended for good, and justice triumphed over history. It was an overwhelming demonstration of the right of any European nation to determine its own fate, by its own free choice. And it was a huge step towards the free, undivided and democratic Europe to which NATO had aspired from its very beginning, now almost sixty years ago.

The accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary was important for these three nations themselves, important for NATO and important for Europe as a whole. For the three new members, it marked the return to Europe from which they had been forcefully separated. NATO membership gave you a seat at the table where key decisions are taken to shape our strategic environment. It gave you Allies with whom to share the common burden of security. And, of course, Prime Minister Tusk indeed as you have said, it did give you the ultimate security guarantee of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, and the assurance that Allies would come to your assistance if you ever came under attack.

For NATO, the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary marked another step in its post-Cold War adaptation, with three new members adding new military and political weight to shape the strategic environment in

a positive way. And for Europe, it marked both the end of its erstwhile division and a new beginning – at the threshold of the 21st century, because the old continent was finally able to leave its tragic past behind.

Over the subsequent few years, the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary proved wrong all those who feared that enlargement could be a net loss for European security. It proved wrong all those who saw enlargement as the creation of a new division. And it proved wrong all those who maintained that it would undermine NATO's cohesion and effectiveness, or that it would force the new members to devote too much of their scarce resources to defence.

None of these predictions came true. Thanks to NATO's enlargement and partnership policies, alongside those of the European Union, our continent has never been more stable and more secure. And the prospect of membership into these two key institutions remains a major incentive for nations all across Europe to get their house in order, introduce difficult but necessary reforms, and pursue good neighbourly relations.

NATO's cohesion and effectiveness have not been affected, either. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have all integrated smoothly. They have made their voices heard, and are still making their voices heard, of course. But they have also displayed the same team spirit as all other Allies, and contributed to the consensus-decision-making which underpins our Alliance. More than that, they have become important and valued contributors to NATO's operations and missions : today Poland has almost 1600 soldiers in ISAF – and I will go to Ghazni province and visit your fellow countrymen next week – with another 285 in KFOR.

The costs of NATO membership have also remained modest. We acknowledged that they would not be trivial, but that they could be stretched over a longer period of time. We said that the necessary military reforms of our three new Allies would need to be ambitious, and that they should continue after their accession. And we said that, while our new Allies would naturally have to make their contribution, the benefits that NATO membership would bring would be very much greater. And that was borne out by the facts. And today, while the global financial crisis leaves none of the Allies unaffected, NATO membership continues to offer us all excellent value for money.

Of course, back in 1999, some nations were disappointed to be left out of this first round of enlargement. But none gave up its ambition to join NATO – and seven more were admitted just a few years later. At the beginning of 2004, as one of my first official acts as NATO Secretary General, I had the privilege to communicate to them our invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. And I have warm memories of the accession ceremony in Washington D.C. in March of that year.

Now, in a few weeks' time, at NATO's 60th Anniversary Summit, in Strasbourg and Kehl, in the heart of Europe, I hope that two more nations will be joining our Alliance – I say two because it is my strong hope that both Albania and Croatia will be with us as full members for this great celebratory moment. We have made clear repeatedly – and no doubt will do so again at our next Summit – that NATO's door remains open for future members. And interested countries, like everyone else, know that we mean what we say.

In retrospect, then, NATO enlargement has proved the doom-sayers to be totally wrong. Enlargement has not

fallen victim to a zero-sum logic. NATO members have managed the process well. And it has been a very clear benefit for European security.

Still, although NATO enlargement has been very successful thus far, we must constantly remind ourselves that it is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end. And that end is to safeguard our security in a rapidly changing world. Now, if we take this aim seriously, then we must not rest on our laurels, but move on. In fact, as someone once pointed out to me, he who can rest on his laurels probably wears them in the wrong place!

So what are the challenges ahead? What must an enlarged NATO do in order to safeguard our security and our freedom in today's world? To my mind, three major challenges stand out:

The first are our operations and missions. We have always said that countries that join NATO must not be mere consumers of security, but providers of security. With almost 300 soldiers supporting the NATO mission in Kosovo and 1600 in Afghanistan, Poland is making a significant, I would say very significant, and very welcome contribution to our common effort. I am confident that your country will continue to demonstrate that same commitment, especially in Afghanistan where the stakes are particularly high, as we all know.

We must ensure that we have sufficient troops and enablers on the ground to ensure security, both during and after the coming election period. As an Alliance, we have had considerable success in training and equipping the Afghan National Army, and we must build on that progress. And while NATO, of course, alone cannot take sole responsibility we must look at how we can contribute to greater assistance in building up the ANP. But there is a lot more

that we – and the international community as a whole – can do, and should do, on the civilian side as well – in helping the Afghans to build functioning institutions, to fight crime and corruption, and get a better grip of the narcotics problem.

And of course Ladies and Gentlemen, we need to look beyond Afghanistan. We must take into account the wider region, and especially Pakistan, with which we must deepen our engagement. We must also get our military and civilian institutions to co-operate much more closely and more effectively in a truly Comprehensive Approach. And I hope that we will be able to make progress in all these areas at the big Afghanistan conference in the Netherlands on the 31st March, as Hillary Clinton termed it, the so-called 'Big Tent' meeting.

For while we are helping the people of Afghanistan, we are also fighting at the frontline of terrorism. Ladies and Gentlemen, I am aware that Defence Minister Klich and Prime Minister Tusk have to defend Polish participation in Afghanistan, often in the face of very critical public opinion, but let's be clear, the stakes are high and failure is not an option.

The second major challenge facing our Alliance is our relationship with Russia. When NATO started its enlargement process in the 1990s, there were fears that we would alienate Russia. Indeed, there were Russian concerns about what enlargement would mean for them. Where we judged these concerns to be legitimate, we sought to address them. Where we felt them to be inappropriate, we made it clear that the future of Europe could not be held hostage to outmoded concepts of 'spheres of influence'. On balance, this approach worked. Within five years NATO grew from 16 to 26 members, and we still managed to deepen our relationship with Russia.

However, the conflict in Georgia last August led some observers to believe that our dual strategy of pursuing enlargement and simultaneously engaging Russia had run its course. Some even said that enlargement had turned from being the solution to being part of the problem of Europe's security. So has a success story ended? I don't think so. NATO's enlargement process remains part and parcel of our strategy of consolidating Europe as an undivided and democratic security space.

At the same time, it is clear that the NATO-Russia relationship is too valuable to be stuck in arguments only on issues which divide us. Afghanistan is one key area where we have obvious common interests, but there are other areas as well, such as the fight against terrorism and piracy, and the need to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. NATO and Russia need a trustful partnership that encourages dialogue on all issues – not just those where we agree but also those where we disagree – with a view towards resolving problems and building practical cooperation. And that is why NATO Foreign Ministers agreed last week to the reconvening of formal NATO-Russia Council meetings, including at Ministerial level, as soon as possible before the Summer. Does that mean we suddenly agree with Russia on a range of difficult issues? No, but not talking is not an option. This is an important partnership and we must see where we agree and disagree and engage in a dialogue which addresses those issues of difference.

The third major challenge for NATO is to define its approach to new risks and threats. NATO's enlargement process began when the term 'globalisation' applied mainly to economic developments. Today, challenges to our security have also globalised. We have seen these past few

years that cyber attacks or the interruption of energy supplies can devastate a country without a single shot being fired. We are witnessing the return of piracy as a serious, global security challenge. At the same time, Iran's nuclear programme continues to highlight the pressing challenge of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

We need to better define NATO's role in meeting these challenges. NATO may not provide all the answers, but that should not serve as excuse for inaction. We must make the best possible use of the Alliance's unique value as a forum for transatlantic political dialogue, and as an instrument for translating political decisions into concrete action. After all, threats don't wait until we feel that we are ready for them.

At our Summit next month we must show that the NATO Allies are able to muster the necessary political will, imagination and solidarity to meet these challenges. And I am confident that we shall. But the Summit must do even more. With a new US Administration settling in office, and with the prospect of France taking its full place in NATO's integrated military structures – this is good news, excellent news. So the Summit is also the perfect moment to launch work on a new Strategic Concept for NATO.

Such a new Strategic Concept will need to combine the Alliance's core purpose, and let's never forget it, of collective defence with the many requirements associated with out-of-area operations. It will need to emphasise NATO's role as a unique community of common values and interests. It will need to make clear NATO's strong desire to engage with the UN, the EU and other international actors, as partners, in a comprehensive approach to the security challenges of our time. And it should also underline, just as our current Strategic Concept does, that NATO will keep its door open for new members.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

If the history of the 20th century has told us anything, it is that the costs of indifference and neglect are ultimately going to be much greater than cost of investing in a strong, effective Alliance. Over the past ten years, NATO enlargement has helped your country – Poland and nine others countries in Central and Eastern Europe back onto the political map. Never again will you be the object of someone else's ambitions. Today, there are several other nations who share this same, very legitimate, aspiration – and others may follow in the future. Your country, and our Alliance, must remain a shining beacon for them. And I am sure that we will. So, finally let me thank Prime Minister Tusk once again, for being here and for Poland's contribution as such a committed, staunch member of the Alliance. That commitment is essential if we are to defend hard won freedoms and values. I realise today that I am preaching to the 'converted' audience, but we also need to reach out to the successor generation and you are well placed to do that: while I was fortunate enough to be born on the 'right side' of the Iron Curtain, you have fought for your freedom and know the values we all enjoy today had to be fought for and that they don't come automatically, that a free world has to be defended. Our successor generation must know too, the importance of defending those values and the key role that NATO plays in that.

Thank you.

Bogdan Klich
*Poland's Minister of National Defence*

## A STRONG ALLIANCE

It is my great pleasure to deliver a this address at such a distinguished conference. The background for our discussions today has an exceptional symbolic meaning. We celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Polish membership in the Alliance and, almost at the same time, the sixtieth of signing the Washington Treaty. These commemorations provide us with a unique opportunity not only to summarise past NATO achievements, but to set new, ambitious goals for its future as well. Prior to the summit in Strasbourg and Kehl, which will take place in three weeks time, such discussions are of particular importance. This high-level meeting will not end the process of transformation and adaptation that NATO has undertaken in recent years. On the contrary, commencing work on a new strategic concept will trigger new perspectives for the Alliance in the twenty-first century.

In regard to the key topic of this session: *The Strong Alliance*, let me emphasise that this is an issue widely and intensively discussed in Poland. The matter strongly stimulates the work of experts from various academic institutions

and think tanks across the country. The obvious reason for this is that Poland has become an active NATO member and takes its membership obligations seriously.

It has already been ten years since Poland joined NATO. We have to state that on the whole the last decade should be described as clearly positive. Polls show public opinion agrees, recognising accession to the Alliance as a success story.

Membership in NATO has significantly enhanced Poland's security. The most important 'defensive umbrella' over our heads is Article 5. Close relations with the United States are also fundamental for our security. And yet another foundation is the development of European Security and Defence Policy within the European Union. These are the essential building blocks of our security.

The security guarantee of Article 5 is not the only advantage of membership. Joining NATO has greatly increased our international role. It is now possible for Poland to influence stabilisation efforts directly across our borders and beyond, both of which are key for the security and stabilisation of the Euro-Atlantic sphere as a whole.

Moreover, it has been a milestone in the adaptation of the Polish Armed Forces to the military standards and requirements of the twenty-first century. These changes were obviously in line with our membership aspirations and developing co-operation with NATO. As a result, our forces are smaller but more capable. They use modern military equipment and weapons. Hence they are able to add significant value to NATO efforts, both in transformational and operational dimensions.

Ten years on, NATO remains central to our security. Poland's policy is to keep the Alliance strong and vital. To this end, there are a few points I would like to make in

regard to our expectations of NATO and its future development.

Firstly, we believe that while developing expeditionary capabilities and conducting operations far from Euro-Atlantic territory, collective defence should remain the core NATO function. This was emphasised earlier today by the Prime Minister and the Secretary General. In a nutshell, the more defence mechanisms and instruments in NATO security policy, the better the guarantees for every member state. In other words, a balance must be struck within the Alliance between new tasks and missions on one hand, and the traditional functions related to collective defence on the other. A few areas are of particular importance in this context.

Reinforcing a key transformational initiative, NATO Response Force, is one of them. We need to make sure that NRF, introduced 7 years ago at the NATO ministerial meeting here in Warsaw, is not a 'paper tiger' but a credible instrument. NRF is to be used for expeditionary missions as well as for strengthening member states should they be threatened with invasion. We need solutions that will enable NRF to be fully effective in these tasks. Moreover, NATO should maintain and develop the operational plans that identify troops for reinforcement of allies in the event of Article 5 threats. While joining NATO, Poland successfully aspired to develop such mechanisms for itself. Facing dynamic changes in the security environment, these plans obviously have to be updated on an automatic and regular basis. Common exercises should also more frequently reflect traditional threats related to Article 5 scenarios.

Last but not least, and of which Poland needs not be often reminded, is the issue of the equal distribution of

NATO installations among the allies. There were two waves of enlargement in the last ten years. The current geographic range of the Alliance is different now than in the 1990s. These changes must be reflected in the development of NATO's structures and military infrastructure. Hosting such elements on the territory of the newer members is crucial for the cohesion and effectiveness of the Alliance. It more deeply anchors those nations to NATO's structure, as well as increases their ability to contribute to the Alliance's operation and development.

The second key expectation is for NATO to remain a forum of dialogue and co-operation between countries on both sides of the Atlantic. The transatlantic link is a core principle of the Washington Treaty. In the current security environment, its strength is a prerequisite for the effective achievement of common goals and defence of common values.

Nowadays it seems to be much easier to look for mutually beneficial solutions than a few years ago. The climate on both sides of the ocean has truly improved. The US seems to be willing to develop and enhance its partnership with Europe. Likewise, Europe is more inclined to consider an American perspective on security issues.

We have to take advantage of this opportunity to deepen transatlantic dialogue. It is high time to establish new practical modalities for co-operation between NATO and the EU. Afghanistan and Kosovo have demonstrated we should not only be able to make full use of *Berlin Plus* arrangements, but to go beyond them in terms of both planning and co-operation. If we do not manage to resolve such issues, we will fail. And by 'we' I mean neither NATO nor the EU, but rather the whole Euro-Atlantic community.

A third issue is our need to intensify activities in Afghanistan, as it poses a real test for NATO's credibility.

Failure is not an option, as stressed today by the Secretary General. The endeavour undertaken a few years ago has to be completed successfully. The Afghan population is counting on the establishment of stability and security in their country. We must also succeed for the sake of our own security, in order to tackle threats before they knock directly and unexpectedly at our doors. Our performance will be a clear indicator of our ability to deal with challenges far from our borders, to mobilise the appropriate forces, and to combine military involvement with civilian efforts. It will also emphasise our solidarity in addressing shared burdens.

For these reasons Poland approaches the ISAF very seriously. Last year we increased our contingent from 1200 to 1600 troops and took over the Ghazni province in order to fully optimise our efforts there. We are also aware that we will face new challenges related to the nation's presidential elections this year. That is why I have undertaken important decisions. In April and May, the fifth rotation of our contingent will be comprised of more combat troops and fewer logistics and support elements. It will also be reinforced with additional troops and helicopters. We are intensifying our development assistance. Training the Afghan army and helping Afghan police are high on our agenda. We are also co-operating vigorously with local authorities. All such activities promote the good reputation of Polish forces, bolster our efforts in Afghanistan, and are widely appreciated by the local community. This is not only my opinion. One of the articles published a few days ago in *The Guardian* recognises our endeavours and their positive impact on the country.

Fourthly, the Alliance needs to respond to the new, less traditional threats and challenges that have emerged in the last twenty years. Although often not of a military nature,

they may have far-reaching security implications for member states. For this reason, even if NATO is not the appropriate organisation to comprehensively address them all, it obviously has a role to play. The protection of critical energy infrastructure is just one example. The development of mechanisms to defend against cyberattacks, such as those in Estonia, is another.

A fifth issue is that of Ukraine and Georgia. I am glad the Secretary General had an opportunity to explain the future of the 'open door' policy when answering a participant's question. We are traditionally strong proponents of the 'open door' policy. It is in our interest that the door to NATO is not closed. The policy clearly enhanced the stability of NATO territory and its environs during the 1990s, as it has at the dawn of this century. In our experience, the policy encourages the development of democratic and free market institutions within prospective member nations. We are glad that two more states – Albania and Croatia are joining NATO in three weeks. This should not, however, mark the end of the enlargement process. The 'open door' policy has to be confirmed, particularly in regard to Ukraine and Georgia.

I recall a conference seventeen years ago on Ukrainian-Polish co-operation, at which the ambassador of Ukraine to Poland, Mr. Hennadij Udovenko, made an important statement in reference to the idea of Jerzy Giedroyc, founding father of the prominent Parisian periodical 'Kultura' (*Culture*). The ambassador's statement was: 'There is no secure Poland without a secure Ukraine.' This is, in fact, the essence of Poland's advocacy for Kiev's aspirations to integrate with Euro-Atlantic institutions.

We are, therefore, anticipating compliance with the agreements made last year at the Bucharest summit and

elaborated upon at NATO's foreign ministers' meeting last December. These decisions are obviously a coherent package. They provide us with a set of practical initiatives to stimulate and assist Kiev and Tbilisi in their political and defence reforms. We should approach this possibility in good faith, ready to invite these two states to MAP, and eventually membership, once they are willing and prepared.

Lastly, I would like to address NATO-Russia relations. No doubt, Moscow has the potential to be a valuable partner. There are many areas where we need Russia's hand – Afghanistan is a good example. Nevertheless, the relationship has many outstanding issues, put in stark relief in August last year. By infringing upon the independent and sovereign territory of Georgia, Russia lost the trust of NATO members, which had taken years to achieve.

As far as Poland is concerned, we are interested in having a credible and trustworthy partner close to our borders. We support co-operation and are open to discussions with Russia, even on issues on which we can hardly agree. I fully concur here with the Secretary General that we must work out a realistic formula of dialogue and co-operation. At the same time, we have to remember that good and fruitful relations with Moscow cannot be achieved at the expense of the values and principles that have confirmed NATO's vitality for the past sixty years. We cannot turn a blind eye to aggression or attempts to establish any sphere of influence.

In conclusion, let me note that these issues will be reiterated at the forthcoming summit in Strasbourg and Kehl. I do hope that the meeting will confirm that despite its age of sixty years, the Alliance remains strong, vital and relevant. The message of the summit should be clear and unambiguous: NATO is capable of transforming itself in

adaptation to the threats and challenges it will face in the twenty-first century. I am sure that the *Declaration on Alliance Security* will be put to good use and not only because professor Adam Rotfeld, the former Polish foreign minister, was one of the 'wise men' who drafted it. I am mainly sure because it establishes a process by which a new strategic concept will be adopted at the next NATO summit hopefully in 2010.

## Radosław Sikorski

*Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs*

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am honoured to have the opportunity to address such a distinguished audience. Let me thank the Ministry of National Defence and the Centre for International Relations for organising this event.

This conference takes place at a very significant moment for Poland. The year 2009 marks the tenth anniversary of Poland's accession to NATO. It was one of the most important political events in our modern history. The year 1999 was a milestone for Poland in building our citizens' security awareness and their trust in the state. Our accession coincided with the tenth anniversary of the autumn of 1989, which transformed the socio-political system of Poland and rebalanced first the whole European continent, and then the world order. Joining NATO was proof that the strategic path chosen ten years earlier was the right one. NATO is the key pillar in Polish security policy.

Since its inception, NATO has undergone profound changes that have shaped the Alliance as we know it today. Since 1949, membership has increased from 12 to 26 countries through five rounds of enlargement. Last year, the

invitation to NATO was extended to Albania and Croatia, which are to sign the accession protocols next month. We also trust that Macedonia will be able to see its membership in NATO in the near future.

Poland strongly supports the Alliance's open door policy. We continue to believe that the best stabilisation instrument for the Euro-Atlantic community is the enlargement policy. Our work to formulate the Alliance's course of action towards an enhanced open door policy will continue, as we believe all democracies have the right to choose their relationship with NATO freely.

Over the last 20 years, the Alliance has gone through a fundamental change – a transformation from a Cold War western military Alliance into a political-military organisation that constitutes a forum of dialogue and co-operation with numerous partners both in Europe and beyond. Since the London Declaration of 1990, we have witnessed the Alliance's rapid evolution. As a result, its current role extends beyond the original responsibility of territorial defence against an external threat. Apart from satisfying this primary obligation, the Alliance began to play an important stabilising role on a global scale. The progressive liberation of this new mindset from the geopolitical thinking of the Cold War era has been a work in progress. Most likely it will take an additional generation or two until this new, non-confrontational approach is entirely comprehended and appreciated.

It was not only the end of the Cold War that so soundly affected the mindset of the Alliance, although it did play a key role in changing the world's geopolitical architecture and, thus, NATO policies. No less important were changes in the security environment that soon became 21st century challenges.

The spring of the new millennium brought a tremendous challenge, as new, 'asymmetric' threats appeared on the international stage that affect us all, regardless of our location on the world map or state policies. The threat of terrorism, including religious extremism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, energy security abuses and environmental issues, all constitute threats that the Alliance has to confront today. In order to effectively ensure transatlantic security, the Alliance has launched the idea of a transformation process, both in political and military terms. I hope we will take action on NATO's new Strategic Concept, which is to be launched at the Strassbourg/Khel Summit just around the corner.

The key element that arises in discussions on the future role of NATO is as a Euro-Atlantic security provider, both in terms of Article V of the Treaty of Washington as well as the Alliance's expeditionary operations. Some may think that these two values are irreconcilable. Let me be clear that it is just the opposite. Expeditionary operations, with the ISAF mission in Afghanistan serving as the best example, prove that NATO is capable of defending its core values and adapting to the challenges of the 21st century.

This has set the ground for today's discussions on the core duties of the Alliance today. The new responsibilities defined for NATO should not detract from the core role it has played in the Euro-Atlantic community. In accordance with the Treaty of 1949, NATO's fundamental role is to 'safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means.' It is believed in our part of Europe that maintaining NATO's capability to defend its members and address traditional challenges should not be neglected when developing new capabilities.

The mission in Afghanistan has proven NATO's ability to adjust to dynamic security challenges and respond to new threats while remaining committed to Article V obligations. It has further demonstrated how, in the new security environment, we may be forced to defend ourselves far beyond our borders. These two functions need not clash. On the contrary, Article V defence obligations and 'out-of-area' missions complement each other.

The Polish presence in Afghanistan best underlines our national commitment to both Article V and expeditionary operations as important for the security of our state, our continent and the whole transatlantic community. For this reason, our engagement in Afghanistan will remain vital. With 1600 troops currently deployed, Poland wants to contribute to the stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. We trust to be able to satisfy the expectations of our Afghan and transatlantic partners in the Ghazni province, where our troops are performing their duties.

Afghanistan will remain the number one NATO operational priority for the foreseeable future. It requires deep commitment, strong co-operation and continued effort to achieve the objectives set out at its beginning. However, the engagement in Afghanistan is not merely a military battle with boots on the ground, but a multi-dimensional endeavour requiring solid, civil-military co-operation. It is important to admit that the Alliance of today plays a role of not only extinguishing the fire, but also creating the conditions needed to prevent a repeated intervention. Known as a comprehensive approach, this vision for the ISAF operation is being successfully implemented in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, today's NATO is not only about remote operations. There is still unfinished business in Europe,

including the operation in Kosovo and the NATO-EU operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Berlin Plus operation). NATO support in the Balkans is necessary if the region is to take its rightful place in the Euro-Atlantic community. Operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina have further illustrated the importance of co-operation between NATO and the EU. A solid partnership between the two constitutes a warranty for transatlantic security. They have both been instrumental in the post-Cold War reconstruction of Europe, and share fundamental strategic interests in the present security environment. As such, it is essential for these organizations to forge a genuine partnership that will deter threats. To do so will also ensure the successful fulfilment of the terms of the 'comprehensive approach', which can be implemented by means of achieving stabilization objectives (such as those in Afghanistan) in close co-operation with other organizations, such as, among others, the EU and the UN.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Strategic Concept of 1999 recognised the importance of maintaining an open dialogue with Ukraine, Russia and the Mediterranean countries, the continued process of enlargement, the problems of nuclear proliferation, and a commitment to conflict prevention and crisis management. Since 1999, it has been argued that several events have critically affected the reality we live in. Those events include September 11th, the proliferation of terrorism, the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and terrorist attacks in London, Madrid, Mumbai and Islamabad. Adapting to the challenges of the new environment has not been easy, nor will be the negotiation process to reflect them in the New

Strategic Concept, especially for a consensus-based organization like NATO. Yet, it is feasible.

The work on the New Strategic Concept and its conclusion will be pivotal for the future of the organisation in the 21st century, both in symbolic and functional terms. A resolute review will be needed in order to prepare guidelines that will address the vital needs of the organisation for the years to come. We believe the upcoming summit will provide solid direction in this respect. Poland is aware of its role in this task, and intends to act vigorously towards developing a new doctrine.

Since the last summit in Bucharest, a lot has happened to prove that there is a need, and room, for adjustments. The political and military crisis in Georgia, the energy crisis in Ukraine and developments in the Balkans, among others, have set the groundwork for discussion on how NATO can perform effectively in the decades to come. Consequently, in a new document, we need to not only address terrorism and WMD proliferation, but also such issues as energy security, climate change and cyber-attacks. These challenges require the Alliance's collective transformation and response.

The question we need to ask ourselves is not whether NATO is still relevant, but what else should be done in order to render it more effective in addressing the security challenges of the 21st century. The military transformation of the Alliance will be significant in this regard, even though not all of the challenges will require military answers. We need to have deployable and efficient forces capable of successfully responding to crises both near and far.

For these reasons, the April summit be a principal event in the public debate concerning security challenges, trans-

formation and enlargement – all essential to guarantee the transatlantic community's future security.

Let me conclude by saying that since Poland's accession to NATO, we have never taken our membership for granted. Throughout the last ten years we have confirmed, on many occasions, our conviction that the Alliance is a major factor in the defence and political stability of Europe and an essential provider of our own security, as well as our ability to stand up to the challenges of not only being a member, but also of being a trustworthy and committed partner, for better and worse. We will continue to contribute to NATO policies and actively participate in their implementation while enhancing the transatlantic partnership.

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to reply to the words of Mr. Secretary General in his opening speech in Kraków three weeks ago. Mr. Secretary General, you can be assured that the 'allied solidarity' you called for in Kraków can be found in this country, where the notion of 'solidarity' is known better than elsewhere. I am convinced that allied solidarity for a purposeful cause will be a new breath for the future of our good, old NATO.

Thank you.

Dr Adam Kobieracki

## WHAT DOES POLAND EXPECT FROM NATO?

### Historical background

Allow me to start with the obvious: reflected herein are my personal opinions and do not constitute any official position. I say this not to be politically correct. Rather, it allows for what I personally want to express under the above-stated title. It has to be stressed, as I am a Polish diplomat, a former NATO official and at time consider myself an expert on security policy.

As a Pole, I also have to be clear from the outset that although there are different categories of Polish expectations vis-à-vis NATO (to which we will come later), there is also an almost sentimental attitude towards NATO shared by most of my compatriots for mainly historic reasons. It is that we expect our membership in the North Atlantic Alliance to serve as confirmation of Poland's inclusion in Europe and its affiliation with Western European values and standards. In

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Ambassador, currently Director of the International Security Policy Department in the Polish MFA, former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations (2003-2007).

a sense, we expect NATO to serve as yet another symbol of Poland's independence, sovereignty and freedom of choice after the dark years of our 20th century history.

This attitude is one reason for the Polish tendency to think twice about any fundamental change in the way NATO functions rather than rush into implementation. When you finally board a train of which you have long dreamt, you tend to sit back and enjoy the ride for a while. We are not necessarily conservative in regard to change, we simply do not want to be deprived of a newly acquired membership in a rather prestigious club, or to see previously forbidden fruit evolving into something quite different.

With such a perspective, we are prepared to undertake NATO's necessary transformation, but only for good reason, in an appropriate direction, and not at any cost. NATO is too important for us, so we are reluctant to risk its gradual erosion with hasty action.

For Poles, NATO's transformation is understood as necessary for adaptation to new politico-military realities and a changing security environment. Adaptation, however, consists of improvements in efficiency and organisation; it does not imply a total redefinition of NATO's *raison d'être* – namely, collective defence, common values and a more secure world.

### NATO's Role in the Defence of Poland

Ten years ago, when we were joining the club, there was a widespread belief in Poland that NATO would be a panacea for all our security problems and a shield against all security threats and challenges. Apart from the obvious joy of self-determination, such an expectation was the main reason for the unusually high level of public support for

Polish membership in the Alliance. It is worth noting, however, that in the late 1990s, popular wisdom held that Poland required defence mainly, if not exclusively, from military threats coming from the East, in the classic sense of that terminology.

Allow me to be blunt here: the only external threat of which Poles were really afraid at that time was the possibility of a re-emergent Soviet empire, resulting in a direct Russian military threat. Given what took place after World War II, the unprecedented situation following the end of the Cold War, and the quite fragile international situation at the time, such a perspective was only natural.

In that context, membership in NATO was seen as an irreversible confirmation of fundamental changes in the post-Cold War security landscape. Yes, in those days, NATO was seen as the sole, and sufficient, defender of Poland. One might find such thinking naive. Nevertheless, it was a tribute to the strong and effective role NATO had played during the Cold War.

Our present expectations of NATO in regard to the defence of Poland are more sophisticated. We understand NATO is very important, albeit only one element in the entire network of international security-related organisations and institutions. We also clearly see that security threats and challenges are different today and continue to evolve. We have learned our lessons as far as the functioning of the North Atlantic Alliance is concerned, its advantages and relative disadvantages. All told, we are no longer a new to the family, thus our expectations concerning its support are somewhat different.

In general terms, both the defence and security of Poland rely on three basic instruments: our own military (and political) potential, multilateral commitments and arrange-

ments, and close bilateral partnerships with selected nations. Obviously, those instruments should complement and reinforce one another. Against this background, NATO is seen as a major multilateral contributor to our defence and security.

To focus on Poland's defence, we see the most important role for NATO in terms of 'hardware' security. The organisation supports our own military capabilities, which are in turn further strengthened through bilateral relationships, in particular with the US. Such a perspective is not based solely on historically motivated fear, nor on our failure to recognise new security challenges. However, regardless of our political ambitions, we are keenly aware that our defence capabilities are not, on their own, comparable to any of the major powers. We cannot allow ourselves the luxury of standing alone, or nearly so, against military threats. One might say NATO is Poland's most important insurance policy.

This is not to say we expect our allies to do the job for us. We hope they will always be ready and willing to provide us with decisive military assistance should it be needed, hence the Polish 'obsession' with the continued validity of Article V commitments. This should not be seen as a 'conservative' approach to the nature of the treaty, but rather a 'realistic' one. There are those who contend that as there are no direct military threats to NATO members today, there is no necessity to stress Article V, develop contingency plans, and so on. I might respond in figurative terms: If the road ahead is clear, you might change gears, but you don't change cars. For the last twenty years we have too often seen how the security environment can dramatically change almost overnight. I have in mind not only 9/11, but also the events of August 2008.

To be absolutely clear, the defence of Poland depends heavily on NATO at present, and we would like to be able to rely upon it in the future.

This not only implies a reliance on the deployment of NATO forces on Polish territory in the case of an emergency. We also expect it to remain a strong politico-military organisation capable of deterring aggression, commanding well trained, equipped and immediately deployable troops, conceiving realistic threat assessments, and conducting military planning for all scenarios. To this end, we would also be happy to see elements of NATO's infrastructure located on the Polish territory.

For NATO to reliably maintain its Article V commitments does not mean it should be preserved in its Cold War version, especially as collective defence today does not necessarily imply territorial defence. On the contrary, NATO has to evolve, adapt to new realities and continue to transform itself. These processes, however, should take place in a balanced and reasonable way. As difficult as it may be for a Pole to accept, the truth is that the deployment of forces under Article V (along with deterrence) is no longer the only mission, as it was in the past. Today, the very notions of 'security' and 'defence' are much broader, making NATO's tasks more complicated than ever.

What helps in that context is the existence of the entire network of security-related international institutions, of which NATO is just one element, albeit the most important. Those institutions – the EU, the UN, the OSCE and others – are not directly involved in the military aspects of the collective defence of any given nation, but their contributions to different aspects of security can facilitate NATO's work. They are also indispensable partners for

allied stabilisation operations, be it in the context of global war on terror or in terms of other security risks.

Of course, the EU is a particular case, as it aspires through the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to play a role in military aspects of global security (through operations and missions) as well as in the formulation and implementation of European defence policy. In an ideal world, the EU and NATO would have complementary capabilities and co-operate closely with each other at both the strategic and operational levels. We do not, however, live in such a world, at least not yet, hence the need for close and effective institutional links and a mechanism for co-operation and co-ordination. From the perspective of Poland's security and defence, NATO and the ESDP should be two sides of the same coin. To state the obvious, we do not expect the ESDP to develop at the expense of NATO, nor vice versa.

Another observation with far-reaching implications for NATO's role in the actual defence of its members is that nowadays we have to deal with a new and different pattern of security threats, risks and challenges. To name just a few, these include terrorism, weak and failed states, religious fundamentalism, energy security and cyber-attacks. NATO is prepared and equipped to undertake such challenges, insofar as they require strong military capabilities. However, it also has to contribute whatever possible to the fight with terrorism, as in Afghanistan. Along with other organisations, it has to consider its role in providing for energy security, such as the protection of critical civilian infrastructure. It has to contribute, on a selective basis, to world-wide stability, conflict management and crisis response. If for no other reason, such responsibilities are necessary to maintain international peace and security, and,

by extension, to prevent the exposure of NATO allies to potential threats.

The latter was one of three main reasons for Poland to participate in operations in the Balkans, Iraq and, most importantly, Afghanistan – the other two being the wish to keep the Alliance effective and functional, and the eagerness to prove Poland's value as a provider (and not just 'net consumer') of security. Needless to say, the underlying Polish assumption in that regard was, and is, that if we would help others, then others would help us if and when necessary.

### Is there any role for NATO beyond Article V?

A direct answer to this question is, of course, 'yes.' I began this article with collective defence to stress Poland's specific expectations. Even 'those Poles' recognise a number of extremely important tasks with which the Alliance is now faced beyond, for example, contingency planning.

First and foremost, at the political level, we expect NATO to serve as a bridge between Europe and North America and as a mechanism for transatlantic co-operation. The days are gone of a Transatlantic Alliance unquestionably united by fear. We must accept that members of the Alliance have, and will continue to have, different threat perceptions, and not simply different interests but identical security priorities. Fortunately, they are still united by common democratic values, respect for human rights and a commitment to freedom. It is a solid foundation on which the community – call it 'Euro-Atlantic' or 'transatlantic', as you wish – can continue to be built. This dynamic process will at times require a contentious harmonisation of interests and intentions, but must inevitably lead to jointly co-ordinated efforts.

We expect the new US administration to take the lead in this process, provided it is based on multilateral mechanisms and institutions, and on a clear recognition (in not only words, but deeds) that NATO's European allies are partners, not subcontractors. Such is a Polish recommendation for a healthy and effective North Atlantic Alliance, at least in my personal opinion.

As mentioned, in addition to collective defence, NATO will also be called upon to undertake crisis response and stabilisation operations outside of its treaty area, and rightly so. Poles will regard such involvement as selective, based on political consensus among participants and in line with overall allied strategy and threat assessment. Over the last ten years or so, NATO has been conducting all kinds of operations and missions – stabilisation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, training, humanitarian relief, crisis response, and real combat, such as in Afghanistan. These activities were linked to an endless search for a new identity after the Cold War, a process that should finally be brought to an end. Though it may not require starting from scratch, there is clearly a need for NATO's further transformation and adaptation. It must, however, focus on appropriate, 21st-century means of usefully contributing to collective defence and a more secure world.

In addition to the strategic and political issues above, there is a long list of Polish expectations towards NATO that are of a more pragmatic and military nature. Without going into any details here, let me just mention them in no particular order:

– Military interoperability;
– Co-operation of defence industries;
– The development of common projects;
– The sharing and pooling of military resources;

– Balanced deployment of military infrastructure;
– Access to modern military technologies; and
– The introduction of best standards for military operations.

At risk of being somewhat repetitive, I would here stress the contributions of the Polish military to NATO, including in its operations. Poland does not expect to be rewarded for nothing. I hope the readers would also understand that, as a humble diplomat and a generally modest person, I do not complain here about the clear under-representation of Polish citizens in NATO's internal military and civilian structures. As a matter of fact, as a former ASG for Operations, I was a Polish pioneer and would love to see my successors in Brussels.

Back to business, however, there are two more issues that I would like to cover in this section. The first is the political role of NATO as a source of stabilisation and a promoter of democratic standards and human values. NATO, in the development of its military capabilities and their use for noble purposes, should master its function as a political centre of gravity. The best way forward in that regard is to advance NATO partnerships with different nations, reaching from the Mediterranean through the Gulf States to Asia, Australia and beyond. We need partners not only for political reasons, but as 'brothers in arms and in civilian reconstruction' during our stabilisation missions.

The second issue is the enlargement of NATO. I take it for granted that everybody expects Poland to be in favour of a continued 'open door' policy, and rightly so. Do I really need to explain the reasons? Just look at the map of Europe and Eurasia, and find Ukraine and Georgia.

Finally, along those lines, a difficult issue: Russia, or, to be more precise, NATO's relationship with Moscow. Poles

are quite often accused of being almost genetically anti-Russian, thus unduly complicating that relationship. In my humble view that question is more complex and can hardly be fixed with simplistic stereotypes.

We in Poland are not biased vis-à-vis Russia, but tend to be cautious and – a key word – realistic. It should be remembered that in the wake of the political enthusiasm of the 1990s, almost everyone in the West predicted that Russia, a truly great nation, would build a strong and real democracy in a decade or so, as well as achieve full partnership with NATO. It did not happen. There were also wide-spread and high expectations concerning joint peacekeeping operations, which also did not materialise. It was only when emotions cooled and the Cold War dust settled that politicians and nations started to comprehend what Poles had always known almost instinctively: Russia has her own, sometimes specific, interests, including security interests. It will take time and effort to harmonise them with the interests of others, or at least to render them non-confrontational.

So, the Polish perspective on NATO's relationship with Russia is that it has to be developed gradually and in a pragmatic way. It should be accompanied by the establishment of explicit aims, even if initially modest. But we must not put the carriage before the horse, as in case of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The NRC remains a very useful tool, but at the moment of its inception the two sides had very different ideas in terms of how to use it and to what end. Institutional solutions should always follow political understanding, not vice versa. Incidentally, the same is true for the so-called 'Medvedev Initiative' – Russia's idea of a pan-European security treaty.

NATO and Russia could and should work together on a number of security issues for their mutual benefit. Such

co-operation may not be taken for granted, but it would have to be based on shared values, common standards and a focus on a pragmatic outcome, as well as patience and realism. Is that anti-Russian?

### NATO's Future à la Polonaise

I hope it is now obvious that following NATO's anniversary summit in early April 2009, work will start on a new NATO Strategic Concept. It is long overdue. We all need new strategic guidance for the future evolution of NATO, its tasks and its missions. As said earlier, we also need clarity as to what kind of operations NATO should undertake, so as to put an end to doing a little bit of everything. Also as mentioned, this new strategy must finally put an end to the somewhat chaotic and at times desperate efforts to find a 'new identity' for the North Atlantic Alliance. Those efforts have only too often overshadowed real progress and achievement in the transformation and adaptation process, which could only benefit from clear and consensual recommendations for its further direction.

As far as I can personally judge, Poland would expect the following of the new strategic concept:

– To explicitly state NATO's commitment and capability to undertake Article V missions and security guarantees when needed, as well as to conduct, or participate in, stabilisation and crisis-response operations outside the treaty area, on a selective basis and in line with the security interests of member nations;

– To stress the need for the further development of expeditionary capabilities, which are required for both Article V and stabilisation missions;

– To recognise NATO as an essential consultation forum on all security issues of concern to all member nations;

– To maintain an 'open door' enlargement policy;

– To affirm the spirit of transatlantic solidarity as a guide in the harmonisation of security priorities and in the elaboration of common approaches to different threats, risks and challenges;

– To express NATO's preparedness to consider new security threats and risks (terrorism, energy security challenges, cyber-attacks, etc.) with a view to determine how NATO might contribute to addressing those threats and risks, in line with its comparative advantages; and

– To acknowledge NATO as part of the entire network of security-related organisations and institutions, with which it is ready to co-operate.

From the Polish perspective, one of the most urgent tasks for NATO must be to establish a real, functional and efficient institutional mechanism for co-operation with the EU, both at the strategic and operational levels. It is a *sine qua non* condition for mutual complementarity, meaningful co-ordination and the non-duplication of efforts, including the development of military capabilities. Yes, it is a very difficult task, but one that can no longer be avoided. European security and global stabilisation may otherwise be at risk.

The last thing Poland wants to see is growing competition between NATO and the EU in the security field. The current financial and economic crisis should be seen as a final warning that we do not have the luxury of spending the same money twice for the same military capabilities, but under different flags. And this is not just a financial issue – it is strategic, political, military, whatever you wish. The lack of proper EU-NATO co-operation is already adversely affecting our otherwise common efforts (in the sense of a common goal) in Afghanistan and Kosovo.

The new strategic concept will also have to confirm that NATO will continue to develop partnerships with other nations, including in the field of stabilisation and crisis-response operations. My earlier comments about partnership with Russia is relevant in that context.

Some experts might be surprised that I have yet to mention the absolutely crucial matter of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation. I do not wish to ignore it. Achieving our goals in Afghanistan constitutes an obvious priority, both now and in the years to come. But apart from operational lessons learned there, the need for a 'comprehensive approach' to stabilisation and crisis-response missions, and specific conclusions concerning civilian-military operational planning, I do not think there is a need to devote any special place for the ISAF in the new strategic concept. An exception worth noting might be to state that failure in Afghanistan is not an option. One might also add that all NATO allies must share this burden.

There are a number of other issues that this new strategic concept should address, which I will not dwell upon in any detail. These include, among others, new and realistic threat assessments, military planning, training and exercises, sharing of intelligence data, and the role of NATO in disarmament and arms control. They are all important and deserve special attention.

## Conclusion

Altogether, the Polish recipe for NATO is to make sure that it has all the requisite modern means to fulfil its defence- and security-related tasks. We do not need to reinvent NATO. We do have to invent and master new instruments for its actions, which must be appropriate for

the new security environment and must correspond to new politico-military realities.

Make no mistakes as to Polish expectations vis-à-vis NATO. We continue to see it as a source of security guarantees and a source of stability in a broader sense. But even when we send our troops to Afghanistan, we do it with a long-term view of strengthening NATO, including its core function as enshrined in Article V. In this country, NATO stabilisation and crisis-response operations are deemed extremely significant, but nevertheless secondary tasks, even if they constitute an obvious priority now and for the foreseeable future. Times, however, may change.

General Franciszek Gągor
*Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces*

## NATO'S RESPONSES TO A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

**1. Capabilities indispensable for expeditionary operations are also useful for collective defence**.

NATO's new strategy should maintain its emphasis on Article V operations. It is commonly understood that all NATO members should have the same security outlook, hence as long as any member nation has concerns in terms of its sovereignty or territorial integrity, the Alliance is obliged to address them. Collective defence should remain NATO's basic mission, serving as a bond between the allied nations. Yet, one cannot agree with the frequently raised opinion that expeditionary capabilities are financed at the expense of capabilities indispensable for collective security.

On the contrary, I would argue that expeditionary forces improve capabilities for Article V operations, indicating no contradiction between the two. It is difficult to imagine how countries located far from politically unstable regions could ensure their own mutual defence without experienced expeditionary forces. Hence, the more expeditionary forces, the greater the security of the entire Alliance and the better

the preconditions for effective implementation of Article V operations.

It is true, however, that attaining expeditionary capabilities is more expensive. With that in mind, it would be fair to allow member states located closer to regions of political instability to maintain a relatively larger part of static forces. In this way, these member nations would be able to conserve resources so as to better prepare their relatively smaller expeditionary forces.

It should be noted that part of the forces are naturally designed for collective defence. This is the case with the air defence system, which sooner or later will need to be integrated into the new missile defence system. One must also bear in mind that the entire allied training structure, which falls under the Allied Command Transformation, is static in nature.

**2. NATO must be prepared to react to imminent changes in frozen conflicts at its outskirts**.

Frozen conflicts can sometimes easily become volatile and endanger the region. The events in Georgia in August, 2008, showed how dangerous frozen conflicts can be to the vital interests of adjacent NATO territories. Lulled by the international community's inaction, they can suddenly and rapidly fall into a new phase of full-scale conflict, endangering the security of member states. Given the security concerns of NATO's member states, the Alliance must possess the military capability to quickly respond in defence of the interests and values which are the basis, or even *raison d'être*, of the transatlantic community.

One possible means by which to address this issue is the proper adaptation of the NATO Response Force concept. I have had occasion to present my own proposal in this

regard at the NATO Military Committee. Similar in nature, although in need of further specification, was an Allied Solidarity Force approach recently presented by the United Kingdom. There was also a Norwegian proposal on the table. Besides a high readiness level of adequately prepared forces, attention to the development of a swift decision-making process for their use is much needed in order to avoid situations in which a 'decision right on target' is made too late in real terms. In this regard, one might recall that the military conflict in Georgia was decided within three days of fighting.

**3. New threats and challenges require complex countermeasures**.

The Alliance's newest challenges and threats – cyber-terrorism, energy security, piracy, failed states – cannot be exclusively addressed by military means. Added to this is the difficulty of defining the *casus belli* for the majority of such threats, as an increasing role will be played not only by non-state actors such as terrorist organisations, but also by groups of hackers. Consequently, it will be difficult to identify the responsible entities. Who should be addressed, if it is not clear whether a government stands behind a particular action? The strictly military responses used thus far are clearly insufficient to face such threats.

The development of new response capabilities for such threats should be predicated upon a clear definition of policy that fully addresses their complexity. To date, such attempts have been sporadic and fragmentary, and frequently too careful. A hesitant approach risks becoming outdated. One cannot build adequate capabilities (which require time) based on documents negatively verified in practice soon thereafter.

It seems that NATO must go beyond its traditional military functions and, as a community of countries linked by shared security concerns, actively engage in other domains. Recently, it has been increasingly apparent that one such area should be international law, created under the auspices of the UN. The effectiveness of efforts taken will be dependent on international regulations. We need, for example, something like a 'cyber law' or an 'energy security law', and new regulations that will enable us to address piracy and the use of international waters by terrorist or criminal organisations. We also need a new approach for failed states and those that serve as a safe haven for criminal organisations.

**4. When dealing with new threats it is important not only to have complex capabilities, but also a new approach to their use**.

To that end I suggest three pillars for success:

a) The development of the new capabilities;

b) Projecting their power, scope and the inevitability of their use to potential adversaries, including non-state actors; and

c) The ability to rapidly effect said capabilities when needed.

The Alliance has plenty of homework to do with the latter two pillars. In particular, mechanisms of the decision-making process need to be improved to prevent obstruction for minor reasons. Neither can one exclude taking preventive action when the security of member states is at stake. We have to act when threats become apparent, not merely when they have occurred.

**5. Professionalisation is an indispensable step in times of complex challenges**.

The professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces is *inter alia* a response to the nature of new challenges. They have such a complex nature that a traditional military based on conscription could not face them effectively. Long-term (e.g. two years or longer) military service is required to ensure the proper training and skill sets for most functions. Given the political unacceptability of mandating lengthy military service, only a professional military, supported by voluntary reserve forces, can ensure a proper level of security. In this respect, the contribution of our professional armed forces helps ensure NATO's ability to adequately respond to new challenges.

Dr Alyson JK Bailes

## NATO AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS

### A 'Comprehensive' Approach for European Security?

The behaviour of NATO and the European Union (EU) towards each other since their creation has had more than a little in common with the behaviour of little boys and little girls. At first – in fact, for much of the Cold War period – they preferred to ignore each other. Each played in its own domain and even if their effects were strongly complementary, especially in banishing the demon of war among Western European states, any consistency was achieved by steering from capitals rather than by contact between the decision making bodies in Brussels. In fact, each institution had a far more direct and substantive relationship with the CSCE (later OSCE) than they did with each other: NATO approaching the CSCE's politico-military basket with a common line, and the EU often supplying the main western initiatives under the other baskets.

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Visiting Professor, Dep. of Political Science, University of Iceland in Reykjavik, former director of SIPRI, Stockholm

As the Cold War neared its end and then under the new agenda of the 1990s, some contact became unavoidable since both organizations had entered at least one identical playing field – the business of crisis management. Even before the EU created its own military arm in the shape of the European Security and Defence Policy, the efforts of the institutions overlapped and became to a degree co-dependent in the Western Balkans. By this time, however, the Western European Union (WEU) had been revived as a kind of European security policy caucus, and up to the year 2000 it played the role both of a middle-man and safety cushion between the two stronger institutions. The scope for friction was also limited by the fact that NATO up to this time was acting only in Europe, while the EU's diplomacy had always been worldwide in the commercial dimension and was becoming so also in 'softer' security contexts, like mediation and arms control.

The EU's creation of ESDP made it impossible at last for NATO and the Union to avoid each other, also because it involved the virtual abolition of WEU. As is well known, it caused a major problem over Turkey's status which was to place especial political and bureaucratic obstacles in the way of the two institutions' interacting normally. But even if that specific problem had not delayed by two years the first hand-over of a former NATO operation (in Bosnia-Herzegovina) to the EU, and even if the USA had not been predominantly sceptical about ESDP at the time, we may suspect that the relationship would still have had a scratchy start. Forced to learn more about each other at first hand, the two institutions naturally saw each other's major differences first of all as aberrations and problems. Not unlike little boys and girls, there were competitive inclinations, superiority complexes and infer-

iority complexes on both sides, as well as a temptation to steal each other's tricks and toys. And the area for the two to trip over each other was widened with NATO's important policy shifts in 2002 that inaugurated its own global role.

Eventually, of course, little boys and girls grow up to realize that each other's differences can be put to constructive and even pleasant use. Ways of coexistence can be found that do not require either making the two more identical, or subordinating one to the other. Are our Western institutions in Europe ready for that kind of maturity? The question is potentially a huge one, but the rest of this text will explore it particularly by following the logic of what NATO now calls a 'comprehensive approach'.

## 'Comprehensive' security, in Afghanistan and Europe

The importance that the 'comprehensive' concept has taken on for NATO reflects a learning process in itself. At the time when the US led the first coalition operation in Afghanistan and still when NATO took over the ISAF command, confidence was high in Western military superiority and the challenge of weak states was seen above all as being to crush the asymmetrical threats they harboured. Today, we have been reminded of the old Vietnam lessons about the resilience of a technologically inferior but fanatical opponent, and about the risks of a porous frontier like that with Pakistan: but also of the fact that weak states when broken are the hardest to put back together. NATO is relearning both Afghan and regional politics, starting to grasp that the real key to stabilization could lie not so much in Helmand as in Kashmir. It has realized the importance of local buy-in and local ownership, which cannot be bought

just by well-behaved troops but demands concrete, expensive inputs for development and welfare – and national leaders who are (and are seen to be) more than Western puppets.

With today's greater understanding of the importance of image and perceived legitimacy, it is no accident that the USA's new President has taken the lead in gestures of renewed respect for the UN, for Treaty law and international legality generally. But the realization of the complexity of trying to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan has equally sharpened NATO's awareness of what it cannot do itself and must rely on others doing, including the EU as a provider of civilian deployments, humanitarian and development aid and many other functional inputs. The need for multi-functional, multi-institutional approaches to peacebuilding (anywhere in the world) is of course not just a NATO discovery but one that is preoccupying the EU itself as it seeks to coordinate its multitude of external policy instruments. The economic crisis of 2008-9 has even raised the question of whether the great International Financial Institutions, hitherto so clearly demarcated from the United Nations, should not become more security-aware in their prescriptions – just as the more traditional breed of crisis managers will have to become more economics-aware.

The other major [re-]learning process that NATO is undergoing at the moment concerns the need to look back at Europe, and to remedy the damage that years of neglect and ill-coordinated action have done both to stability and political unity in the Alliance's own heartland. Europe is not, of course, Afghanistan and the challenges are more about policy re-calibration than about risks of deadly conflict, hopefully even in the Western Balkans. Yet the needs are both serious enough and complex enough to

suggest that, *prima facie*, an exercise in trying to apply the 'comprehensive' approach might be very timely for Europe's own purposes as well.

Here too, the dynamics have both a strategic and an economic dimension that may be summed up in the words 'Georgia' and 'financial crash'. The hostilities of August 2008 in Georgia should not, of course, have come as a surprise but the very fact that NATO was caught as it were on the back foot, and had so few options for response – even compared with the EU or OSCE! – supplied a necessary wake-up call. The most obvious lesson learned was that Russia remains an unsolved problem, in terms of its relations with the West, its relations with its closest neighbours, and arguably its own self-image and style of governance. Equally clear was the fact that the West's own policy on integrating states east of Central Europe had been built more on wishful thinking than on any real grip or mastery of the situation. The prospect of further NATO and/or EU enlargement, while turning regional politics into a zero-sum game with Russia, had not actually brought speedy reform and westernization of the USA's most favoured candidate states: arguably it did more to tempt their leaders into distinctly 'un-Western' behaviour. The West could thus neither protect nor discipline its prospective recruits and, judging by Russia's recent behaviour towards the Baltic states, might have its work cut out even to deter interference with its existing members.

While these lessons of the Georgian war soon swung mainstream opinion in NATO and the EU against risking the overstretch of any further Eastern enlargement for the time being, the episode also highlighted how divided the NATO members had become on such major questions of strategy. Most 'old' allies had gone along only reluctantly

with any talk of enlargement beyond the Balkans, and many also saw the USA's own missile base plans as a needless provocation. Some EU members had declined to recognize Kosovo *inter alia* because of precisely the kind of precedent Moscow claimed to be following when it recognized an independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Some new NATO and EU members, on the other hand, saw the war as proof that they had been right to stay on their guard against Russia all along and that NATO had not done enough to make their own Western alignment unchallengeable, either militarily or politically. Why otherwise would the prospective missile basing states have thought it so essential and valuable to get US *national* guarantees?

Given the speed with which the Georgian incident as such was smoothed down, perhaps NATO would not have been impelled to re-examine its role in Europe by these events alone. The loss of earlier self-confidence in and about Afghanistan helped, but so did – and perhaps more decisively – the economic crisis starting in late summer 2008 and still continuing today. If Georgia called in question the credibility of NATO's claims to extend its wing over Central Europe without actually taking any military measures there and while focusing its main strength abroad, the financial travails of several new members have shown that the EU model was installed there in an often hasty and fragile fashion, all too reliant on foreign credit and sanguine forecasts of growth. The 'model' itself is under challenge everywhere in the EU as national politicians apply self-serving and barely coordinated remedies and the inadequacy of common regional and global institutions, even in sheer terms of capital available, is exposed. Putting all these strains together, it is hardly exaggerated to say that the European space is facing a risk of competitive re-natio-

nalization and facing it, moreover, on top of a decade of unusual division and stress – with the hoped-for renaissance of the Lisbon Treaty still in limbo.

The mixing of these strategic, political and economic pressures is enough in itself to justify the idea that Europe today also needs *comprehensive* solutions. In fact, the word 'comprehensive' has for a long while been part of the CSCE/OSCE vocabulary, where it carries just the right meaning of an approach to security that ranges across all functional boundaries and takes account of the totality of relationships. The OSCE has also spelled out more clearly than most institutions (eg in the 1999 'Platform of Co-operative Security') the need for different organizations to work together for comprehensive results. So, what would be an ideal prescription to allow Europe today to recover confidence in its own security, and to do so in a way that actively rebuilds intra-European and trans-Atlantic political unity, while using all tools available in the most efficient combination?

## Roles for NATO and the EU

The good news for NATO – as well as the challenge! – is that there are still some tasks that only it can perform. No other institution, least of all the EU with its six non-Allied members, has yet come forward to meet the 'hard' needs of Western security or to re-create the *strategic* trans-Atlantic bond. NATO is the forum where the leading Western democracies must now face up to the issue of a possible security deficit in Europe itself; must debate more frankly than before how far it is an objective and how far a subjective problem; and find some way of rebuilding confidence and common purpose among all members, not just in foreign fields but here on their own home ground. It is

already clear, given the resource constraints, that the solutions may be as much political as military: but that was always the case even with NATO's Cold War policies – did anybody think 'forward défence' would ever work in military-technical terms?

In fact, the more NATO can recapture the lessons of its past experience in Europe, the more the long-term success of the so-called Harmel concept combining defence and 'détente' will come to the fore. Strong defence and deterrence does not mean adventurism and aggression, but rather the opposite. Taking the Russian challenge seriously means also working seriously for stabilization and containment, through arms control, confidence building and the recognition of certain wider frameworks and interests that link all parts of the wider Europe regardless of political regimes. It is clear that President Obama's Administration will seek to make up for lost time on arms control especially in the nuclear sphere, probably back-pedalling on missile defence in the process. For NATO's health it is absolutely crucial that this should become an enterprise for the whole Alliance and that any progress with Russia should be a win-win bargain for all Allies. For Washington and Moscow to do hasty deals over others' heads would be just as politically erosive as it is for them to take turns provoking each other, regardless of the fall-out in Europe.

Even for these tasks, however, NATO needs synergy with and reinforcement from other institutions. On the Russian issue it is clear that the handling of economic, energy, and even many political aspects now falls to the EU. Both NATO and the EU will need all their skills to retain some influence in the former Soviet zone and to make sure Russia does not consolidate a stifling hegemony there, given what could be a very lengthy pause in enlargement combined with

the smaller states' economic woes. A good lesson from Georgia is, however, that greater efforts to solve the remaining 'frozen conflicts' will be worthwhile on all counts: easing human distress, transnational threats, and blockages to reform as well as denying Moscow more pretexts for intervention. Here the need arises for some third process that can handle joint Western and Eastern undertakings too sensitive for direct action by either the EU or NATO. Much weakened as the OSCE may be, if it did not exist there might well be – in the present mood – a drive to invent it. Could the proposed new European Security Treaty end up as just such a re-invention, providing Russia and the West with a process for re-making the rules of coexistence but hopefully, ending up not too far away from the original Helsinki *acquis*? The new Administration's representatives have already stated as a precondition that there must be no freezing of spheres of influence, but perhaps even more crucial would be to re-build a framework that not only allows but hastens the *self-transformation* of Europe's transitional states. Which would be the better for Europe in the long run, a Ukraine belonging to NATO but without full democracy, or a Ukraine that was fully reformed, stable and democratic with a recognized neutral status?

The EU with its wider competences has, if possible, an even more daunting set of tasks than NATO. It has to master the demons of nationalism and de-integration, to maintain a single strategy for economic recovery where all support all, and to find new regulatory and policy tools that will not only stave off further disasters but reduce the West-East inequalities so damagingly exposed by the crisis. At the same time it has to speak for Europe's interests in the process of re-inventing financial and economic governance at the world level, and in the renewed effort that might now

be made to complete the world trade negotiations (the WTO's Doha Round). As already mentioned, it must strive for a new level of integration and solidarity in its internal energy affairs if it is ever to negotiate from strength with Russia and other external suppliers. It has to make the most of the new chance to work with a US Administration in the battle over climate change, which in the long run could be more decisive for mankind's survival than any number of purely economic disasters.

In the Cold War the EU was able to get on with such tasks under a NATO umbrella that left it more or less free of security duties. Today the Union has its own worldwide strategy and takes responsibility for a wide range of functional security topics – anti-terrorism, anti-proliferation, anti-crime, transport and health security and more. But it does still rely on NATO to provide the ultimate guarantee for Europe's own territory as well as shouldering the toughest military tasks abroad. France's planned return to the NATO integrated military structure is a striking signal of belief that the Alliance still provides something both strategically and politically necessary for Europe. Beyond this, the EU recognizes the usefulness of a CSCE-type process perhaps more clearly than NATO has done in recent years, and is also more closely engaged than NATO with the UN across a range of global governance issues including development aid. EU economic strategies, and policies on certain issues at the economics/security interface, are both shaped by and feed back into the leading nations' forum of the G8 (which may now to some extent be supplanted by the G20). Finally, the EU seems gradually to have learned the potential value of sub-regional organizations to look after development and 'soft' security issues in the different parts of Europe, as shown by the effort it

recently invested in re-tailoring the Northern Dimension and – hopefully – in the quality of a new Baltic strategy to be published soon.

There remain some challenges on which NATO and the EU need to work together more directly or, at least, to clarify new extensions of the demarcation line between them. Keeping the peace in the Western Balkans and completing the difficult process of steering all nations there towards full integration, amid the complications caused by Kosovo, is already recognized as a joint task where roles are rather clearly defined. An interesting new example would be how to handle the fall-out, hopefully positive, of a final UN-brokered settlement in Cyprus. More general emerging tasks include a functional one – the respective and coordinated roles to be played by military and civil assets in disaster response, which will become a growing burden for Europe itself with climate change; and a geographical one – the representation of Western interests in the forthcoming opening-up of the Arctic. Both organizations, of course, in their own ways will be trying to maintain the values of democracy both within and between their own states, and to make sure that a more cautious incoming phase in Western strategies is not read – anywhere in the world – as a retreat from fundamental Western values.

Compared with the repair and renewal work to be done in the greater Europe, NATO and EU coexistence in missions further afield should really not be today's greatest problem. The political conditions are set fair from the US side, the French side, and perhaps even in the sensitive Turkey/Greece/Cyprus nexus if the Cyprus negotiations already mentioned can make progress and if the West's new approaches in the Middle East and Iraq cause the need for Turkish partnership there to be better appreciated. In

practical terms, both institutions are feeling overstretch and are ready more frankly to face up to their limitations. Enough time has passed for the comparative advantages of each as an overseas problem-solver to be better understood and for the *de facto* demarcation between their missions of choice to become clearer. The USA's new attitude to the UN and international regulation should bring relevant aspects of the NATO culture closer to the EU's. Last and not least, there will surely be no lack of cases requiring both institutions' help even after Iraq is evacuated and even if an exit strategy can be found for Afghanistan. Both the working through of climate change, and the breaking strain put on many weak states by current economic developments, seem bound to keep up the tempo of conflict outbreaks even on the – hopefully solid – assumption that direct great-power conflict remains a thing of the past.

## The Way Forward

The shift of international agendas since the economic crash and with the arrival of President Obama has already passed some milestones. In the context of main interest here, one was the publication in December 2008 of the EU's reassessment of its December 2003 Security Strategy, which had a noticeably less triumphalist tone and offered a more complex risk analysis – including more open admission of problems with Russia – than the original document. This paper, produced by Javier Solana's staff, but also the procedural decisions taken by the EU Council of Ministers and European Council in the same month kept stressing the importance of an EU-NATO 'strategic partnership'. More specifically, the latest EU policy statement on ESDP proposed a new high level group of NATO and EU representatives to discuss joint tasks. From

the US side, both President Obama himself and leaders from his new Administration, such as Vice-President Jo Biden speaking at the Munich Security Conference in February 2009, have promised to use a 're-set' button to correct the more divisive policies of the Bush period including its hostility towards fixed partnerships and institutions as such.

For NATO itself, the key next steps are the holding of the Strasbourg 60th Anniversary Summit which should solemnize France's return to the military structure; plus the process that may be launched there to review the Alliance's Strategic Concept (last formulated in 1999). Such a strategy review is, on the face of it, the natural way and place to crystallize the new or renewed ideas that all Allies need to agree on regarding both the Alliance's own role, and its complementarity with other institutions. Some observers are worried precisely about the effect a negotiating process could have in exposing the true depth of divisions, or perhaps even undermining practical aspects of NATO work that have been able to muddle along so far without probing too much into states' true motives. The judgement is a tough one to call; but it is probably safe to say that a continuation of muddling through, while reducing the political stakes, is also likely to reduce still further the Alliance's relative standing and output. The EU faces rather similar risks with the launch of its latest high-level reflection group, which is tasked with looking into issues of the Union's ultimate shape and mission that could reawake all the most sensitive internal debates over pooling of sovereignty on the one hand, and the ultimate geographical limits of integration on the other.

In the end, it is nation states that still decide in Europe how the European institutions will evolve. For the latest

review exercises to succeed in building new consensus within and between the EU and NATO, and for the relations and burden-sharing among all of Europe's institutions to become more rational, it is attitudes in capitals that must change first and foremost and national reactions that must be disciplined and refined. In a Europe as large as today's has become, better understanding and more coherent joint platforms among states in regional groupings would also help a lot. In international institutions' cooperation just as in relations between the genders, maturity must begin at home.

# Paweł Świeboda

*On a lighter note*

*What follows is a letter drafted by European Union officials on the occasion of celebrating NATO's sixtieth anniversary. It was written in German with French corrections. The working English translation reads:*

Dear Big Sister NATO,

Happy Birthday!

To be frank, I never thought you would still be around at this point. No offence, but I thought it would be 'mission accomplished' for you after the Cold War. You really played it well: no bullets fired, that guy Walesa there and the wall crumbling. Good stuff. Many of my members thought you should have claimed success and closed shop, that doing so would make you shine in the history books. But you decided otherwise and went on addressing international crises of all kinds. I didn't much like that, you know. I thought it was my turn, and you really just made things more difficult with your blunt and outdated instruments.

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President of the foundation demosEUROPA – Centre for European Strategy (Warsaw)

Some of my members genuinely believe you've become counterproductive to the task you were created for: to guarantee security in Europe. I mean, everybody knows you were there for different reasons. A while ago, the real question was how I could use your military tools. Now you want to turn the question around to how you should take advantage of my resources and experience.

You were for some time a clearing house for the 'coalition of the willing', led by your uncle George W. I always suspected that was exactly what you needed enlargement for: to have a larger group of like-minded friends to choose from, this 'New Europe' thing. To that end, you even contemplated opening up to Israel, Australia and Japan. And look at our old friends the Russians. You know, we really do need to get along with them. They ARE our next-door neighbours. We'd already be in each others' arms if it wasn't for your cocksure behavior in the 90s. I mean, you didn't even want to change your name!

You were smart with the new members, I have to say. I got them on board as well. My God, they cost me dearly but they are nice folks. I love their obsession with the Russians. It is so charming. Makes me sentimental for the good old days when we thought the Russians would sweep across Europe in a day or two. We were young and beautiful then. Now the Polish youngsters want to take you over... Well, well.

High time for the real stuff now. I think we need a deal. Your new uncle Joe came up with the 'reset' button for the Russians. It looked more like a nuclear button, but in any case – have you got one for me? Let's sit down, discuss and plan for it together. You remember our grandfather Freud and his 'narcissism of minor differences'? Well, let's tell our folks that they need to get a grip on things. The West is

back. Your other new uncle knows that. I'm willing to trust you again and play together, from combining our strategic concepts to force planning. We could build a comprehensive approach that makes the most of our civil-military experience, and then move on to the harmonisation of equipment programmes. In general, we should talk about what we can do for one another rather than what we cannot. We can become relevant actors in the security field, but we could also sink in oblivion.

Do you think we could have a dinner together again sometime?

Yours,

The European Union

(*twenty-seven illegible signatures*)

# Jamie Shea

*Dear European Union,*

Thank you very much for your kind letter of congratulations and for sending Mr. Solana to our summit in Strasbourg/Kehl to deliver it in person. Thank you also for enabling us to use Strasbourg, the city symbolizing European unification, and the home of the European Parliament, as the venue for our 60th anniversary NATO Summit. Hopefully you will invite us to your EU sixtieth anniversary in 2017, and we invite you already to hold this event in Washington and to meet in the same government building where the Treaty of Washington was signed on 4th of April 1949. What better symbol of transatlantic unity and our own bilateral rapprochement could we have than to put European integration firmly in its transatlantic context. We sincerely hope that your cohesion will not be undermined by the current financial crisis. After all, this crisis should be an opportunity to demonstrate the value of the Euro in protecting us from global market fluctuations and in enhancing support and solidarity for the new EU

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Dr. Jamie Shea is the Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of the Secretary General of NATO. This is a spontaneous and much appreciated by conference participants reaction to P. Świeboda's 'EU's Anniversary Letter to NATO'.

member states whose economies have suffered the most. The great historical importance of the EU is to allow Europe to withstand global shocks and not to be weakened by them.

By the way, we also hope that the Lisbon Treaty will be adopted before too long, even though it is not for us to advise the Irish on how they should vote. Frankly, we need the European Union to be an outward looking, cohesive and acting institution. This presupposes that the EU is able to have a pause from the exercise of treaty drafting and constitution building, which in recent years has consumed so much time and political energy. Although it is important to perfect the instruments for crisis management and military deployments, it is even more important to use those instruments. This would also help NATO by showing a greater European willingness to shoulder the burden of today's challenges; and not only those of tomorrow.

If we may, and using this opportunity to reply to the suggestions in your letter, we could suggest a few things that would not only be useful for you, but also greatly benefit NATO.

The first concerns strategic purpose. We fully understand the utility of the EU common foreign and security policy in demonstrating to the outside world that the EU is now a mature, capable actor and that a unified European foreign policy is a reality. The twenty plus CFSP missions carried out thus far have done much good in the world. However, what has perhaps been lacking is a sense of Europe's strategic priorities and immediate security interests. Where does Europe need to focus its efforts and achieve results? Where should it engage long term rather than short term? As Churchill once said: 'However beautiful the strategy, one should occasionally look at the results.'

Second, we in NATO believe that Afghanistan is not only our top priority at the present time but also the most important security challenge facing all the Western democracies. Failure there would expose all of us to extremism and more well organized terrorist attacks. So Afghanistan in not only or even primarily a NATO responsibility. It concerns Europeans as much as Americans, whatever institutions they choose to coordinate their responses. So clearly NATO welcomes the greater EU role in Afghanistan, in police training, development aid and more recently gendarmerie, but we would like to see even more efforts. The EU has much to contribute in areas where NATO lacks capabilities especially on the police and civilian side. The financial crisis is making us even more aware that we have limited resources. We cannot be everywhere. NATO and the EU have to bring their complementary resources more closely together to serve common strategies for solving common problems. To disperse or to work in isolation is to fail.

Thirdly, be more demanding. One of the things in NATO that we've tried to point out since the end of the Cold War is you don't get the benefits of membership without demanding in return the contribution from your members. We believe in NATO that you in the EU have been very content to supply the benefits, but have been less demanding than we have been in terms of what your members should be contributing. Therefore there is a gap between ambition and resources. We like this idea that French president Sarkozy has been pushing for reinforced cooperation and convergence criteria among those EU members that want to pursue a closer form of integration and we very much hope that once the Lisbon Treaty has been ratified this idea can go into effect.

Number four – we would love EU if you could be more open to synergies with NATO. We understand that you're an independent organization and will remain so. We have no objection as NATO to the EU having set up [This is a futuristic letter] your own operational headquarters to carry out your missions. If that is what you wish, although we should try to avoid duplication as much as possible. But we do believe that there is room for joint planning, joint certification, coordinated commands, integrated headquarters for operations. We only have a single set of forces and we should put them together.

Finally, dear EU, on the occasion of our sixtieth anniversary and looking to your sixtieth anniversary, we would like you to be more self-confident. The idea that NATO or the United States could be a threat to European integration suggests that you believe that you are far more fragile than you really are. To sense that anybody could hold or break the process with European integration is a signal of lack of self-confidence in your own project. So please, dear EU, be a more self-confident institution, because in that way you will not only serve your own purposes, but also those of the Transatlantic Alliance.

Thank you very much indeed for your letter. We hope that you will read ours one day.

**On the 60th anniversary of NATO**

a n d

**the 10th anniversary of Polish accession to the Alliance**

The Center for International Relations
with the Ministry of National Defence

in cooperation with NATO HQ
the Euro-Atlantic Association, Poland
and the Atlantic Council of the United States

THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OF THE UNITED STATES

***cordially invite you to the international conference***

# NATO – CHALLENGES AND TASKS AHEAD

**13th March 2009 – Warsaw**

Hotel Sofitel Victoria, ul. Królewska 11

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09:00 **Opening of the conference**

Welcome by **Eugeniusz Smolar** – President, Center for International Relations

Key-Note Speeches:

- **Hon. Donald Tusk** – Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland
- **Hon. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer** – Secretary General of NATO

- Questions and answers session moderated by Ambassador **Jerzy M. Nowak –** President of the Euro-Atlantic Association, former Permanent Representative of Poland to NATO (2002-2007).

10:00 – 12:00 **PANEL I: A Strong Alliance**

- **Hon. Bogdan Klich** – Poland's Minister of National Defence

  Moderator: **Eugeniusz Smolar** – CIR President

  - NATO 60 years later – achievements and also significance for Poland;
  - Political and military aspects of NATO functioning – historical and current perspective;
  - Solidarity in defence as the fundamentals of NATO's credibility;
  - Defence alliance in the transatlantic region and the international security stabilizing functions ('out-of-area' operations).
- **Chrisitian Schmidt –** Parliamentary State Secretary, the Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin
- **Prof. Adam Daniel Rotfeld –** former Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, former director of SIPRI, Stockholm.
- **Dr. Andrew Michta –** Professor at George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

12:00 – 13:00 **Lunch**

13:00 – 15:00 **PANEL II: Cooperation or division of roles?**

**Moderator: Frederick Kempe** – President and the CEO, Atlantic Council of the United States

- Role of NATO in United States' security strategy;
- Differences among the European Allies' policies and their contribution to NATO functioning
- The significance of France's return to NATO military structures;
- Present and desired state of cooperation between NATO and the European Union, UN, OSCE and other actors of the international scene.

- **Dr. Jamie Shea** – Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of the Secretary General of NATO
- **Muriel Domenach –** Deputy Head, Centre d'Analyse et de Prevision, MFA, Paris
- **Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp –** Director, Research Division, NATO Defense College in Rome
- **Dr. Alyson Bailes –** VisitingProfessor, Dep. of Political Science, University of Iceland in Reykjavik, former director of SIPRI, Stockholm
- **Paweł Świeboda –** Director, demosEuropa, Warsaw

15:00 – 15:30 **Coffee Break**

15:30 – 17:30 **PANEL III: NATO – Adequate Answers**

- **Hon. Radosław Sikorski** – Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moderator: **dr Janusz Reiter**, Head of the Center for International Relations Council, former ambassador to the US and Germany

– Old and new threats – NATO's level of preparation to meet them (cyber-terrorism, critical infrastructure, energy security, other asymmetric threats);

– Necessity to change the nature of the NATO 'out-of-area' missions

– Regional security, influencing stability in the East;

– Professionalization of the Polish Armed Forces, Polish input in NATO integration (level of compatibility and interoperationality).

- **Michel Miraillet** – Undersecretary of Defence for Policy, Director for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Paris
- **General Franciszek Gągor** – Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces
- **Kurt Volker** – U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council
- **Dr Hans Binnendijk** – Vice President for Research, National Defense University, Washington

- **Adam Kobieracki** – director of Dept. of International Security, Polish MFA, former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations

17:30 – 17:45 'Diplomacy and International Affairs: contest award ceremony, organized by the Euro-Atlantic Association – **Dr. Jerzy Nowak**, President of the Euro-Atlantic Association

17:45 **END OF THE CONFERENCE** – **Dr. Jerzy Nowak**, President of the Euro-Atlantic Association

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Donald Tusk – Prime Minister of Poland


Donald Tusk – Prime Minister of Poland and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer – Secretary General of NATO


Bogdan Klich – Poland's Minister of National Defence

Radosław Sikorski – Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs


Panel I


Panel II


Panel III