

NATO SUMMIT 2008
Transforming NATO
Polish and Regional Perspective

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
Warsaw March 2008



CENTRUM STOSUNKÓW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH
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Introduction

Eugeniusz Smolar

President of the Center for International Relations

Arguably NATO is in the process of transformation. Not just change. Change takes place constantly and is incremental in living organisms which are adaptive in nature. Transformation suggests something more radical, a change which is further reaching, in a long-term goal-driven perspective.

The Allies have been unanimous in supporting transformation at subsequent summits, however the heterogeneity of the process needs underscoring. Not all NATO members undertake actions which aim at implementing the agreed objectives and the time goals that have been established.

Afghanistan is a good example. Also the readiness of the United States to take up independent, unilateral actions not really counting on European Allies to act jointly and coherently using its unmatched military capabilities, causes a lack of confidence and opposition to something which is deemed to be US-engendered pressure.

On the other hand, another worrying phenomenon that can be observed is the distancing from previously undertaken decisions in NATO structures of the same Europeans in different contexts e.g. bilateral relations or on EU forums. Furthermore, this distancing is often reinforced by public criticism of collectively agreed decisions and the consequences that they may bring about.

Poland and other countries from the region anticipate anxiously the consequences of such changes related to a growing globalization of NATO activities. They tend to stress the durability of Art. 5 of the

Washington Treaty, and the strength of traditional defence-related commitments of the Alliance.

And even if it should be considered as self-evident that Poland and many other members of the Alliance do not have global interests, we all, as NATO members, share not only regional but also global security responsibilities a point stressed by both Bogdan Klich and Stanisław Komorowski Polish Minister and Deputy Minister of National Defence.

Before the Bucharest summit, a number of questions need to be addressed. Where do these disparities originate from? Are they caused by different threat perceptions? According to some, the Alliance should be capability-driven and respond according to its growing global responsibilities. Others mainly Europeans believe it should first of all respond to recognized 'genuine' threats. What will come of this disparity in perception? How will this influence NATO transformation, cohesion and most importantly the effectiveness of its actions?

This publication is the fruit of a conference, which undertook a discussion on the above-outlined issues, on the eve of the NATO Bucharest Summit 2008. It is the amalgam of analytical texts and speeches delivered by the Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Polish Minister of National Defence, Mr. Bogdan Klich and several top ranking military personnel, diplomats and independent experts from both sides of the Atlantic.

The conference and ensuing discussion would not have been possible had it not been for the exemplary cooperation with – and support of – the Polish Ministry of National Defence.

I hope you will find this input in a much needed debate on NATO Transformation important, topical and intellectually vibrant. Such open and thought-provoking discussions need to be continued in Bucharest and beyond.

*Eugeniusz Smolar,
President of the Center for International Relations*

Keynote Address

by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

NATO Secretary General

Minister Klich,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me start by thanking you, Minister Klich, and the Polish Ministry of National Defence, as well as the Center for International Relations, for the opportunity to speak at this important conference in such an impressive setting. The Royal Castle is truly grand, but it is also symbolic – reflecting the long history of a country that has always prided itself on its freedom, independence and cultural identity.

Not only the venue, but also the timing and the theme of this conference, are very well chosen. NATO's Bucharest Summit is less than a month away now. The Summit agenda is taking shape. It is becoming clear that our next Summit will be a milestone in NATO's evolution in a number of respects. And I am very pleased to discuss our Summit agenda with such a distinguished audience – including several familiar faces, such as my good friend Ambassador Nowak, the former Dean of the North Atlantic Council.

NATO's Bucharest Summit will be a big event – first of all quite literally. We expect some sixty Heads of State and Government, as well as senior representatives from several other leading international institutions, to join us in Romania for our discussions on ISAF. That will make Bucharest a very visible demonstration of NATO's continuing transformation – our adaptation to the

complex, global security challenges of the 21st century – and our determination to tackle those challenges together with the rest of the international community.

Afghanistan is of course, central among these new challenges – and hence central to our discussions in Bucharest. The NATO-led mission in that country is the most demanding mission that NATO has ever undertaken. I was there with my colleagues on the North Atlantic Council just a few weeks ago, and there is no doubt that, for a country that has just emerged from 30 years of war and conflict, Afghanistan has made remarkable progress. Refugees have come back in their millions. Children are back at school. People have greater access to health care. You see more and more banks and cell phones. And the legitimate Afghan economy is flourishing. Still, it is also clear that there remains a lot to do, including for NATO.

At the Summit, we will produce an honest appraisal of where we stand with our Afghanistan mission. We will take a hard look at how we can do better in helping the Afghans to run their own country. We will make public a forward-looking vision statement concerning our own engagement and that of the rest of the international community. And we will reaffirm our strong commitment to the emergence of a stable and secure Afghanistan, at peace with itself and its neighbours.

Afghanistan will remain NATO's Number One operational priority for some time to come. It will require a sustained effort, strong resolve and continued solidarity on the part of all the NATO Allies. As we all know, the words 'Poland' and 'solidarity' go together very well. And indeed, over the past few years, this country has made a major contribution in Afghanistan. Poland continues to show that commitment today, with more than a thousand brave men and women on the ground, vital assets such as helicopters, and its involvement in areas such as reconstruction and training. I will meet with Polish soldiers who have served in Afghanistan in the Polish Military Museum later today, but I do also want to use this opportunity to commend and thank Poland for its strong engagement in Afghanistan.

While Afghanistan will keep NATO busy for the foreseeable future, the Alliance cannot lose sight of its European vocation – and it won't. Almost twenty years after the end of the Cold War, Europe

is still unfinished business. NATO's mission is to help complete it – to continue to play its part in the further unification of this continent. And I believe the Bucharest Summit will be important in reaffirming that very fundamental, long-standing Alliance objective as well.

Helping to unify Europe requires, first of all, that NATO stays engaged in the Balkans. We have arrived at a decisive juncture in Kosovo. NATO is called upon to ensure that Kosovo remains stable and secure – a place where Kosovar Albanians and Serbs can live together in peace. We have said repeatedly that we will meet that responsibility. The NATO-led Kosovo Force – including more than 300 Polish soldiers – plays a vital stabilising role all over Kosovo. And when they meet in Bucharest, our Heads of State and Government will no doubt reaffirm NATO's commitment to see through our mission in Kosovo.

It is important, at the same time, for NATO to continue to help the entire Balkans region to take its rightful place in the Euro-Atlantic community of nations. We must avoid a division into 'winners' and 'losers' – between Balkan countries with more security, and others with less. And that is why I hope – and indeed expect – that the Bucharest Summit will open NATO's door to new members from this region, and reach out as well to new Alliance partner countries such as Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, who have made it clear that they do not want to be left behind.

There is no doubt in my mind that Serbia's long-term future, too, lies in Euro-Atlantic integration. And so we must make clear to Belgrade and the people of Serbia that there is no viable future in a retreat into angry nationalism. Our Bucharest Summit will be an excellent opportunity to send precisely that message – and to show that NATO is keen to engage with Serbia as well as with its many other partner countries.

NATO's policy of partnership and cooperation with countries all across this continent has been a huge success. Over the past fifteen years, the Alliance has helped many of its partners to meet difficult reform challenges. We have also helped to forge a pan-European security culture that has never before existed on this continent – a strong disposition to work together in tackling common security challenges. And we see this reflected in the valuable contributions

which many of our partners are making to NATO's operations today.

NATO's Euro-Atlantic partners have been invited to take part in our Bucharest Summit. We want to make clear to them our interest in developing our partnerships. We want to tailor our cooperation even better to their needs and requirements. We want to further engage our partners in meeting today's security challenges together with us. But we also want to think creatively about extending NATO's network of partnership relations to include nations outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

Here, as well, there is a key role for Poland. Throughout the 1990s, Poland was one of NATO's most active partners – and it used its partnership relations to great effect to move closer to the Alliance. More recently, as a NATO Ally, Poland has been a major champion of our partnership policy in general, and a driving force behind the formulation of the Alliance's course of action especially towards Ukraine and Belarus.

I am confident that we can continue to count on that solid experience and constructive engagement by Poland, as we look to further develop closer cooperation with all our partners in the months and years to come.

I have mentioned NATO's open door in connection with the Balkans, but I want to emphasise it again. Because there are other countries, too, that wish to join NATO – like Ukraine and Georgia. As long as there is a gap between where countries are and where they want to be, the unification of Europe will not be complete.

And as long as some countries feel that they are not entirely masters of their own future, not least because others try to deny them their free choice, Europe is not the common space that we want it to be. And so I believe our Bucharest Summit should also send a clear signal to Ukraine and Georgia that NATO's door remains open.

Against this background, I am hopeful that we will also be able to move the NATO-Russia relationship forward at our Bucharest Summit.

Prior to the inauguration of Dmitriy Medvedev – whom I congratulated upon his election last week – President Putin has said that he will attend the Summit. No one expects that he will stay

silent on issues such as Kosovo, the CFE Treaty or NATO enlargement.

But we must not let our differences on those and other issues disguise the very real progress that NATO and Russia have made in a number of other areas – such as in the fight against terrorism, the training of Afghan and Central Asian counter-narcotics officers, or our Cooperative Airspace Initiative, which will have its NATO-hub located here in Warsaw.

A solid, trustful NATO-Russia relationship is vital to the security of our continent, and indeed the stability of the world around us. That is why we want to deepen our cooperation and to continue our dialogue, including on issues on which we may disagree. As far as NATO is concerned, there really are no ‘red lines’, and no limits on how far our relationship with Russia can go. I hope that President Putin will come to Bucharest with a similarly open mind as well. And that he will be prepared, together with his NATO colleagues, to give our cooperation a political push again, and a much-needed strategic quality.

Equally vital to the security of our continent is a solid partnership between NATO and the European Union. There is no question that both the Alliance and the EU have been instrumental to the post-Cold War reconstruction of Europe. They share fundamental, strategic interests in today’s volatile security environment. 21 countries belong to both NATO and the European Union. And, taken together, all that makes it difficult to understand – and to accept – that we have still not managed to develop a true strategic partnership between us.

Removing the lingering nervousness in our relationship, and forging such a genuine NATO-EU partnership, will require strong political commitment at the highest level in a number of capitals. President Sarkozy has said that it makes no sense to pit the EU and NATO against each other, and I fully endorse that view. I believe that the new Polish Government, as well, can be instrumental in bringing NATO and the EU closer together. And I hope that our Bucharest Summit, where the European Union will also be represented, will show that we are moving in the right direction.

Bucharest must also give a further push to the adaptation of NATO’s structures and capabilities to the new security environment.

Of course, not all security challenges require military solutions – but military competence remains crucial for dealing with many of them. And so it is essential that the Alliance maintains its military edge, and that our member nations continue to make the necessary investments – to make their forces more flexible and useable, and give them the right equipment to do their job. I am glad to say in the presence of Minister Klich here today that Poland is well aware of the urgency of this matter.

While we reinforce our ability to meet near-term operational requirements, we cannot ignore the emergence of several new risks and threats. One of these is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In light of this threat, we are taking a fresh look at missile defence, and whether the system which the United States has been discussing with Poland and the Czech Republic can be complementary to ongoing programmes at NATO.

At Bucharest our Heads of State and Government will take stock of that work and give further direction.

Poland has been instrumental in putting another emerging challenge on NATO's agenda, which is energy security. We have been looking at ways to better protect the security of our critical energy infrastructures – and how NATO can complement existing national and international efforts to maintain the flow of vital resources. Again, I expect our Heads of State and Government to give further impetus to that work when they meet in Bucharest.

As we come to grips with these emerging challenges there are two key notions that must underpin all our efforts, and which I know are very important for Poland. One is the indivisibility of security. We cannot, and will not, allow some parts of NATO's territory or populations to be less well protected than others. The second notion is one that I already mentioned, and that is solidarity.

Just as Allies are expected to assist other Allies in dangerous, demanding missions such as Afghanistan, those same Allies may expect an equal level of solidarity in facing security problems nearer to home, such as proliferation threats or energy cut-offs. The formula of the Three Musketeers – 'one for all and all for one' – must remain our strategic compass as it has always been.

This all points to one final challenge that I would like to briefly touch upon, and that relates to public diplomacy. The Alliance

today is very different from the Cold War NATO. Indeed, it is very different today from the NATO which Poland joined almost exactly 9 years ago. The international security environment has seen tremendous changes over the past two decades. NATO has transformed to respond to those changes. And of course it continues to evolve.

To my mind, getting and keeping our publics on board – explaining to them why the new, transforming NATO is unique and vital to their security, while never forgetting the core function of NATO, Art. 5, solidarity, collective defence – will be a key public diplomacy challenge in the coming years. It will be particularly important to manage the public’s expectations about our operations – to explain the dangers involved, and the long-term character of many of our engagements. We have to underline NATO’s enduring commitment to finishing Europe’s unfinished business – but also its relevance to emerging challenges, such as proliferation threats and vulnerabilities in our energy supply.

Our Bucharest Summit next month will be a valuable opportunity to showcase the transforming, 21st century Alliance. But it will require a sustained effort to really make the new NATO understood, and appreciated. Here in Poland, you – Ladies and Gentlemen – play an important role in that effort, and I encourage you to play that role to the full. Because in this age of uncertainty, there is every reason for the people of Poland to continue to see NATO as ‘the Alliance of their dreams’.

I thank you for your attention.

Opening Remarks

Bogdan Klich

Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am honoured to be able to give this inaugural speech, opening our conference. Indeed, the preparations for the Bucharest Summit as well as the perspective of next year's jubilee Summit, are a good moment to take a look at the current status of NATO and the challenges it faces.

I fully support the point indicated in the materials prepared for today's conference. There is no alternative to NATO. The exact question about its future should be: 'What can be done to make it even more effective?'

NATO had been fulfilling its mission during the first forty years of its existence, by defending Allies from aggression as well as fostering the integration of Western Europe. Later on, it also added to the momentum of transformation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, granting most of these countries a Membership. It has also successfully conducted several stabilisation efforts beyond its mandatory area.

Doing this, NATO has been paving new ways. No organisation, nor country has undertaken such complex activities. Once one realises this, further value is added to the Alliance's achievements.

We, however, shall not be complacent and, as the security environment changes at an unprecedented pace, NATO itself should not only match this pace, but also trespass it.

The Bucharest Summit should have two main goals. First, it should consolidate Allies, by putting emphasis on the elements

common for them, also, it should emphasise the so far undervalued achievements. Second, it should identify the challenges ahead of us. It should indicate them and send a clear message, that we are ready to face them.

As far as the political dimension is concerned, the Bucharest Summit should underline the importance of transatlantic ties by highlighting the fact that all Allies are subject to the same threats and are ready to counter them collectively. After the Summit, we should consider possibilities of increasing the quality of the transatlantic dialogue, so that it becomes deeper and more effective with both parties understanding each other and with the cohesion of the Alliance preserved, even if Europe cannot join the US activities.

Unfortunately, to my concern, during the Summit, we will not be able to develop a roadmap to overcoming the impasse in the NATO-EU relations. For a long time now there have been certain unsettled issues between those organisations. Undoubtedly, this problem should be addressed in the nearest future, as we will not be able to successfully complete the stabilisation of Afghanistan or Kosovo without a closer cooperation between NATO and EU. Without this being done, we will all fail, losing at the same time the capacity to influence the security environment. It is becoming more and more obvious that the problem of NATO-EU relations cannot be solved without completing the debate on the future of Turkey in Europe.

Another important subject to dominate the Summit discussions will be Afghanistan. NATO engagement in the reconstruction of this country is not appreciated enough by public opinion. Building roads, power plants, providing training to next units of the Afghan army or extending the area of control of the Afghan government over the next portion of the territory – all of the above do not seem to be as interesting to the public opinion as a terrorist attack with plenty of victims is. Therefore, it is significant to emphasise in Bucharest, how much Afghanistan has changed over the period of the last few years. At the same time, it is important to point to the unsolved problems and ensure in a convincing way that we intend to resolve them. Here, it obviously comes down to the difficulties regarding the arrangement of appropriate forces and military capabilities as well as national caveats that make it difficult for NATO commanders to use the units in an unimpeded way; insufficient progress in creating

the Afghan armed forces as well as unsatisfactory co-ordination of civil and military activities. All of the above problems have one thing in common – and this is the lack of readiness of many countries to bear the financial and political costs related to complex stabilisation operations. We need to work on that if we want to succeed in Afghanistan.

The April Summit will be remembered by most as an event marking the next step in the enlargement of the Alliance. Inviting the next round of states to launch the accession talks will be the most convincing proof of NATO's vitality and its continued and unchanged attractiveness. Future enlargement should be accompanied by permanent reflection on the role of this process in the Alliance's strategy. Why again, do we decide about the future members at the last moment? Is it enough that a country aspiring to NATO membership fulfils the criteria or is enlargement to be an element of a broader policy of stabilisation to be pursued by the Alliance in the region? Will we be able to have Ukraine and Georgia join when they fulfil the required criteria and the only obstacle to appear will be 'just' the fact that not all of their neighbours may be pleased with that fact. Does the statement, that in case of these countries we do not talk about 'if' but about 'when' may become our official stand?

The Bucharest Summit will definitely not be a breakthrough with regard to relations with Russia. It will rather confirm the discrepancies in issues of fundamental importance for global security. The Summit will remind of the difficulties in developing effective cooperation. It seems that after the Summit we will launch a new debate on the future of relations with Russia. This should start with a basic question on the role of this cooperation. Is the NATO-Russia Council mainly supposed to be a forum for building trust? Or can this be used as a means of increasing positive influence on Russia. And if so, then in which areas and to what extent?

When it comes to military transformation, it should be continued being subject to the political goals of the Alliance. Not only will this allow for maintaining the balance between the political and military functions of NATO, but most of all, will ensure, that the transformation itself keeps the course of the political goals outlined by the Alliance.

In Bucharest the Alliance will be able to clear-consciously send a message that the Allies are successfully adjusting their armed forces to the new security reality and their efforts are yielding tangible results measured in an increased capability of conducting multinational operations.

At the same time the Summit should encourage further work, as many issues remain unsettled. The most important of them all is, I believe, the difficulty in completing the NATO Response Forces, which are tasked to increase the Allies' rapid response capabilities. We also lack certain capabilities and forces crucial for the effective conduct of operations. The shortfalls include: combat support units, logistic support units, tactical and strategic transport assets and MEDEVAC assets. We have been working on overcoming these limitations for quite a long time now. We are looking for ways of improving the bilateral and multilateral ties between the Allies. This seems to be a good way of overcoming the shortfalls.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I agree that we – the new Member States – have our own perspective on the Alliance's development, yet without establishing a closed group of interests, which promotes an alternative view on NATO's future. The commonalities are mainly a result of the geographical location and shared past.

This is, for example, the source of a strong belief, that NATO – developing new capabilities – should maintain its ability to defend its members. It is not about separating NATO from new tasks, as much as it is about sustaining its capability of addressing traditional challenges, while developing itself.

Our warm support for Ukraine's aspirations is a result of the trust we have in NATO's abilities to accelerate a country's transformation. It is also an acknowledgement of the simple fact, that being a 'regular' NATO member is much better than being a NATO's privileged partner.

Our attitude towards cooperation with Russia may be described as distant, but hopeful. We believe that in the future Russia will have become a fully democratic and predictable state and that the Alliance – at least to a certain extent – can have influence on the positive changes in Russia.

Countries of the region also share the opinion on military transformation, that it should enable us an even deeper consolidation with the Alliance's military structures.

That is why during the Summit we will in most cases speak univocally.

There are, however some differences. Not all the countries of the region attach the same importance to energetic security as Poland does.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you for your attention. It seems to me, that instead of answering some of the questions asked by the organisers, I rather added some. I am sure, however, that such a distinguished group of experts will deal with them easily.

Towards a Successful NATO Summit in Bucharest

*Dr. Jerzy M. Nowak, Center for International Relations,
former Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to NATO*

&

*Ambassador Adam Kobieracki, former NATO Assistant Secretary
General for Operations, Warsaw*

In order to be successful, NATO at its highest, political level meeting has to produce clear and simple, yet meaningful messages. These messages should highlight both achievements and failures, provide elements of at least medium-term vision (bearing in mind the 2009 Summit, probably in Berlin), and help to pave the way for future endeavours.

This requires overcoming the customary distance between verbal declarations and common practice, but also keeping the right balance between political will and transformational creativity.

What does NATO look like at the eve of the summit?

NATO leaders will meet in April amid the usual complaints: that the Alliance is becoming irrelevant, continues on the road towards a strategic drift, lacks clear identity and ignores the role of the EU in the field of foreign and security policy.

Questions about the relevance and importance of the Alliance in the 21st century were put forward from the beginning of the NATO's transformation process in 1991. Those questions seem to miss one

fundamental point: all beings, human or institutional, regardless of their origins, can be relevant in different environments, provided they are capable of effectively developing, transforming and adapting to evolving requirements. NATO does not need to prove that point again and again as it:

- provides security to its members in an adequate manner,
- has developed a global character,
- continues to enlarge,
- leads or participates in a number of crisis response and stabilization operations,
- co-operates with the UN, the EU, the OSCE and a number of other players, and –
- has an impressive and growing family of world-wide partners.

In other words, it is going through a deep transformation process intended to meet new security challenges, which has already begun to produce results.

The basic question that arises is not whether NATO is still relevant, but rather what else needs to be done in order to make this organization more effective.

One psychological observation on NATO's public perception in this regard: under Cold War terms, the Alliance was perceived as a monarch, whose wisdom should not be questioned, since it would have been too risky for the security of the entire kingdom, given a clearly recognized and well-known enemy. In the new post-Cold War conditions, international relations are more complex and dynamic than organizations or procedures which are static in nature. The environment is more democratic. Today, NATO 'has the right' to make mistakes and its health can be subject to public scrutiny. This is a natural change which is not undermining the existence or *raison d'être* of the Alliance.

A profound reflection is to be expected on four issues:

- on the balance between political and military functions of the Alliance,
- on the level of NATO's predictability,
- on the equilibrium between hard-core functions (Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty) and new obligations (stabilizing operations and expeditionary capabilities),

– and finally, on the effective contribution to European and global security in the near future.

NATO's picture on the eve of the Summit is like a big family photograph. It is enlarging, it has a lot of friends and partners, it is remarkably involved in securing stability in some volatile areas of the world, it tries to understand fully the nature of challenges it faces and it constantly attempts to refine and develop its instruments of action. One of the problems is that the longer it takes to transform and change the way it functions, the more impatient its critics become. For example, no one who knows Afghanistan would have ever expected NATO to be the only solution to the problem. Yet, there are voices that it is actually the Alliance, which is failing there. However, the truth is that the entire international community, including NATO, has to rethink its strategy and tactics in that part of the world.

In Bucharest, NATO has an opportunity to evolve in a number of areas.

Four contentious issues, however, will be followed with particular attention:

- the enlargement dilemma,
- the future of the antiballistic missiles programs (including the possible location of a third American site in Central Europe),
- partnership in the Afghanistan operation, and –
- overcoming the NATO-EU stalemate.

Questions for the summit

TRANSATLANTIC FORUM

A fundamental question is what NATO can and may do to improve the mechanisms of transatlantic dialogue?

It is obvious that it cannot, due to different new challenges and security perceptions, continue to serve as a sole expression of transatlantic unity, like it did in the past. The Alliance, however, can and should offer a forum and a number of security instruments – related to discussions between Europe and North America, which would lead to common positions and coordinated actions on the

most important security and defence issues. The Alliance can also serve as a kind of transatlantic coordinator on questions pertaining to the Washington Treaty on one hand, and to the EU – ESDP on the other.

Questions of a decisive nature in this regard are:

– How the partnership between North America and Europe may be reconciled with some form of American leadership in the field of security?

– Could Allies acquiesce – and under what conditions? – that the US government may occasionally decide to form a ‘coalition of the willing’?

– To what extent is the US ready to accept the strengthening of a European pillar of NATO in the perspective of the possible future cooperation with the European Union?

Such a European-American dialogue within the framework of the Alliance would not proceed without difficulty, although one has to accept a premise that disputes can lead to healthy solutions and they are not doomed to become a chronic illness, paralyzing the entire organism.

Experiences in NATO-EU operations and missions have recently proven that close co-operation between the two institutions is indispensable to achieve their goals i.e. maintaining stability, security and the promotion of shared values. Both organizations cannot continue to drift apart on these crucial subjects. A success of the Bucharest Summit will depend to a large extent on whether some form of a roadmap to better EU-NATO relations is formulated. A perspective of France’s full membership in NATO military structure would be particularly helpful. Turkey’s objections to strengthening NATO-EU ties needs to be addressed. Last but not least, EU and NATO objectives in developing military capabilities and force goals require confronting them in a working manner in order to harmonize and define a common line in their improvements.

A number of questions require answers, in particular: on Trans-Atlantic, continental and regional dimensions of security, weakening Europe’s centrality to American foreign policy, dangers of more selective transatlantic cooperation (‘coalitions of the willing’).

In brief, NATO is expected to function both as a space and as a mechanism of cooperation and at the same time to closely integrate the collective military power of Europe and North America as well as to legitimize United States' presence in Europe. Therefore, the question remains, how to work-out a deeper organizational synergy and coordinated action in order to develop an effective and unifying transatlantic agenda?

NEW CHALLENGES

The key security challenges of the 21st century can only be resolved if NATO will function in a strong and undivided transatlantic vein.

Highly relevant questions in this regard are:

– whether the Alliance should be looking at all the security challenges threatening its Member States or should it be selective?

– should it aspire to develop new capabilities in order to deal with new threats or should it limit – at least initially – its actions in the context of new challenges to those for which it is well equipped already now?

– how to work out a broader understanding of military transformation towards expeditionary capabilities, while retaining the Alliance's defense capabilities and working out a comprehensive approach to crisis management and stabilization operations?

Transformation priorities should be developed, embracing *inter alia* more profound political consultations, more solidarity, a broader approach to partnership, and an increased role of training and capacity building.

Apart from the **struggle against terrorism**, to which every multilateral organization or institution must contribute in line with its comparative advantages –

– should NATO deal more assertively with new emerging security issues like energy and protection of critical infrastructure?

– how should this be carried out and what is the scope of feasible decisions?

And next problems:

– The Alliance has a well-established record of active involvement in arms control. Should this involvement be maintained? If

yes, than the most urgent question is, how to overcome the crisis caused by the Russian withdrawal from the **CFE Treaty**, considered rightly to be a cornerstone of military stability in Europe?

– The Russian move has serious political and military consequences, the latter predominantly for the Caucasus region, and will thus require the utmost attention of the Allies. It might be worth considering whether the time is not right to **focus on military transparency rather than on conventional arms control, understood as a set of limits on military potential, and to prepare new proposals for Russia to avoid keeping a uniquely defensive posture.**

In addition to the above, NATO members at their Summit will have to examine carefully what kind of role the Alliance might usefully play in the problems relating to **WMD, non-proliferation and Ballistic Missile Defense**. Specifically the latter requires urgent decisions going beyond theoretical considerations and feasibility studies in the context of the US anti-ballistic third site in Central Europe proposals. It should look at four projects: **US Missile Defense, Alliance Ballistic Missile Defense, Theatre Missile Defense and possible co-operation project with Russia on MD**, with a view to reconcile those different perspectives in order to define NATO's role in all these endeavors. In any case, the Alliance is in a position to offer a general framework in which various MD schemes could be brought together and made compatible, as far as the obligations stemming from Art. 5 of Washington Treaty are concerned.

Needless to add, that the on-going military transformation of the Alliance needs to be continued and actually accelerated, if we really want NATO to be relevant in the context of new security challenges and threats. The Summit has a chance to re-focus NATO on its **core functions: collective defense, missions and stabilizing operations and partnerships.**

NATO OPERATIONS

Obviously, given the current pattern of NATO involvement in crisis-response and stabilization operations, the Summit must focus first of all on Afghanistan and Kosovo.

As far as **Afghanistan** is concerned, the Summit will offer a good opportunity to do at least the following:

– emphasize that NATO is still determined to do its job there, but urgently needs other partners, including the UN and the EU, to do their share;

– make it absolutely clear that since military actions alone cannot bring about a comprehensive solution to the Afghan crisis, NATO for its mainly military involvement needs broader, politico-military strategy there;

– put an emphasis to commit resources to training programs and equipment donations for Afghani security forces. This constitutes a pivotal element of NATO exit strategy, which needs to be a long process;

– look at the prospects for a stable and self-sustaining Afghanistan in the broader context of regional stability, involving *inter alia* Pakistan and Iran.

It is first of all in Afghanistan that the Alliance needs to display its solidarity and readiness, to act in the spirit of real partnership, which *inter alia* should also be reflected in the **unified command structure of the ISAF**. Every nation should contribute to this operation, in accordance with its capabilities. Everybody should follow common strategy there, which in turn should be an integral part of the entire international community coordinated plan to achieve a common goal: a stable and self-sustaining Afghanistan.

The summit is strongly expected to demonstrate and to confirm that despite all the political uncertainties around **Kosovo**, KFOR will secure stability there. The most difficult question in that context will be how to arrange for – and maintain – the absolutely necessary co-operation and co-ordination between NATO and the EU on all Kosovo-related issues.

Allied leaders should also take a careful look at **the military capabilities their nations put at the disposal of the NATO for its operations and missions**. The level of political ambition here must be commensurate with the level of military commitment and more effective allocation of resources.

As the Alliance is going through the next stages of its transformation, special attention should be given to an **as equal as possible burden sharing among Allies**. It has to be the best possible expression of the Alliance's solidarity, but it is also a necessary condition for the smooth functioning of the entire Alliance. Nations may and should develop complementary – but not over-

lapping – specific military capabilities, such as strategic transport, but all of them have to contribute to the achievement of agreed common goals. It simply cannot be the case that only some Allies carry out combat missions, while others focus just on civilian aspects of operations. Contributions may and will differ proportionally, as nations have different military potentials, but should come from all Member States.

ENLARGEMENT

There are obvious specific decisions to be taken: **who is eligible to be invited to join the Alliance?** Whatever the final outcome of political debates on that issue will be, there are **four rules that have to be observed:**

- every nation wishing to join the Alliance deserves careful consideration and a clear answer to its aspirations, on the assumption that NATO is a performance based organization;

- no one from outside NATO should have any kind of a veto right on enlargement;

- a balance should be kept between enlargement and the effective functioning of the Alliance. Neither should enlargement adversely affect the Alliance’s contribution to the defense and security of its members, nor should the statutory roles and functions of NATO preclude a possibility of extending their benefits to other nations. Enlargement has to be compatible with transformation, understood as normal functioning combined with constant refinement of tools and instruments of action;

- some elements of political (informal) ‘parallelism’ between NATO and EU enlargement should be taken into consideration.

Guided by these rules the NATO Summit has to determine its attitude towards the current membership aspirations expressed by the three Balkan States, Ukraine and Georgia and consider appropriate reaction to unfounded Russian objections.

PARTNERSHIPS

The summit in Bucharest will consider future co-operation of the Alliance with its different partners, in terms of scope and substance.

First of all, apart from the strategic relations with the EU, attention must be given to those partners who could be called ‘bro-

thers in arms' i.e. all those who contribute to NATO-led operations and missions. Sometimes these are military contributions, sometimes civilian, financial or other. All of them are equally important and have to be recognized. However, recognition in that regard is not enough. Operational partners must be treated as partners in the real meaning of the term, which leads us to a delicate issue: the participation in NATO decision-making mechanisms in a given operation. **One can hardly expect a nation to get involved in ISAF and take the associated risks, without being able to influence decisions concerning these Forces.**

Specifically in Afghanistan, NATO needs as many partners as it can find, and should also be looking for political allies in the region and in the entire Islamic world.

A next category includes partners who remain in some kind of institutional relationship with the Alliance: within the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Mediterranean Dialogue, European non-NATO States, 'global partners' (in NATO jargon: 'contact States'), MAP countries, etc. NATO leaders are expected to define chances and opportunities to extend and expand co-operation with all those partners. Special attention will have to be devoted to relations with Ukraine and with Russia.

Ukraine, a 'distinctive partner' – despite the current political problems – cannot feel overlooked or ignored by the Alliance, since that could only complicate the situation there. A possible decision on MAP status would constitute an important encouragement to Kyiv, in spite of Russia's stand. The same applies to **Georgia**.

As to the 'strategic partner' – **the Russian Federation**, the motto of the day at the Summit should be 'business as usual'. That should include pragmatic co-operation, security dialogue, consultation and mutual support wherever possible. Obviously, the Alliance's solidarity, and practical development of the 'Eastern dimension' is indispensable to do effective business with Russia.

CENTRAL EUROPEAN EXPECTATIONS

Central Europeans do not have separate, different interests from their allies, although they may accentuate their expectations in a slightly different manner.

First of all, desiring to strengthen security in an increasingly uncertain world, they would be particularly interested in **strengthening the classical functions of the Alliance** (collective defense), deepening Transatlantic ties and reconciling European and American views regarding the security of the continent.

Central Europeans are seeking some common **reassurances vis-à-vis increased Russian post-imperial policies and implications of Moscow's drive towards multi-polarism**, which in the region is understood as an ambition to return to the policy of spheres of influence. They are expecting some pragmatic decisions on NATO-Russia relations based on inclusivity rather than exclusivity.

The Central European geopolitical location makes one sensitive to **arms control**, and reconsideration of the post-CFE regime and transparency measures. Poland and the Czech Republic should also be interested in some, even loose, forms of linking the future American third site anti-ballistic systems installed on their territories to corresponding Allied Missile Defense systems.

Finally, Central European states are also strong supporters of the **'open door policy'**. Poland in particular is expected to support granting MAP to Georgia and Ukraine and presenting to Tbilisi and Kyiv clear perspectives of NATO membership.

CONCLUSIONS

The Summit in Bucharest has some difficult issues to tackle, but also faces a good chance to be a successful event. A condition for that will be the right balance between current and longer-term, strategic issues.

The biggest political challenge seems to be **making NATO a 'transatlantic co-ordinator'** between Europe and North America in the field of security and defense through a number of concrete messages concerning new challenges and threats to security, operations and missions, enlargement and partnerships. This requires also an initiation **of a new strategic concept** to narrow the gap between the conceptual framework and practice.

Poland and other Central Europeans, having in mind various diverging approaches, do not wish to see NATO weakened, whether in its classical, i.e. collective defense functions

or in tackling new challenges, sometimes far away from their borders.

A two-tier alliance, for those who are ready to carry the full burden of NATO objectives and missions and others who think – for whatever reason – that member states can afford a NATO *à la carte*, is not an option.

This text represents the personal view of the authors.

NATO's Political Shape and Further Evolution (Before the Bucharest Summit and Beyond)

Prof. Roman Kuźniar, Head of the Strategic Studies Unit, University of Warsaw, former director of the Polish Institute for International Affairs

1. The Atlantic Alliance remains in relatively good shape. It continues to be a reliable instrument of collective defense and security policies of its Member States. Recent doubts and critics are not well founded. They are being formulated in the context of the war against terrorism. This is wrong, because NATO was not created to counter non-state, decentralized and non-military threats, therefore it should not be expected to do well what it was not meant to do.

2. Neither can NATO's performance in Afghanistan be perceived as a sign of its weakness. Relatively successful operations and missions in the Balkans did not set the pattern or create a precedent for NATO's engagement in other regions of the world. No one should be misled by the opinion that the Alliance is failing its test in Afghanistan. ISAF is not an 'out of area mission of choice' but a 'rescue (S.O.S.) operation' after the U.S. failure to win and a concurrent failure to stabilize the country. The US decision not to involve NATO in the Afghan operation made performing this job in a right way impossible from the outset. We are in trouble there also because of the collision between ISAF mission (its purpose) and the 'Enduring Freedom' concept and its execution.

3. Notwithstanding the present controversies over 'the war on terror' and the war in Afghanistan, there can be no doubt about NATO's rationale and future. The Alliance fulfills – and should

continue to fulfill – important functions and will stay indispensable and irreplaceable in its role. Yet, this will not happen by itself.

4. An overarching role to be played by the Atlantic Alliance is to protect the West understood as a civilization and a way of life, i.e. liberal democracy and open market economy, including human rights and fundamental freedoms. The West, both as a civilization and a system, is under a different pressure now; we should have a manifold capability to ensure the long-term survival of the West. NATO should be an important tool of achieving this end.

5. NATO has to defend our (Western) security and strategic interests and our position in the global order, including stabilizing our direct security environment. The problem is to define the nature and extent of this role and interests.

6. NATO should also contribute to the stability of an international order. Its role in this context should, however, not consist of undertaking expeditionary operations in far away regions. NATO should not play the role of St. George ('goes not abroad, in search for monsters to destroy', warning of J.Q.A. to the U.S. foreign policy, 1821). It should rather contribute to the solidity of international (mainly UN) institutions and norms in the field of security (on use of force, non-proliferation, disarmament), and not to replace them.

7. Another important 'meta'-function of the Alliance should be to keep North America and Europe together, which is indeed more and more difficult against the background of –

- American global ambitions and unilateral actions,
- A growing and well justified desire of Europe to become more responsible for its security (especially when U.S. becomes less and less reliable and partner-like ally).

8. As to 'domestic' problems, NATO cannot be viewed as a relevant and credible security instrument solely when it serves foreign and security interests of its leading power (in other words, to clean up broken glass after its actions). The Allies cannot be told that either NATO will become an expeditionary force or it is useless.

9. The Atlantic Alliance should remain 'Atlantic'. Progressive over-extension is the way to its gradual weakening and disintegration. An overwhelming majority of Member States have no global interests. NATO survived the Cold War in good shape without undertaking a single military mission. Today, there is no need to

look for every opportunity of military engagement in order to confirm its credibility (virtue of self-restraint).

10. In assessing our (NATO's) international role, we have to be more realistic, modest and efficient. 'Out of area' cannot be seen as a capability and readiness to engage in 'another Afghanistan' in any part of the world. The priority of attention and resources should be given to Art. 5 function and Art. 6 area and direct environment – consolidation of security and stability within the Euro-Atlantic zone. The only permanent exception – an indirect security guarantee for Israel – should be treated the same way as for non-NATO Western country guarantees during the Cold War.

11. We are safe and powerful:

- the transatlantic area is the safest one on Earth;
- we are in charge of some 75% of global military expenditure;
- we are the only ones to have global expeditionary capabilities.

This should not be abused or spoiled by a never ending search for more, which can lead – in a long-term perspective – to counter-reaction, a new polarization ('the West and the Rest'), an arms race and instability. The lesson drawn from the failure of the 'Wider Middle East' project should be carefully analyzed and learned by NATO.

12. Further transformation of the Organization should be threat-driven and not (as is the case of the U.S. BMD program) capability – or ideology-driven. Particular interests should not jeopardize the integrity of the Alliance (again the divisive role of the U.S. BMD). Taking into account an unstoppable global geopolitical shift, we have to rely less on the arguments of power and more on the power of arguments (and set an example and standard for other powers and regions).

Due to our place in the international system, we have a larger political responsibility that goes beyond Art. 5 and 'out of area' missions. The increasing disparity between security standards of the transatlantic area and the rest of the world will not make us any safer. Instead of creating selective global partnerships (ersatz-alliances) and therefore deepening a situation and feeling of uneven security, NATO's political aim should be to improve the efficiency of the universal system of collective security.

This text represents the personal view of the author.

NATO Military Transformation

Ambassador Adam Kobieracki, former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations, Warsaw

Introduction

There are many definitions and explanations of the concept and process of NATO military transformation, and rightly so, since there are a number of perspectives, from which one can look at the issue in question – military, political, civilian, national, Alliance-wide etc. There is no point in going through all of them here and now. However, it should be useful – just before the Bucharest Summit – to consider this still ongoing, but clearly at much slower pace, process of military transformation in its different aspects. The aim will be to try to understand its rather complex nature, its limits and its prospects.

In order to do that properly, I will first share with you my views on what I would call ‘transformation proper’ (capabilities, forces, military commands structure, and evolution of military doctrines). Then, my favourite subject (since I had served 4 years as NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations), which is the relationship between actual operations and transformation, what kind of interaction could be found there, how operations and missions influence transformation and vice versa. That will include at least a few words about the relevance of transformation for the Alliance co-operation with external partners – nations and organizations, first of all EU and UN. Finally, something has to be said about

transformation in the context of inevitable discussion on the NATO strategic concept. Can we look at transformation as a *de facto* substitute of a new comprehensive strategy, or should we rather assume that the fundamental reason for obvious slowing down of this process is actually the lack of a new strategic concept?

No one can deny that NATO is undergoing deep transformation, including the military one. The importance of the latter can be hardly overestimated, as well as all the difficulties that it poses for both the nations and the Alliance as a whole. Yet, it does not occupy any prominent place at the Bucharest Summit agenda.

Why? Is it considered to be too technical, and I don't want to say 'too difficult', for the Heads of State and Government?

Or is it loosing direction and coherence it had at its inception?

Or simply other issues are considered to be more important this time?

Transformation proper

Leaving aside well-known origins of this process, such as Prague Capabilities Commitment, let's focus on its substance and nature. Addressing that issue, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer once said: 'We need forces that are slimmer, tougher, and faster; forces that can reach further, and stay in the field longer'. That is of course true. In addition to that, we need also everything – from decision-making process down to financial-budgetary regulations – that would allow us to develop and deploy such forces.

On the other hand, General Lance L. Smith, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, describes the same process in more military terms: 'NATO's ongoing transformation reflects cultural and institutional change on a grand scale. The increasing need for its forces to be multinational and joint by design, deployable wherever and whenever needed and coherently interoperable in thought and action drives the process ever forward. NATO's military transforma-

tion encompasses reorganization and re-equipping and introduces new ways of looking at challenges through the lens of capabilities’.

The important thing here is to understand that even though transformation is about military forces and different ways of using them, it does affect the very nature of the Alliance and its mechanisms, or simply – the way it is functioning. The reason is **transformational focus on capabilities, as opposed to threats to security**. In the past, all the planning disciplines under the heading of ‘defence planning’ took as starting point for their work different threats-based scenarios. Transformation mantra says one should start with planning capabilities, as it is virtually impossible to envisage meaningful threats-based scenarios in the new security environment. Theoretical as this assumption may sound, it does change fundamental organizing principles of the Alliance – defence planning process, structures, doctrines, the entire way of doing business. It also puts premium on close military-civilian cooperation under a clear political guidance and leadership.

It is obvious that a lot has been already done (new command structure, new military doctrine, creation of NATO Response Force – NRF, new ways of planning), but much more remains to be done. To use somewhat lighter tone, the ship ‘Transformation’ has left the harbour, but it is sailing through rather stormy waters and we must assure that it stays on course.

The new command structure has already started to be introduced, mainly through the establishment of Allied Command Operations (at SHAPE) and mentioned above Allied Command Transformation (in Norfolk, replacing SACLANT). That was a decision of pivotal importance, as it allowed ACO, and its subordinate lower-level commands, to concentrate on the conduct of current, and planning of future, NATO operations and missions. At the same time, the basic mission of ATC is to develop and pursue transformation, which includes the process of drawing lessons from ongoing operations.

So far, so good. However, a question is still open, whether all kinds of lower level commands under ACO, like in Naples, Lisbon, Brunsum etc., do not require any streamlining or other restructuring. There is no shortage of concepts and ideas in that regard, at least informal. But there is a clear lack of common position and even

common thinking on that issue among the nations, as it affects quite strong national preferences and interests. It is therefore not an easy subject, but it will not go away from us, if and as transformation will proceed.

There is also a constant need to make sure that ACT is well connected to the current business at NATO, if it is to continue to serve as a transformation leader. The reason is simple: this process has to be meaningful, understandable and realistic for the nations, and must not be perceived by them as an abstract or theoretical exercise.

As far as military doctrines are concerned, both strategic-level commands (ACO and ACT) actually seem to be working quite close together. The most important development here was the introduction of the Effects-Based Approach to Operations after the Istanbul Summit in 2004, where a general idea of such an approach was presented. The aim of EBAO – as explained by the ACT itself – is to select those capabilities that produce required effects and avoid wasteful effort and unnecessary attrition. It is not a purely military concept. At the grand strategic level, it encompasses all instruments of political, economic, civil and military power that can be brought to bear by the nations of the Alliance and potentially beyond, in partnership with other international organizations and agencies, to successfully achieve end state of any mission. I do agree with this ACT definition. It is very much in line with the concept of comprehensive approach to operations, which is one of favourite subjects for discussions back at NATO HQ in Brussels. And I do think that transformation at the doctrinal level is in a very good shape. The overarching problem is with the implementation of concepts and ideas, and first of all with the establishment of truly expeditionary armed forces and the acquisition of relevant military capabilities.

Once more, a lot of hard work has been done on the issues of military forces and capabilities. A number of so called targets for national military potentials has been set – for mobility, deployability, sustainability of armed forces etc. To be precise, one should say that there was a lot of discussions about setting such targets. However, so far the nations' record in reaching those targets is mixed at best.

There are, of course different reasons for that situation: different national threat assessments, budgetary constraints, historical traditions, national legal limitations, even the fact that not all NATO nations have yet introduced professional armies. Some nations are more reluctant than others to move quickly from stationary defence postures to highly mobile, expeditionary forces. However, they should remember that as some military put it, today ‘general purpose forces are no purpose forces’. Nowadays, military have to be prepared, trained and equipped for irregular and asymmetric warfare. They have to rely on modern technology. Having expeditionary forces is not equal to a decision to participate in all kinds of overseas operations. It should be understood as equal to being prepared to face new challenges to security.

Unfortunately, whatever the arguments, which I am sure most of the nations would verbally accept, the political reality is such that in the majority of European capitals public opinion, and parliaments, would find it extremely difficult to accept any sharp increase in military spending. At the same time, one cannot dream about modernizing and transforming armed forces without rather substantial costs. The net outcome is therefore a kind of a vicious circle, almost impossible to break. Nations at a political level generally agree that they themselves and the Alliance as a whole do require more expeditionary armed forces and modern military capabilities, but they – or at least most of them – are rather reluctant and find it somewhat difficult to immediately follow and implement in full this general agreement at national levels.

One should also bear in mind that for some of the new members of NATO territorial, static defence is still of certain strategic value, due to their specific security threat assessments. Accordingly, for them modernizing armed forces in general is of utmost importance, but making them expeditionary is not necessarily a priority.

Let me, however, be absolutely clear: there is progress in the process of transformation of military forces, but it is not as fast and swift, as one would have hoped for. Ironically, to a large extent this progress results more from the participation of NATO nations in operations and missions, and less from agreed documents and standards. I will come to this issue later.

We witnessed during the last few years also a number of initiatives concerning military capabilities, including on a very important issue of strategic transport, but as well on communications, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defence, information technology etc. Para 24 of the Riga Summit Declaration of 2006 lists altogether 11 different initiatives in that regard. Considerable time will elapse before we would be able to benefit from the concrete results of those initiatives, but at least they have been introduced and put in motion.

There are, in my view, three basic problems with all those useful and right steps and initiatives concerning ‘transformation proper’, be it on command structure, military doctrines, armed forces or military capabilities. These are: time, money and more and more apparent lack of overall, coherent and simple (i.e. not over-sophisticated for simple minds) concept of military transformation.

Actual implementation of any substantial step aimed at real transformation takes a lot of time. It means that for politicians expected to bless and approve military decisions they do not seem urgent, as the impact of those decisions clearly goes beyond the usual four or five years election cycle. In other words, whatever (sometimes hard and difficult) decision is taken today, it will bear fruits only for their successors. It may not be a problem for all NATO nations, but surely, for some it is.

Then, as already stated above, transformation is costly. Yes, it is a very good, but long-term investment. Especially for smaller and medium-size members of the Alliance, who in some cases have to start transformation almost from the scratch, it does pose a problem. The only way to convince public opinion, parliaments and politicians about the need to reserve budgetary means for transformation and modernization of armed forces is to offer them a truly coherent and comprehensive, but also realistic, concept of transformation. It is the only chance to persuade them that this process will serve interests of their nations.

And that is exactly what I have just called a third problem. The last time transformation efforts were presented as a coherent whole was at the Prague Summit, under the title of Prague Capabilities Commitment. From that time on, there was rather a series of

individual, isolated steps, which of course had a common, transformational denominator, but were not presented as such in a way easy enough for non-experts and non-military public. Personally, I suspect this is the reason for which Heads of State and Government are not expected to deal with those issues at the Bucharest Summit. For the highest-level politicians those issues simply seem to be somewhat abstract, too technical and excessively fragmented. It may sound trivial, but the military masters of transformation should keep that in mind for the future.

Finally, under this chapter, a few words about NATO Response Force. Established as both a first echelon and a test-bed for military transformation, they were expected to serve as a real rapid reaction force, with which NATO could quickly respond to international threats.

As Karl-Heinz Kamp wrote in his research paper on the NATO summit in Bucharest (Research Paper, NATO Defense College, Rome, No 33, Nov. 2007): ‘Two main problems hindered the NRF from the beginning. First, the Europeans only grudgingly made the necessary resources available. This was less an issue of insufficient manpower than of scarce and costly ‘critical enablers’, such as airlift capacity and strategic intelligence capabilities. The declaration that the NRF had reached ‘Full Operational Capability’ by the end of 2006 was only possible because the U.S. stepped in at the last minute to provide the missing force components. Second, there was from the beginning no consensus as to under what circumstances the NRF should actually be deployed’.

The only thing which I would add to this assessment – and which Karl-Heinz Kamp addresses in another part of his paper – is that there is still no agreement among nations on financial aspects of potential NRF deployments: who is to pay for what? We all became acutely aware of that problem immediately after the deployment of some national NRF elements during the NATO disaster relief mission in Pakistan in the aftermath of earthquake there.

Altogether, NRF did fulfil and continues to carry on its training function for national units, increasing interoperability and serving as a testing ground for different aspects of military transformation. But the prospects for actual deployment and operational use of NRF are at the moment at best grim.

Transformation and NATO ongoing operations

Military transformation notwithstanding, it is obvious that NATO is also going through a kind of 'operational transformation'. *De facto*, both processes are different sides of the same coin, complementing and reinforcing each other. Whereas the first applies first of all to military forces and capabilities, the second concerns mostly civilian-military cooperation and coordination, decision-making mechanisms and procedures, planning, budgetary mechanisms.

NATO get involved in operations because of new security environment, the search for a new role of the Alliance, new expectations on the part of its partners (UN, EU, others), as well as because Member States started to look more and more at NATO as an instrument of their foreign and security policies in different areas, not just 'defence insurance company' against Cold War enemies. Military transformation was invented on the one hand to better prepare Allies for operational involvements, and on the other – to make sure that they will have comparable, at least to a certain extend, military capabilities, even though still different in terms of their actual size, allowing, *inter alia*, to share in more equal manner the burden of participation in operations and missions.

The best example of military and operational transformation processes complementarity is the military concept of Effects Based Approach to Operations, when compared to much more civilian idea of 'comprehensive approach to operations'. They are addressing the same problems and putting forward similar suggestions, just from different perspectives.

In general, operations contribute to the process of transformation through the evolution of operational planning, development of operational strategies and politico-military doctrines, changes in the decision-making mechanisms, evolving pattern of civilian-military coordination, as well as consideration of lessons learned from operations, which makes it possible to see whether transformational concepts work in practice.

It would be fair to say that ongoing operations and missions in practice indirectly transform the entire way of doing business at NATO, even without high-level declarations and commitments. Just

to give you an example: it was because of operations that NATO military started to report on a daily basis to all the nations about developments in theatre. It was because of different missions that military and civilian personnel in theatre had to start now more or less routine, although not yet perfect, coordination.

Then, modernization of armed forces and military capabilities. There is no better source of experience in that regard and no better argument to convince nations that military transformation is worth all efforts. In reality, nations are transforming their military units through their participation in operations and missions. And they are doing that apart from and regardless of formal commitments, officially set 'targets' etc. It is a real life military transformation, resulting directly from experience and training gained through the participation in operations. Thus, it is yet another argument in favour of as broad as possible participation in those missions.

Let's now look at some selected examples of clear interaction between operations and transformation, in its both military and non-military aspects.

Experience from the field, be it in Afghanistan, Kosovo or elsewhere, leads to a firm acknowledgement that military means alone are not sufficient in order to solve complex crisis situations, and not just in Afghanistan, even though it might be the most prominent case. Hence the need for much closer civilian-military cooperation and coordination.

It starts with a necessity to develop strong and functional civilian-military links in the phase of operation's planning. The classic approach, under which military are being given general political guidance and then are more or less free to plan a given operation, is not valid any more. The reason is that operational strategies cannot be exclusively military and cannot rely on military means alone. Consequently, the need for joint civ-mil operational planning becomes obvious. Such a mechanism is in the making at NATO HQ, although has not been fully established yet.

Then, political/civilian control over operations. Such a control function is formally vested with the North Atlantic Council, and that was always the case. The new development in that regard is that with more operations and more discussions about them at the NAC meetings, the Council actually started to exercise that function on an

almost daily basis. We witness the creation of a new culture here, somewhat different from the old 'chain-of-command' attitude and breaking some still existing military taboos, like on reporting lines or the role of political advisers, attached to military commands, who in the past served more as a media advisers than anything else.

Civilian-military coordination is also changing dramatically in operational theatres. That is a logical development, following the recognition of a comprehensive nature of operations. The best example in that context is the situation in ISAF HQ. Back in 2003, NATO has decided to establish a post of a Senior Civilian Representative there. At the beginning, it was a modest advisory post. Nowadays it is one of the leading civilian officials in Kabul, coordinating NATO/ISAF efforts with other organizations and institutions, working closely with troop's commander and vested with the political authority of the Secretary General. On the margins let me just observe here that in case of UN operations, the highest civilian UN representative in theatre is at the same time the 'supreme overall commander' of a given operation, to whom all the UN military are subordinate. It is still different in the case of NATO operations, where the military and political/civilian chains of command in theatre continue to function in parallel, but they are being coordinated closer and closer.

Another, internal level of interaction between operations and transformation can be found in the structures and procedures at the NATO HQ. Let me just mention them, since although they may not be strategic in nature, they do influence the internal way of doing business.

First, there is much closer cooperation between civilian and military structures – the NAC, Military Committee, International Staff, and International Military Staff. Then, the Secretary General and SACEUR work much closer together and it is not limited to occasional military briefings on operations, but applies to the entire spectrum of NATO responsibilities. Finally, in recognition of new operational tasks of the Alliance and the need for enhanced civilian-military coordination, Operations Division was established in 2003 at the NATO HQ.

Military transformation's overall aim is to better prepare NATO to deal with new security threats, including through

operations and missions. In the 21st century, it is impossible to do that without cooperation with other organizations and institutions, starting with UN and EU. Some of them, like UN, would be actually happy to see the Alliance taking some of peacekeeping burden upon its shoulders, of course under UN mandate and guidance. On its part, the European Union, busy with the development of its own military capabilities, looks at NATO for capabilities it does not have at the moment, but also expects the Alliance to take care militarily of the crises which it does not want to or simply cannot deal with. Of course, a very complex relationship between those two organizations deserves a separate study, so I am just mentioning it here in the specific context of transformation and operations.

There are other organizations, too, which look at NATO as a possible helping hand, like the African Union. The AU did approach Brussels for assistance in Darfur, and for advice and help in the process of establishment and training of the African Stand-by Force, which would be African equivalent of the NRF. Altogether, there is quite a demand for militarily transformed and operationally capable NATO, and given the current picture of crises and threats to security, this demand will not disappear in a foreseeable future.

It is worth observing therefore that NATO operations have quite an impact on the relationship with other organizations and institutions. The broader the operational involvement, the clearer the need for closer coordination of all those involved in a given crisis management or response efforts. It is another expression, let's call it 'institutional' or 'external', of the recognition of the necessity of civilian-military coordination and advantages of a comprehensive approach to crisis response operations.

Apart from widely known and obvious cases of cooperation with UN and EU in places like Afghanistan or Kosovo, it was thanks to operation in Afghanistan that NATO started to develop for the first time in its history quite fruitful contacts with the World Bank. Involvement in Afghanistan also prompted the Alliance to undertake efforts aimed at enhancing international cooperation there, without any claims to lead those efforts. Now it is already a routine practice to organize periodically in Brussels meetings of organizations and institutions involved in the efforts to solve Afghan crisis, in

order to exchange information and pave the ground for better coordination.

Finally, operations influence transformation process through the involvement of partner nations. There is not a single NATO operation nowadays without the participation of non-NATO partners. It does help to achieve broader military interoperability, but it also contributes to increasing transparency of both civilian and military structures of the Alliance.

Altogether, the North Atlantic Alliance is changing step-by-step because of its involvement in operations. Those are quite often pragmatic changes, not always reflected in theories and manuals, but going in the same direction as the military transformation.

Transformation and strategic concept – concluding remarks

Whether we like it or not, military transformation is going on. One could venture to say that it is somewhat losing momentum it had a few years ago – it is becoming more fragmented and does not look as a comprehensive and coherent whole, as it is being translated into a series of rather isolated mainly military initiatives.

On the other hand, it is of pivotal importance for the Alliance solidarity and transatlantic cohesion and unity (whenever possible). Military transformation from that point of view has far-reaching political implications and should be considered as an important integrating factor.

It is time-consuming and costly endeavour, not easy to comprehend for non-expert, civilian minds. It is not being presented at the moment to the public opinion as an understandable package of reforms of fundamental significance for the NATO future, but it does continue, even though at a slower pace. There are other urgent priorities on the agenda – operations, partnerships, enlargement – which slightly overshadow grass-roots, longer terms transformational investment requirements.

However, a fundamental question seems to be whether the lack of a new strategic concept, for which the Comprehensive Political

Guidance agreed a few years ago was just a partial remedy, does not actually hamper further development of military transformation? Both in terms of conceptual evolution, as well as in terms of implementation of already accepted standards of transformation.

The risk here is that transformation efforts require strict and clear guidance at the grand strategic level, which is difficult to find outside of somewhat outdated Strategic Concept.

It is true that military transformation is also taking place in a very pragmatic manner, mainly as an internal outcome, or almost side effect of operations and missions. However, such developments have their limits and operational 'lessons learned' would also need to be translated into the language of strategic guidance at some point.

Therefore, the question for the next conference should be either how to bypass the dilemma for transformation posed by the mere lack of new strategic concept, or how to arrive at a new strategic concept in order to give a boost to military transformation.

In an ideal and perfect world, everything I have said so far would have led me to the conclusion that one could expect from the Bucharest Summit a decision to start the work on a new strategic concept, and from the next summit (in Berlin?) – a debate on the first draft of a new strategic concept.

This text represents the personal view of the author.

NATO at the Bucharest Summit as Seen from Central Europe

Istvan Gyarmati, Director of the International Center for Democratic Transition, Budapest

NATO's next Summit meeting will take place in Bucharest in early April. Much attention is paid to several issues that will be discussed at the meeting. The issue that draws the most interest is whether and which countries will be invited to join the Alliance and/or its MAP program. The other theme in the press is President Putin's participation (and in what capacity?). These are important questions.

The first relates to the role the Alliance can still play in stabilizing the former Communist space. Will it be able to finish what started more than a decade ago in the Western Balkans or will that region remain a source of instability and what role, other than offering membership NATO will be able to play?

The enlargement decision is – again – not an 'if', but rather a 'who' question. In addition to Croatia, Macedonia and Albania hope to join, too. There is and will be serious debate, but it is 'only' a matter of timing: unlike the European Union, there is no real enlargement fatigue in the Alliance.

The other issue, NATO's relations with the Russian Federation, is even more difficult and more complicated. Most countries by now recognized that Russia did not become what they hoped it would in the early 90's. Far from it. Instead of becoming a relatively democratic state, which cooperates with the West in most areas, we can witness an increasingly authoritarian (maybe not – yet – totalitarian)

state. A state with an imperialist and aggressive foreign policy destabilizing its surroundings and trying to do the same elsewhere – e.g. in the Balkans – using its ‘*wunderwaffe*’, oil and gas, to increase its influence even in some NATO and EU countries, as well as the other new ‘weapon’ – capital investment, to buy as much of the strategic economies of other countries as possible.

One could say that with the above ‘tools’ Russia is just pursuing its legitimate economic interests. Unfortunately, it is clear that this is not true. First, it is more than suspicious that Russian ‘economic interests’ surface exactly at the same time, that Russian foreign policy is becoming more assertive and aggressive. It is hard to believe in such coincidences. Second, it is very telling when Russia makes mistakes. Let me mention just two. First, a very obvious one. Why is it that Russia is now buying a strategic oil company in Serbia for less than half of the market price at exactly the same time, when it is using its veto power to prevent a Security Council resolution granting independence of Kosovo? What a lucky coincidence! But there is another one, which did not receive so much attention: a Russian private company bought 5% of the shares of Airbus. Other Airbus shareholders became worried: will it mean that the Russians will want a seat on the Board and influence the policy of Airbus? The Russians, of course, immediately made an effort to calm down these worries. The most competent person assured them that the **private** Russian company does not and will not want a seat on the board: President Putin himself spoke for just a private company? Needless to say, too, that this promise was not kept: the Russians just a few months after the Putin statement tried to secure a seat for themselves on the Board.

Or, let’s take a look at Iran. Russia is the main supplier of Iran’s nuclear material needs. Moreover, in clear breach of Security Council resolutions, it supplies Iran with most modern weapons, too. At the same time, hypocritically, it participates in the efforts aimed at preventing Iran’s nuclear weapon capabilities. One should ask: why does the West always buy these tricks? Was it not enough to learn from Stalin’s policy? Do we have to repeat the same mistakes again and again and again?

As a consequence, I believe NATO should rethink its relations to Russia. The NATO-Russia Council was, even in the moment when it

was created, a wrong concept. It supposed that Russia will become more cooperative and more democratic by inclusion. This, however, is a sign of misunderstanding – and I am afraid, for many this misunderstanding stands – the logic behind Russian policy: inclusiveness is a sign of weakness, which must be used and abused to the maximum extent possible. That is what happened in NATO-Russia relations, too, as a ‘result’ of the NATO-Russia Council (by the way: the same goes for Russia’s inclusion in the G7/G8).

The most important issue, however, that should dominate the Summit’s agenda is the future role of NATO. There is some thinking about NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan, which is closely related to the main question, but it is not enough and anyway, I am afraid, it doesn’t and will not go far enough. The real problem is that we cannot or do not want to face the real situation in the world. We do not want to admit that it is more dangerous than it has been for a long time. I am convinced that the danger posed by – what we wrongly call terrorism – is more real and more present than the Communist threat has been – and it will be much more difficult to cope with it.

The problem is, in my opinion, that globalization has reached a stage, when it affects and ‘globalizes’ not only economies, but also socio-political-cultural systems. In other words, if we come to a joint conclusion that economic development in a free market environment – in the long run, in the era of the information society – cannot develop beyond a certain point within a dictatorship, then globalization will enforce the ‘democratization’ of the environment on all countries and regions, which it affects i.e. practically the entire world. Democratization, which is used here as a shorthand of different socio-political system, albeit having certain common features, such as the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, beyond doubt poses a threat to most closed societies. Societies that defend themselves against change, most vehemently – and most violently – are those that have an ideology that gives them the power to bring people together. Not only against change, but also **for** something and these are the most aggressive. Unfortunately, this opposition against change found an ideology in Islamic fundamentalism, which is – we know – a distorted and false interpretation of Islam, which is – we know – used, abused and misused

for political purposes, but which, at the same time – let's recognize and admit it – offers a common platform to the enemies of globalization and democratization.

This combination of being really threatened – even if this 'threat' can lead to a much better life – and the ideology, which is misused for political purposes, is the root cause of terrorism, which at present haunts most countries, democracies and their allies all over the world. It is a very difficult threat to cope with. First, it is not visible. It used to be easy to point at thousands of Soviet warplanes and tanks, at millions of soldiers at arms and tell what the threat was and where it was coming from. It was also relatively easy to find the antidote: tank against tank, warplane against warplane, soldier against soldier. And the whole operation enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of democracies, since the threat was so blatant and so visible. Today it is very different. There is no agreement on the nature of the threat. There is no agreement, where it is coming from. And there is no agreement, how to fight it – or even, if there is a need to fight. It is also a problem of 'political correctness' since opposition against terrorism easily deteriorates into anti-Islam, anti-foreigner, or as a counter reaction, into anti-American sentiments.

The second problem is that, even if the threat is recognized, it is extremely difficult to fight against it. Military force alone cannot do it, but military force is indispensable nevertheless. However, military force must be used very differently. Today's military must be prepared to fight in a network centric war or in the bush, against machetes. And that is far from being enough. We need the entire spectrum of economic, legal, political, financial, diplomatic and other means to take it up with a slight chance for success.

This fight is also, and that is the third problem, closely linked to globalization and democratic change. These changes, however, take a lot of time. Therefore, it is essential to be and remain engaged for years, or maybe decades. But this is not, what democracies and governments in general like to do. It is very difficult to convince governments and to get public support for long, expensive and frequently dangerous engagements far from our borders and, for a long time, without visible success.

This is NATO's most important dilemma, too: if and how to engage in this process? Where to go and where not to go? How to

get the troops? And, even more difficult: how to raise the enormous amounts of money that are needed not only for the military, but for the civilian work that needs to be done? Is NATO really the best suited to cope with this? If we decide it is, how do we reorganize NATO to make it possible for the Alliance to face these problems?

These are questions that have not been answered yet. Nor have they been asked. But these are the questions NATO must and should be able to face, discuss and find answers to. Unfortunately, for several reasons, this is not what NATO does these days. We do not even dare to launch a discussion on NATO's strategy, although we all know the current one is almost irrelevant to current challenges and threats.

We should also discuss how to reestablish the credibility of the Article 5 security guarantee. Article 5 today is not seen – and is not in reality either – as a real, reliable security guarantee that would ensure that states, members of the Alliance could be one hundred per cent sure that they would receive all necessary help from allies, when and where necessary. Under these circumstances, one cannot expect that Member States devote the necessary attention to their contributions to NATO. Therefore, and also, because we do not agree on the threats, most countries do not live up to their possibilities in terms of their contribution to NATO's efforts – and this situation will not change until there is more clarity about the mission and the forces needed.

NATO should also redefine what it wants from member states. Well meant and nice concepts, like NATO's Rapid Reaction Force, do not work and we should seriously analyze, why and draw the necessary conclusions. The same goes for our major operation in Afghanistan: we must seriously think about it. Is it not failing?

Turning to the concrete issues that will feature on the agenda of the Summit, let me start with enlargement. I believe we must reinforce the notion that the enlargement process was a great success. Maybe the second most important achievement of the Alliance after having been able to deal with the Soviet threat during the Cold War. It has – beyond any doubt – contributed to the stabilization of the former Communist space and to democratization of former Communist countries, but has also strengthened the Alliance, not only in military terms, but politically. It also contributed to the

transatlantic commitment of the Alliance in years, when traditional allies were not so enthusiastic about it. The new members – we – have also made the Alliance more sensitive towards the needs and the real interests we have vis-à-vis old and new threats, such as the understanding of the new Russia and the Western Balkans.

It is the reason that I believe further enlargement will do the Alliance much good. The membership of Croatia, Albania and Macedonia will stabilize these countries and the region – although Croatia might not directly need stabilization, but the two others definitely do. It would be important, especially in this historic moment, when the turbulence around Kosovo – which is to a large extent artificially generated by nationalists in Serbia and by Russia – would definitely be curtailed by such a move. It would also be useful to invite Ukraine and especially Georgia to the MAP, since they both deserve and need it, but because it would send a strong signal to Russia that NATO does not allow intimidation and blackmail, while the lack of such a move will signal the exact opposite.

Regarding the future of NATO operations, it was a mistake to declare that the future of NATO depends on the success of the operation in Afghanistan. No operation alone – except in the past, World War Three – can be the sole criteria for success or failure. Especially not, when the situation is as dynamic as it is today. Indeed, we need to succeed in Afghanistan. But what is success? Is what **we** determine as success, also the understanding of the Afghans? Which Afghans? How much does it depend on NATO and how much on others? I think it is much more important to draw, already now, lessons from the operation and as a first step, ask the right questions. Questions such as:

1. Was the decision-making process that led to the NATO operation in Afghanistan correct? Did we assess the consequences right?

2. Is the force generation process sustainable for such operations? Should NATO's defense planning procedure be revised and include somehow the perspective force generation issues? Does the NATO Response Force concept work in real life?

3. Is NATO the right organization to lead an operation, where the non-military component is as important or even more so than the military?

4. How can we deal with the challenge of democratization in such traditional societies? Are extended partnerships useful, e.g. to deal with this problem?

5. What role can the Russian Federation play in handling these issues? Is Russia part of the problem, part of the solution or both? (this is by the way a more general question, too, relating to the role of Russia and how to handle it).

NATO faces a world, where obviously there is more need for such an alliance of democratic nations than ever. But exactly in this situation NATO cannot live up to expectations, not even to the needs. It is not NATO's fault. The reason is that Member States are not able or/and are not ready to seriously face realities and discuss it within NATO, because they partially believe that there can be a more or less free ride and/or they somehow know that the answers would be – or will be – very unpleasant. This is nothing unique. There are other threats and problems that democracies are not ready to face, such as the threat of populist extremism to democracy, the collapse of health care and pension systems, etc. But for NATO this is the major dilemma. We can only hope that NATO, the most successful alliance in history, will be able to reform and become, again, the security institution of choice of democracies.

This text represents the personal view of the author.

The Political Dimension of NATO Transformation

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Minister of Defense, Ladies and Gentleman. I have to start by saying that I have lived in Europe for a long time, but the world is continuously surprising. Today, if I want to hear pro-American rhetoric I go to Paris, and if I want to hear anti-American rhetoric I come to Warsaw. The delights of the world never cease! I want to try to pull the lens back a bit and talk about NATO in a new geo-political context, because some of the discussion about NATO's relevance or lack of relevance has been overtaken by events.

This discussion initially began with considering where NATO was in the 1990s. It was a world that looked very different not only from the Cold War but also from the world that I think we are now living in. That was the time when not only had the Soviet Union collapsed, which was the major strategic reason for NATO, but it was generally assumed in the 1990s, that the whole idea of Great Power conflict was something of the past. It was believed that we had moved into the new era of international relations that would be predominantly shaped around geo-economics not geopolitics. The European Union, for instance, was to be an economic super-power in a world where that was what mattered. More specifically, the kind of XIXth and XXth century competition between Great Powers, was not going to be what the post Cold War world looked like. In addition, after

the fall of communism, most of us agreed with Frank Fukuyama when he wrote about the end of history, by which he meant the end of ideological conflict, the end of any challenge to what was widely accepted, certainly in what we call the West, as the triumph of liberal capitalist democracy over any plausible alternative.

As we look around the world today however, I wonder whether those assumptions have proven correct. And if they have not proven correct maybe we need to reassess what NATO means in this context. Because, in a world that was converging around a common ideology, in a world where the geopolitical competition had essentially ceased, NATO could be said to be scrambling around for a mission. And phrases like 'out of area or out of business' made some sense. But such justifications seem less necessary in a world where we have seen, as I believe we are seeing, a return to a rather traditional pattern of geopolitics, with the rise of numerous Great Powers. Today's great powers include not only Russia but China, India, and Japan to some extent. And the United States never ceased behaving as a Great Power. And what we see is the rise of Great Powers not only in terms of their economic strength, but also increasingly in terms of their military capabilities, and finally in the most traditional sense of having Great Power ambitions. Really, if you think of human history, certainly since the invention of the Nation state, to a great extent the great drama of history has been the clashing ambitions of Great Powers. I think that we are once more in that world again, certainly more than we ever expected to be. In addition, although we do not have any kind of universalistic ideology like communism – the only universalistic ideology that we do have is the enlightenment, liberal, democratic model – nevertheless, I don't think it is possible to say that there are no challenges to this democratic idea and that there are no plausible alternatives, because we see in two of the greatest powers of the world, with well over a billion people among them and possessing the second and third largest military in the world, we now see the entrenched autocracies. Certainly China is an autocracy. It is not a communist government perhaps, but certainly it has all the hallmarks of classic autocracy. Now I think what we see in Russia, that there is no doubt anymore that the system is not fundamentally democratic except for the trappings and what we have is autocratic rule. You can call it

‘putinism’, you can call it ‘tsarism’, etc. One thing has to be said about these autocracies, because I think we tend to underestimate this, is that these autocratic leaders take their autocracies seriously. They believe in autocracy. They are not just ruling because they like to rule, but there is also a conviction that their countries need it. It is not clear to me that majority of people in Russia and China disagrees with this view. Yes there is an autocratic model and it is a model that is attractive to other would-be-autocrats in the world. We have seen throughout history that as the fortunes of one style of government have risen, they tend to be copied around the world. When fascism was prominent in Italy, Spain and Germany in the late 1920s, 30s and 40s, there were little fascist governments cropping up around Latin America, copying that model. When the communist model took hold in the Cold War, all of a sudden you see communist monuments springing up and taking power and seeking support from the large communist powers. When democracy was triumphant, over both fascism and communism, we had an explosion of democratic governments around the world. I think we should expect that if the balance in the world is more even between the great democracies and the great autocracies that a tendency towards autocracy will increase to some extent. At the very least, we should give up our attractive, progressive notion, that the evolution of mankind moves only in one direction consistently, and that an evolution towards a democratic government is inevitable. And this is where I would take exception to what Frank Fukuyama was arguing. It is not inevitable. This brings me way up from there way down to the question of NATO.

If the world is as I described it, and I am sure there are people who would argue with this view, the relevance of NATO needs to be viewed in an entirely different context. Than we are talking about a military, strategic and political Alliance of democracies, operating in a world where geopolitics is relevant, where not only soft power but hard power is relevant – the question of whether you are a democracy or not is relevant. And it seems to me that as we are moving to this return of history, as I would like to call it, it brings back the old cliché that if something like NATO did not exist we would be looking for ways to invent it. I don’t think the issue of NATO is ‘out of area or out of business’, I think that NATO’s relevance, in this

current international situation ought to be very obvious. Now let me just talk a little bit on how we should think about NATO's role in such a world. I must say that listening to Professors Kuźniar's paper and also after some conversations that I had here in Poland for the past couple of days, I am struck by this idea that the job of NATO should be confined to the Article 5 commitment and to the Euro-zone or, at most, to the Transatlantic zone. There is an element to this, which sounds a little bit like the purpose of NATO ought to be to protect Poland. I think we have to be careful about that. By the way, I am very grateful as are all Americans, for the contribution – and it is the most important contribution a country can make to the fighting in Iraq and in Afghanistan. I don't want to minimize that, but when I hear in Poland this discussion 'We are doing these things for you in these messes that you have made. Now what are you going to do for us?' I completely understand that sentiment, and I think that in any kind of Alliance that kind of bargaining goes on. Why should one be in an Alliance that is not serving ones interests? Still, I would like to suggest that there is a danger in pushing that logic too far. Because if all of us, and here I am speaking particularly of the United States, continually took a rather narrow interpretation of what this Alliance was for, if we said only what is in it for us?

I think it would be a big problem. If you went to the American people and said now evaluate the alliance in a very narrow way or even evaluate our Article 5 commitment to Poland in a very narrow way and say what is in it for us. I am not sure that the answer would be the one that we are looking for. Americans have a very broad view of their global responsibilities. That same view of our global responsibility sometimes takes us into places like Vietnam or Iraq. Sometimes it will lead to error, but the overall approach is a very broad and global view of American responsibilities. And it is that same broad and global view of American responsibility, that convinces Americans that one of those responsibilities should be to provide Art. 5 protection to Poland and the Baltics and other countries that our very far away from us. I think it is important to all of us to think not only in terms of narrow interests but to understand that we are all in what we used to call the West or the democratic world. We do have a responsibility to that idea and not only to the protection of our own borders. I was struck by the comment of

Professor Kuźniar and it is written here in the paper, that an overwhelming majority of Member States have no global interests. I wonder if that really can be true. Does Poland have no global interests? I live in Belgium, which arguably has fewer global interests than Poland, but Belgian businesses are involved everywhere in the world. The Belgian economy depends on the global economy. Belgian security depends on a relative level of global security. It doesn't seem to me possible in a modern world to say that a country like Poland has no global interests. There may be some tiny countries with very little interaction with the rest of the world and no global interests, but I don't think that can be said about any nation in Europe. That is why we are part of the NATO Alliance, and that is why I believe NATO has to think not only about Art. 5 protection of the Eurozone but about the general state of security and the well-being of the democratic idea around the world. While we must engage in the often 'sausage-making' quality of going through what it is to make an Alliance like this work, I don't think we should lose sight of the broader mission that we are all engaged in.

This text represents the personal view of the author.

The Political Dimension of NATO Transformation

Prof. François Heisbourg, Chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London and of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Special Advisor, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris

It's an honour to be here in this particular building, in this particular city, which is the embodiment of the tragic dimension of human history but also a symbol of our collective – and the individual Polish – ability to triumph over adversity.

When one talks about NATO I am always reminded of the reply Harold Brown – when he was Secretary of Defence of the United States – would use, back in the early seventies when people were saying: 'NATO is in disarray, NATO is in disarray'. Harold Brown would respond by saying: 'Hell, NATO is in disarray, I have never actually seen it in array'. This is, I think, the nature of the 'Atlantic Beast' which is always changing, transforming, reforming. The fact is, however, that it is facing major challenges and I will walk very quickly through five of them and then say a few words about the specific, French situation.

When I was preparing my remarks I obviously had no possibility of knowing what the Minister of Defence of Poland was going to say. I will begin with the first challenge – picking up from what he said about the defence nature of NATO, as a defence organization. We have a real, major and growing tension and Roman Kuźniar also alluded to it by saying that when something awful happens it will be 'all for one and one for all'. In effect – in business terms – one could

say that NATO is an unlimited liability organization with a geographically limited ambit. On the other hand, it is a combination of an organization operating in the world where the mission determines the coalition, to use Donald Rumsfeld's post-9/11 formula which – as is often the case with Rumsfeld's semantics – actually happens to be true. I can quarrel with his policies but he has always been very good at describing the situation. Add to this the old paradigm: 'out of area or out of business' and indeed NATO has gone out of area. That means that it has become – again, in business terms – a limited liability organization instead of an unlimited liability organization with no geographical limits (as to the scope of its actions) but also no clear understanding as to where the geographical limits of its membership may be, above and beyond what the treaty actually says. And with no presumption therefore of unity of policy or unanimity of action. For example, take Afghanistan, which has become essentially – but not entirely, in my opinion – a NATO operation, yet one in which – as we all know – many NATO members are not actually involved in and other NATO members have a widely differing understanding of what they are supposed to be able to do in Afghanistan. I am referring here to the so-called caveat issue.

Reconciling these two identities of NATO is not impossible, but we will not be able to achieve it if we pretend that they are naturally compatible and that this it will not take a major effort and extreme care to work towards their reconciliation. It is not as simple as walking and chewing gum at the same time. Real world experience tends to show that NATO has been able to reconcile to some extent these two visions but further reconciliation will take very hard work indeed.

The second challenge is of a rather different nature. The question is: what will be the role of NATO in the US-European relationship? And this is a challenge for NATO, not for the US-European relationship. NATO, first of all, has ceased to be pivotal – for very good strategic reasons – in American defence planning. If you look for NATO in the Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) you are not going to find very much of it. The world has changed. NATO is not the mechanism which Europeans or Americans tend to use to deal with the most important issues on which they try to cooperate, be

they China, global warming or Iraq at a time of crisis. This poses a problem of the relevance of NATO. I am not sure this is a big problem for the transatlantic relationship but it could become one if – again – we do not acknowledge that there is a natural tension caused by a convergence in the manner in which we used to handle transatlantic relations – in which NATO was the pivotal organization politically and militarily and the current situation in which it simply is not.

The third challenge, is very traditional not to say classical. I think it has become much less of an issue in terms of principles but rather a problem in terms of implementation. This is the question of the EU-NATO interface. Berlin Plus changes – also in interstate relations – the relationship between France and the United States. This has created a climate and a situation in which I don't think we have a major EU-NATO problem in principle but we do have a real problem in practice. At least one major NATO member is not at all happy in terms of implementing the EU-NATO *modus operandi*: that is Turkey. How we deal with that issue is something we are going to have to look at carefully over the next few months and years.

The fourth challenge – one which I think was implicit in what was said by the Minister of Defence – is the risk that we move into a situation where we have a world vision of the West against the rest, with NATO becoming the embodiment of the West. This brings about a self-fulfilling prophecy: we drift into a *de facto* strategic tension between the 'Western World' and those who do not belong to it. Here I am referring to the way the issue of global NATO which discussed by the RAND Corporation (a few years ago) and other Washington think-tankers (notably from the Democrat side) *i.e.* democracies versus non-democracies. That is a tricky challenge. I don't think we should allow for NATO to become the vehicle of that particular potential polarisation.

A last challenge, which is very traditional within NATO, but not so traditional in the EU – is the burden sharing debate. The burden sharing debate has been with us within NATO literally since the beginning, since the definition of the Lisbon Force Goals back in 1952. And it is still here with us. It has been given more thought of late, for reasons which Roman Kuźniar alluded to and that is because of the divergence of approach between those who consider

that NATO should primarily be threat-driven – the Art. 5 vision if I can put it that way and those who consider that NATO should primarily be capability-driven or the 'mission determines the coalition' approach.

Honestly, if I look at the state of this debate today and the way it was twenty years ago or forty years ago it is a pretty small beer. However, I am moving from what I think is relatively good news to what is rather bad news: the burden sharing debate will begin in an EU context. The EU is developing its role in security and defence and the disparity of efforts between different Member States – who also, mostly, happen to be members of NATO – will become politically much more visible and significant than they have until now. It is a fact that 45% of defence expenditure, 60% of defence equipment expenditure and 80% plus of military research and development expenditure within the EU comes from London and Paris. My critique is not aimed at Poland – a country that takes defence very seriously – nor at other Central and Eastern European and Baltic states. But there are other countries who have not been pulling their weight and this was disregarded politically within the EU. Today ESDP is developing and this issue is becoming politically loaded.

In conclusion a few words on the French debate concerning NATO. There was a major, deliberate attempt back in 1996-1997 to reintegrate France into transforming of NATO. That effort failed essentially because of disagreements on command structure. The French had pretensions to the Southern Command in Naples, Americans were unhappy with that etc.

In those days 1996-1997 the debate about France's full re-entry into the integrated command structure was largely military and secondarily political. We had major interoperability problems, deriving from the fact that we were not involved in NATO Planning and precisely because France at that stage was beginning to participate in real NATO operations which began in the first half of the nineties: the Bosnia operations, subsequently Kosovo operations etc. The fact that we did not have adequate interoperability, the fact that we were operating as a fully integrated member of NATO in military operations but not as a fully integrated member in the planning stage obviously put us and our partners at a difficult

situation due to the Kosovo air war. We were not part of the planning, at least not formally.

So the rationale really was mainly military. That is no longer the case. Through NRF, through our participation in all of NATO's military operations including those which are not of war-like character (like patrolling the Baltics or the defence of the North-Atlantic air space) we – along with other NATO members – are replacing the Americans.

All of this has led to a situation in which our possible re-entry into the Integrated Military Command Structure would not actually be of major military significance.

So the real issue has become political. Will it be good for France to entirely rejoin the Integrated Military Command Structure? Will it be good for NATO? Will this help the relationship with the US? Will this help the relationship with our European partners who are members of NATO? Will it help or hinder our relationship with those countries who are not members of NATO and have become used to us not being a fully integrated member of NATO? And possibly – most importantly – will this help the development of ESDP? It is from this calculus, in my view – and my view is entirely personal – that French decisions will flow in terms of the content and the timing of the decisions concerning our *rapprochement* with NATO.

Is the prospect of *rapprochement* helpful to our relations with the US? Apparently yes... Has this helped move forward the improvement of America's attitude towards the ESDP? The clear answer for the moment is – yes. Recent American statements on ESDP have been very positive.

The second part of the calculus is the relationship with European NATO members towards ESDP. Here there is more suspense. It is not yet entirely clear what stand the United Kingdom – a benchmark country in terms of defence policy and expenditure in Europe – will take. It has not -for the moment at least – given clear signals regarding the development of ESDP.

I would add, that a part of this is a consequence of obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which results in there hardly being any British soldiers involved in ESDP operations. However this is not the result of a deliberate choice. It is a result of *conjuncture*, as the French would put it.

But there is also a more political aspect and that of course is that there is a great debate in Britain about the future nature of Britain's position *vis-a-vis* the EU, the debate about the ratification of the EU Reform Treaty and all this in the midst of an upcoming election. All of this creates a climate in which it is not yet clear whether the British will – as they did in 1997-1998 – move ESDP forward. ESDP would not have happened, had it not been for Tony Blair's historical initiative in 1998. It was called the Blair Initiative at the time – to move together with the French at Saint-Malo, to establish what became the ESDP. The British were there at the creation I am not sure whether they will be here for the maturation, if I can put it that way, of the ESDP. That will, I think, weigh heavily on the French calculus.

Transcript unauthorised by the author.

This text represents the personal view of the author.

A Regional Perspective: A View from Poland

*Witold Waszczykowski, Undersecretary of State,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland*

Next year we will be celebrating the 10th anniversary of the accession of the first Central European countries – Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary – to the North Atlantic Alliance. It will coincide with the 60th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. This will be an opportunity to ponder both the achievements and the future of the Alliance in the dynamically changing international environment. The transformation of the global environment and consequent challenges and threats to allies' security led to the redefining of the geographical distribution of threats and interests of the Alliance. As a result, the Alliance has been subject to an ongoing transformation since the beginning of the nineties.

What appears to be a problem is the dynamics of the changes in the security environment. It constitutes a challenge even for such an efficient structure as NATO. We had barely succeeded in adapting to the changes that the nineties brought about, when the 9/11 terrorist attacks confronted the Alliance with the necessity of being active in entirely new areas and faced us with an unknown opponent. Naturally, this outside pressure generates structural tensions between 'traditional NATO' and the 'NATO of the 21st century' as well as amongst Allies. This due to differences in understanding the role and optimal form of the organisation. There is no doubt however that NATO remains the most efficient and most ambitious security community based on treaty-guaranteed rights to collective defence.

From the point of view of Warsaw and other Central European capitals, NATO remains a major point of reference in forming a security policy, being both a key guarantee of security and a consultation forum. Poland has always been keen on the traditional dimension of NATO's activity – namely that of defensive alliance. This view is justified by our geographical location and historical experience. The guarantee of security, as epitomized by the Alliance, constituted the underlying motivation of Poland to obtain membership in NATO. Today, we wish just as much that this traditional dimension of NATO does not cease to be clearly marked. Without it, the Alliance's internal integrity and appeal to external partners are at stake.

All this does not mean that we are oblivious to the necessity to adapt to an ever-changing security environment or that we do not understand globalisation – or as some put it – a selective globalisation of NATO's role in the international security system. However, we perceive transformation and adaptation as a set of activities performed in parallel in a number of areas, without losing sight of the primary binding agent – the Washington Treaty and Allies' solidarity which it was built upon.

These areas of transformation are as follows: (i) constant development of military – and maybe also civilian – capability in response to changing requirements of effectiveness of operations, (ii) adequate response to new threats, (iii) political adaptation, expressed in the 'Open Door' and NATO partnership policies.

Ad (i) – in terms of out-of-area operations, Poland and other countries of the region have been constantly giving evidence of their commitment. Examples range from the Balkans including a key operation in Kosovo, to Afghanistan. These countries contribution, when compared to their economic capacity, is very often much higher than that of the so-called 'old' members of the Alliance. The principle of solidarity, which is a key factor of success in operationally difficult regions, is treated very seriously in our part of Europe. The Alliance is also in need of a strategic, long-term vision of its commitment in Afghanistan. Such a vision would help the wider public realize the importance of the operations in Afghanistan for security both in that part of the world and the whole Euro-atlantic region. It is also essential to make Afghans

aware of the goal of our operations, which is to hand the responsibility for the country over to its citizens as soon as it is possible. Central European countries are particularly sensitive to the plight of the nations fighting against the regime and its consequences.

Ad (ii) the Alliance must be ready to take a broader perspective on the challenges and threats, based on a realistic assessment which will however reach beyond current problems. New challenges include among others: energetic and cybernetic security and the development of anti-missile defence systems. The Bucharest summit will be of vital importance in terms of the Alliance's potential to respond to new challenges. It is meaningful that these issues are most fervently supported by NATO new members from Central Europe. We can venture a statement that our countries are bearing the weight of the dynamic transformation in the face of new challenges.

Ad (iii) since joining NATO, Poland has been one of the countries supporting the idea of the continuation of the 'Open Door' policy. We are confident that this policy plays a crucial part in extending the zone of stability and security in the whole Euro-atlantic region. Ever enlarging NATO is a bearer of commonly shared democratic values and a catalyst of internal change. We expect the Bucharest summit to confirm the importance of the 'Open Door' policy by inviting all three countries involved in cooperation within MAP to begin accession talks. These countries are: Albania, Croatia and Macedonia.

After the current candidate countries have been invited to the round of pre-accession negotiations, the door to NATO shall remain open. Therefore we believe that the decision to invite Ukraine and Georgia to MAP should be made at the Bucharest summit. It would give impetus to the process of national reforms in these countries.

As regards NATO enlargement, we could always rely on our Central European allies' support and collaboration. Together we are stronger – therefore it is important for us that our partners from the region support the decision to include Ukraine and Georgia in MAP already in Bucharest. Our countries have a particular responsibility to emphasize at each opportunity that decisions on enlargement of Euro-atlantic structures shall always be a sovereign choice of NATO

members, and not a form of calculated settlement with third countries.

The issue of security of Central European states is not reduced to NATO. Nowadays, the Alliance is not able to tackle the challenges single-handedly. Strategic cooperation with the European Union is essential. We do not feel at ease in the present situation, characterised by a lack of dialogue and frequent rivalry. We do not comprehend this. However, we are not at the source of the problem. We will nevertheless continue to act, both on an individual and collective basis, in order to break the deadlock. Parallel involvement of both institutions in international operations – in Kosovo and Afghanistan, among others – requires us to adopt this approach.

Relations between the Alliance and Russia are of core significance to Poland and its neighbours. NATO, or to be more specific, the NATO-Russia Council, is a great platform for discussing a whole spectrum of difficult issues related to security policy. We strongly believe that it is necessary to reinforce a pragmatic and strategic dimension of cooperation between NATO and Russia in order to ensure regional and global security.

Central European States which have already participated in NATO's work, operations and transformation process, have proven that they are mature and reliable allies. In spite of the fact that these countries do not constitute a clearly separate group of interests in NATO, and their stance on some matters is not unanimous, they share a similar sensitivity to certain issues and an affinity in the field of security. Common causes definitely include: a traditional perception of NATO as a defensive alliance, the continuation of the enlargement process, including integration aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia, compatibility and consistency between the actions of NATO and EU, as well as the control of armament and disarmament, directly affecting the security interests of the region.

Some degree of unanimity in terms of security opens up the avenue for further cooperation in this field among the countries of the region. We would like to make use of this potential in the course of the forthcoming presidency of Poland in the Visegrad Group.

A Regional Perspective: A View from Lithuania – Rebalancing NATO

Renatas Norkus, Undersecretary for Policy and International Relations, MOD, Vilnius

I would like to start by suggesting that **there is a growing common understanding among a good number of NATO countries that we in the Alliance need to have a fresh look at rebalancing NATO functions.** Bucharest Summit offers us an opportunity to address this issue at the highest level. To illustrate the demand of NATO rebalance I shall use the concept of three concentric circles described by five prominent generals in their recent study defining the short and long term security agendas for our Alliance.

The first circle is a NATO treaty area or let it be called **‘NATO homeland’**. Collective defence and protection of our population is the most important element of ‘NATO homeland’. **The second circle** encompasses a wider area of **NATO partnerships (Pfp, NUC, NRC, ICI, MD), including aspirant countries.** It is **‘NATO neighbourhood’**. ‘NATO neighbourhood’ is the area of strategic NATO interests and is closely related to the ‘NATO homeland’. **NATO operation in Afghanistan and initiatives of global partnerships** belong to the third circle, which is an outer stability area – **‘NATO periphery’**. All three inter-dependent circles define what NATO is and what NATO is doing.

Almost twenty years ago, when Francis Fukuyama declared the end of history and the final triumph of Western liberal democracies over authoritarian ideologies – communism, fascism or other forms

of absolutism, the **main NATO function was to protect its homeland**. When Central and Eastern European countries applied for NATO membership, the **allies were debating on strategy in NATO neighbourhood**. NATO involvement in the Balkans and decisions on enlargement made in Prague embodied the increasing NATO role in the neighbourhood. Finally, when we became full-fledged members of the Alliance, in Istanbul Summit, allies took the responsibility to engage in Afghanistan. **Thus the geopolitical balance of NATO functions shifted towards ‘NATO periphery’**.

There is no doubt that **this shift facilitated the process of enlargement and allowed allies to redefine the practical *raison d’être* of the Alliance**. The answer to the question ‘Why do we need the alliance after the Cold War?’ has been found. We need an instrument to manage the regional crises as it was and still is in the Western Balkans and a tool to cope with the newly emerged global threats as it is in Afghanistan. In the words of former NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson, ‘We must go to Afghanistan or Afghanistan will come to us’. It is widely agreed that Afghanistan has become a test for the transformed NATO and the success or failure in this country may be critical for the future of the Alliance. Thus it is not a surprise that allies in the Central and Eastern Europe have substantially contributed to NATO’s operation in Afghanistan. Lithuania, which is leading PRT in Ghowr province and devotes almost ten percent of defence budget for this contribution, is a good example.

On the other hand, **NATO agenda has become overloaded** by operational issues and long debates about force generation. NATO summits in Istanbul, Brussels and Riga were focusing on Afghanistan or as I called it ‘NATO periphery’. The issues related to NATO homeland and to smaller extent – NATO neighbourhood – remained behind the scenes. Nevertheless, the questions ‘How can we better protect our populations?’, ‘How can we increase NATO visibility in Europe?’ and ‘How can we better promote stability in our neighbourhood?’ still needs to be answered. Otherwise, it may become very difficult to convince our publics to support NATO operations in distant places like Afghanistan and pay the high price of our commitments.

Indeed, we sense an increased interest and political willingness to find an appropriate niche at NATO for newly emerged threats such as disruption of the flows of vital resources and cyber attacks. **We expect Energy security and Cyber defence will be among key deliverables in Bucharest.** They would rightly accentuate the role of the Alliance in protecting ‘NATO homeland’. While the consensus on cyber defence policy has been emerging, discussions on energy security and NATO’s role in this field is still met with cold attitude if not reluctance by some allies.

To sum up: Bucharest summit offers us a good opportunity to rebalance the functions of the Alliance by strengthening its role in NATO homeland and NATO neighbourhood. Certainly, Bucharest will not become a final step in this process. These goals may and will remain key principles in our agenda beyond the Bucharest, including the eventual review of NATO strategic concept.

Let me end up by citing Minister Sikorski, who so eloquently said in his recent address in Munich Security conference: ‘The further NATO goes beyond its treaty area into troubled regions, the stronger the need for solidarity both within and without the Alliance.’

Summary and Conclusions

*Dr. Jerzy M. Nowak, Center for International Relations,
former Poland's Ambassador to NATO*

&

*Ambassador Adam Kobieracki, former NATO Assistant Secretary
General for Operations, Warsaw*

Political dimension of NATO transformation

1. The debate has reconfirmed two basic assumptions: **first**, that 'there is no alternative to NATO' and that the Alliance continues to be the primary instrument of the security and defence policy of its members; **second**, that dynamic changes of the security environment constitute a constant challenge to the Organization and generate questions regarding its relevance. Differences of views and – at times – heated discussions on the latter were considered a normal state of affairs within the Alliance of democratic and equal States.

2. New threats, risks and challenges have redefined their geographical location and modified the understanding of the interests of the Alliance. Among well known challenges (asymmetric threats, fallen states, cyber terrorism, energy supplies), particular attention was given *inter alia* to the **following strategic problems**:

- Decreased role of NATO *vis-à-vis* US-European relations ('NATO is neither a prime mover nor a pivotal organization for both'), differences of security perceptions in America and Europe;
- EU-NATO relations and stalemate; Turkey's dissatisfaction with the *modus operandi* of cooperation between the two Orga-

nizations; the necessity of serious efforts and political will which are essential to creating a solid EU-NATO partnership;

– The risk that the interest of the Alliance in the state of democracy in the world may produce a perception – in particular in Moslem countries – that NATO is a ‘vehicle for East-West polarization’; in this context warnings were raised to avoid anti-Islamic rhetoric;

– The Russian concept of the *concert of great powers*, which may lead to the danger of the ‘return to the policy of zones of influence’ and Russian ‘logic to treat openness as a proof of weakness’; it was strongly emphasized that NATO does not threaten Russia;

– NATO’s possible role in the face of the ‘return to great power rivalries and conflicts of autocracies vs. democracies’; although the existence of such phenomena was not questioned, it was emphasized that it should not mean the return to the well known pattern of two ideological camps. There were warnings that there should be no option for the militant roll-back of autocracies; NATO should protect the security and strategic interests of the ‘West’ (this term should be redefined again) in the new world security order;

– Geographical range of national interests of individual Allies vs. global NATO engagement; a view that most of the Allies have limited or no global interests at all has been questioned on the grounds that being members of the Alliance they undertake not only regional but also global responsibilities;

– Structural tensions between ‘traditional Alliance’ and ‘21st century NATO’ concepts and divergent views on the role and optimal shape of the Alliance. They should be subject of constant dialogue and pragmatic decisions in the process of the Alliance’s transformation.

The above strategic challenges should be taken into consideration at the Bucharest Summit, even if they are not formally included into its agenda. Instead of debating on NATO’s relevance, a pragmatic reply should be given to the simple question: what needs to be done to make this Organization more effective?

3. There was a strong expectation that the Bucharest Summit will initiate the work on the **new strategic concept**, using Comprehensive Political Guidance, which should take on board implications of the rapidly changing security environment and up-to-date experi-

ences with NATO operations and missions. It is time to end the practice of 'strategy without concept'.

As to the differences among Allies on the course of the operation and responsibilities in **Afghanistan**, it was pointed out to the fact that NATO is divided rather on tactics and not on strategy and that application of the solidarity and partnership principles is indispensable to overcome difficulties. Everything should be done to avoid the danger of a 'two-tiered' Alliance in this context.

Burden sharing has been recognized as one of the difficult issues of NATO transformation, which is relevant to the discussion whether the Alliance should be driven mainly by capabilities or by the requirements of Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty. It was stressed that the need for more even burden sharing applies to both capabilities as well as to the scale of actual involvement in NATO operations and missions.

A possibility of the **French return to NATO's military structure** was welcomed politically (helpful in the US-France relations, possibility to convince Washington to the usefulness of ESDP), although there was a view that it will not be of major significance from a military viewpoint, having in mind French participation in NATO operations and NRF.

A suggestion appeared that a new version of the **Harmel Report** might be useful to push forward a new strategic deal on NATO transformation, having in mind that NATO is on the strategic crossroads similar to those from the times of that Report.

4. The expectations of the Bucharest Summit have been realistic. There are hopes that the meeting will initiate the next wave of enlargement, give positive impulses to the operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo and decide on the perspectives of the Berlin Summit in 2009.

Military dimension of NATO transformation

1. There was an uncontested view that the **military transformation** of the Alliance – even though it is still progressing – is **clearly slowing down**. No one denied the fundamental importance of the transformation and its focus on capabilities, as opposed to threat-

based scenarios, which in the past constituted the starting point for NATO defence planning. However, concerns were raised to the effect that not all transformational objectives are being achieved and that the entire process is actually losing the coherence and the clear sense of strategic direction it had at its inception.

2. It was highlighted that **transformation is of pivotal importance for both operations** and NATO missions in their entirety. It encompasses technology, interoperability and entire 'military culture'. Efforts in the fields of modernization of armed forces, acquisition of new military capabilities, reform of military command structure and the evolution of military doctrines were praised. However, these efforts are becoming more and more fragmented, they are being seen as isolated steps and initiatives, presented to politicians and public opinion neither in an understandable way nor in a comprehensive manner. Thus, they look too abstract and technical for non-experts.

3. **The contribution of Allied Command Transformation** to the process of transformation was recognized, both in the context of making armed forces more expeditionary, as well as in the evolution of military operational doctrines, based on a comprehensive approach to operations and thus covering military, civilian, economic and other aspects.

4. It was stressed that there is a clear **interaction between military transformation and ongoing NATO operations**. Allies participating in operations modernize their armed forces much faster and in a very pragmatic manner. On the other hand, a reluctance on the part of other Allies to obtain expeditionary capabilities was attributed *inter alia* to specific national threat assessments, legal limitations, historical reasons, financial constraints.

5. At a general level, **military transformation seems to face three basic problems**: money (lack of sufficient budgetary resources and national reluctance to increase defence spending), time (long gap between the moment of decision on e.g. acquisition of a new capability and its final implementation) and the absence of a clear, simple and comprehensive concept for military transformation.

At the same time, it was widely recognized that this transformation is of utmost importance also for NATO relations with partners, both nations and organizations, like the UN or the EU.

6. At a more specific level, the **following military problems facing NATO** in the context of transformation were discussed:

- lack of preparedness to deal with asymmetric threats;
- problems with force generation for operations resulting in the situation, under which military commanders have to conduct operations below the level of Minimum Military Requirements;
- difficulties with the development and actual use of NATO Response Force;
- the fact that NATO command structure is not prepared and configured to conduct operations;
- delays in operational standardization, internationalizing logistics and acquisition of new capabilities.

7. It was recommended during the discussion that at a military level the **reform of command structure** must continue, the new military strategic concept has to be developed, so called deployability targets for armed forces should be met, the NRF concept could be reconsidered and the idea of establishing multinational units, including those with the participation of partners, has to be pursued.

8. From the specific **Polish perspective** it was stressed that a proper balance should be kept between expeditionary and non-expeditionary units. The wisdom of setting up military units designed exclusively to deal with stabilization and reconstruction tasks was questioned. Poland is clearly interested in all transformational initiatives dealing with cyber and energy security. Polish armed forces will soon meet deployability targets and as a whole are ready even now for the entire spectrum of possible military missions.

9. It was also pointed out during the discussion that pragmatism and realism should be among guiding principles of transformation and that the NATO level of ambition could be reviewed. Looking at NATO targets for armed forces one should keep in mind that nations also have other commitments. Military capabilities must continue to be nationally owned and their development has to be coordinated between the Alliance and the EU.

10. Overall, there was a general feeling that the best recipe for speeding up transformation would be to start to work on a new NATO **strategic concept** as early as at the Bucharest Summit, as

such a development would put military transformation in a clear strategic context, securing its direction, coherence and comprehensiveness.

Central European allies before Bucharest summit

1. It was recalled that the 9th anniversary of the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to NATO (12 March) facilitates the reflection on the role of the states of the region within the Alliance and nature of their expectations before the Bucharest Summit, which is the third in a row to take place in the former Warsaw Pact countries.

2. While there was a concordance of views that Central Europeans (notion by which Baltic States are also included) do not have separate from other Allies basic security interests, there was also an understanding that they may have different **sensitiveness, regional perspectives and expectations**, in particular:

- a strong attachment to the classical and traditional concept of the Alliance (Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty – collective defence), which does not exclude a creative and dynamic approach to NATO transformation; the latter is understood as a permanent adaptation to the new environment (including enlargement process and development of partnership concept), undertaking adequate reaction to new threats and challenges, development of proper military capabilities (including expeditionary ones) – everything without losing sight of primary obligations stemming from the Washington Treaty; ‘the Alliance should strengthen its role in NATO homeland and NATO neighbourhood’;

- two principles were particularly underscored: that of ‘equal security’ (including in its geographical meaning) and ‘solidarity’, which is indispensable for the successful running of the NATO missions and operations and formulating common responses to new challenges;

- the desire to contribute to the strengthening of the EU-NATO and Trans-Atlantic link, harmonization of the US and European security interests, including American presence on the continent; Central European states are in a particularly uncomfortable situation in the midst of frequent manifestations of rivalry and the absence of dialogue and cooperation.

– a vigorous, careful but at the same time an ‘open door policy’ *vis-a-vis* the Balkan States. Granting Ukraine and Georgia MAP status, and creating perspectives to other countries which may wish to join the Alliance and comply with the principle that NATO is a performance based Organization; the knowledge and empathy towards the ‘kin’ countries of the region is an asset for the Alliance. There is a general expectation that Bucharest will likely be an enlargement Summit.;

– engagement in arms control measures, in particular CFE regime and means to increase mutual transparency, in particular in relations with the Russian Federation;

– understanding of vital character of relations with Russia; a cohesive and cautious approach to the new policy of the resurgent Russian Federation is considered indispensable; at the same time they are willing to search for balance between policy of inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness on the one hand and a need to react to post-imperial tendencies on the other. NATO-Russia Council should be used as a useful vehicle to strengthen strategic and pragmatic dimension of NATO-Russia cooperation.

3. There was an understanding that all these sensitivities resulting from historical experience and common destiny may have a constructive contribution to working out the tactics and the strategy of the Alliance and its intellectual *acquis*. What is more Central European allies participating actively in NATO operations, transformation and every-day activities have already **proven their political maturity and credibility**, developing a constructive identity in security matters. States of the region have a legitimate right to pursue their national interests within the Alliance, without resorting to forming any sub-regional group of pressure, in accordance with common values and obligations. Proper care should be taken that national interests are not narrowly and rigidly interpreted and well harmonized with those of other Allies.

4. As to the possibility of the **American third site anti-ballistic system** being installed on the territories of the Czech Republic and Poland, there was a clear feeling that it would be helpful to link it with the NATO missile defence systems. There is an expectation that Bucharest Summit may reflect it in a proper way.

Overall discussions at the Conference proved that the Alliance is faced with a number of fundamental questions and dilemmas – some of them of strategic impact – which should be addressed at the Bucharest Summit Meeting, even if all of them will not be resolved there. Due to the agenda of the Warsaw Conference, and its rather long term focus, current operational issues were addressed within the strategic context only.

**International Conference
NATO SUMMIT 2008
Transforming NATO – Polish and Regional Perspective**

**Royal Castle in Warsaw
Thursday, 13 March 2008**

**9:00 – 9:20 Bogdan Klich – Minister of National Defence,
Poland – Opening Remarks**

9:20 – 11:00 Political Dimension of NATO Transformation

The Alliance's role in providing security to its members, search for effective measures to counter major new risks and challenges to security: ways and means to build solidarity in promoting sustainability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond – through cooperation with partners (EU in particular) and through enlargement; strategy for the future, in particular on harmonizing Euro-Atlantic interests; other NATO functions and activities.

MODERATOR: Eugeniusz Smolar, President, Center for International Relations

– **Prof. Roman Kuźniar**, University of Warsaw, Advisor to the Minister of National Defence, Poland

– **Prof. François Heisbourg**, Chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London and of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Special Advisor, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris

– **Dr. Robert Kagan**, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington – Brussels

11:00 – 11:30 Coffee Break

11:30 – 13:00 Military Dimension of NATO Transformation

A desired direction of military transformation; development of military capabilities (including burden sharing), military aspects of the on-going stabilizing and crisis response operations and missions, in particular in Afghanistan (including the solidarity challenge).

MODERATOR: Ambassador Adam Kobieracki, former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations, Warsaw

– **General Franciszek Gągor**, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces

– **Rear Admiral Jorgen Berggrav**, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Representative in Europe, SAC-TREPEUR, NATO HQ, Brussels

– **General Stefan Czumur**, Deputy Military Representative of Poland to NATO and the EU Military Committee, Brussels

– **Colonel Philippe Montocchio**, Head of Atlantic Alliance Department, Strategic Affaires Delegation, Ministry of Defence of France

13:00 – 14:00 Lunch

14:00 – 14:45 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General of NATO – Keynote Speech and Questions & Answers Session

14:45 – 16:15 Poland and Central European States before the NATO Summit

Central European Member States before the Bucharest Summit: specific interests, concerns and expectations, approach to the enlargement of NATO.

MODERATOR: Ambassador Jerzy M. Nowak, former amb. to NATO, CIR

– **Witold Waszczykowski**, Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland

– **Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati**, Director, International Center for Democratic Transition, Budapest

– **Renatas Norkus**, Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Defense of Lithuania

16:15 – 16:30 Stanisław Jerzy Komorowski, Undersecretary of State, Ministry of National Defence, Poland

Closing Remarks



CENTRUM STOSUNKÓW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CIR is an independent, non-governmental think-tank, dedicated to the study of international relations and those foreign policy issues, which are of crucial importance to Poland, Europe and transatlantic relations. CIR carries out its own research projects, prepares reports and analyses and participates in international projects in cooperation with similar institutions in several countries.

CIR has become an influential forum for foreign policy analysis and debate, involving hundreds of leading politicians, diplomats, civil servants, local government officials, academics, students, journalists and representatives of other NGO's.

OUR GOALS ARE:

– to strengthen a Polish 'foreign policy community', involving politicians, civil servants, diplomats, scholars, business people and journalists, who influence the thinking about foreign affairs in Poland and abroad,

– to deepen the knowledge of international relations in Polish society,

– to influence the understanding of the goals of Polish foreign policy among the political and diplomatic elites in other countries as well as to make Polish leaders aware of foreign policy objectives of other countries.

Our main fields of activity in 2007/2008 included:

- The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU,
- EU's Eastern Policy incl. the European Neighborhood Policy of the European Union,
- The ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty of the EU,
- Transatlantic Relations,

- Transatlantic Trends – presentation and debate over GMF US annual research,
- The changing role of NATO and transformation of the Alliance,
- Monitoring the political situation in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine – from the internal and foreign policy point of view of these countries, including relations with the EU, NATO and the USA,
- Bilateral relations of EU and NATO member-states with Russia and their significance for Poland and Europe,
- Poland’ energy security,
- The role and influence of Central and Eastern European countries in NATO and the EU,
- Transnational migrations, their influence on the European labour market and internal security,
- Transatlantic internal security agenda and dilemmas for European migration policy.

We acknowledge with gratitude that many CIR’s projects have been sponsored over the years by:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Poland, The European Commission, The Ford Foundation, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, The Robert Bosch Stiftung, The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, The Polish-German Cooperation Foundation and many others.

Janusz Reiter, former ambassador to Germany and the USA founded the Center in 1995 and was its head for ten years. Following his appointment as an ambassador to the USA, Mr. **Eugeniusz Smolar was nominated the new President** in October 2005. **CIR’s vice-presidents** are: **Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz**, former minister of defence and former vice-president of the European Parliament, at present Vice-Chairman of its Foreign Relations Committee and **Professor Jerzy Kranz**, former Ambassador to Germany.

CIR experts often appear in Polish and foreign media as commentators on current affairs.

The Center’s reports, analysis and other publications are available on our website: www.csm.org.pl.



Opening of the Conference by Mr. Bogdan Klich – Minister of National Defence of Poland

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer – Secretary General of NATO





FIRST PANEL: Political Dimension of NATO Transformation: R. Kagan, E. Smolar, F. Heisbourg, R. Kuzniar

An American Perspective: Robert Kagan & Eugeniusz Smolar





SECOND PANEL: Military Dimension of NATO Transformation: F. Gągor, A. Kobieracki, J. Berggray, S. Czumur

THIRD PANEL: Poland and Central European States before the NATO Summit: R. Norkus, J.M. Nowak, W. Waszczykowski, I. Gyarmati





Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in conversation with Konstantin Kavtaradze, Georgian Ambassador to Poland



